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This dissertation argues that theories of collaborati n in rhetoric and composition 
studies have for too long relied on social constructionist epistemology to explain what 
collaboration is and how it works, resulting in a widespread, if not tacit reluctance on the 
part of instructors to encourage collaboration in the teaching of writing that goes beyond 
various forms of group work and peer-review. In an attempt to recover and renew the 
values of collaboration, I suggest that it can be re-conceptualized ethically as a discursive 
relationship collaborators foster with one another to invent discourse that transgresses 
and transforms the limits of what individuals are able to articulate alone. Moreover I use 
the rhetorical canon of invention to explain why social constructionist epistemology is 
incapable of theorizing collaboration other than as a “ tyle” of doing work. I draw upon 
the tradition of classical American pragmatism, along with the more contemporary work 
of language philosopher Donald Davidson and other externalist theorists to theorize the 
techné of collaboration, which I argue manifests in the habits of dialogue collaborators 
foster to engage its inventive work. Finally, I explain how such a re-conceptualization of 
collaboration informs the pedagogical possibilities of post-process composition theory, 
which has waned in recent years for its lack of pedagogical articulation. 
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PREFACE 
 
 
ON EUREKA, SLOW HUNCHES, AND THE ORIGINS OF INNOVATION 
 
 
“The trick is to figure out ways to explore the edgs of possibility that surround you.” 
    - Steven Johnson, Where Good Ideas Come From (41) 
 
 
In his newest book Where Good Ideas Come From, the popular science writer Steven 
Johnson takes what he calls a “long-zoom” approach to understand how creativity gives 
birth to innovation. Rather than rely on individual c se studies and inductive speculation, 
Johnson identifies patterns of innovation that only become visible when looked at 
macroscopically. One of these patterns, what he calls “the adjacent possible,” speaks to 
how good ideas are never the product of isolated moments of creativity, that even if we 
credit certain breakthroughs to particular individuals, there is always an environment 
within which these breakthroughs emerged, an enviroment in which the individuals 
were only a part. Put in different terms, the provebial “light bulb” that sparks with 
electricity in a moment of eureka has to gets its power from somewhere. Nothing gets 
created out of thin air. For Johnson, the adjacent possible names the conditions of 
constraint that at any given time limit feasibility. It denotes the myriad limitations—
conceptual, physical, and technological—that constrain and, in a way, direct how we 
think. If the world is capable of change, the adjacent possible reminds us to keep our eyes 
on the horizon.  
To say all of this differently, we cannot transgress the boundaries of the adjacent 
possible because the adjacent possible marks our perceptual limits at any given time. 
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Instead we must adjust our perspectives—how we see the world—to manipulate the 
perceptual borders of the adjacent possible itself. “The strange and beautiful truth about 
the adjacent possible is that its boundaries grow as you explore those boundaries,” writes 
Johnson. “Each new combination ushers new combinatio s into the adjacent possible” 
(31). Johnson suggests that we can study the history of great inventions and innovations 
through the lens of the adjacent possible, through an examination of the environments 
that made certain kinds of novelty possible. One example he offers is the story of 
YouTube, the fantastically popular website started by three former PayPal employees 
who launched the site in 2005. “Had [Chad] Hurley, [Steve] Chen, and [Jawed] Karim 
tried to execute the exact same idea for YouTube ten years earlier, in 1995, it would have 
been a spectacular flop, because a site for sharing video was not within the adjacent 
possible of the early Web” (39). For example, Interet users were constrained to slow 
dial-up connections incapable of streaming video content with any modicum of 
efficiency, but in 2005 this was no longer the case. “Another key to YouTube’s early 
success,” Johnson adds, “is that its developers were able to base the video serving on 
Adobe’s Flash platform, which meant that they could focus on the ease of sharing and 
discussing clips, and not spend millions of dollars developing a whole new video 
standard from scratch. But Flash itself wasn’t released until late 1996, and didn’t even 
support video until 2002” (40). Without high-speed Internet and an easily adaptable Flash 
video platform, in other words, YouTube probably wouldn’t exist.  
The point Johnson makes with his explanation of the adjacent possible is that good 
ideas don’t spring eternal from some transcendent ether. Nor is innovation really ever the 
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result of private genius. To understand how good ideas become good ideas, we have to 
understand the ecology out of which they develop. While it is impossible to trace the 
development of ideas as ideas with an engineer’s accuracy, the takeaway for Johns n is 
nevertheless straightforward: innovation can be explained. We might need concepts like 
“the adjacent possible” to aid in these explanations, but certainly we need not rely on the 
magic of Archimedes’s bathtub insight to imagine how innovation works.   
To put this glibly, there is no magic to conger inve tion. Eureka has no metaphysics.  
Of course, rhetoricians have known this for over two millennia. To learn the arts of 
invention, orators were trained using topoi, those “places” of argument where one could 
locate the materials to construct effective enthymemes. Whether argumentative 
procedures or topical commonplaces, the topoi were never conceptualized as mystical 
sources of invention; they represented trails of thught already blazed by the experience 
and deliberation of others. What could be considere a “good” idea had to first be 
recognizable within a rhetorical space appropriate for its delivery. These kinds of spaces 
don’t magically emerge; orators craft them drawing o  the available means of persuasion; 
they utilize the tools already available to them.  
As a rhetorician and a pragmatist, I read Johnson’s book heuristically, which is to say 
I believe crafting theory to understand innovation, r any concept for that matter, is 
valuable insofar as it helps us to expand some aspect of “the adjacent possible” in our 
own thinking. In other words, the benefits of theory can be measured according to 
heuristic application—how well it informs our attempts to think productively in the 
abstract. Interestingly, the terms “heuristic” and “eureka” share a similar etymology, both 
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dependent on the Greek stem meaning “to find,” yet today they get invoked in vastly 
different contexts. Heuristics are conventionally understood as reasoned, systematic 
procedures utilized methodologically in the service of problem-solving, whereas eureka 
is for many people the echo of stumbled upon insight or the catchphrase of accidental 
genius. One is rhetorical, rooted in the world of topical relationships while the other is 
metaphysical, nothing more than romance and lazy curiosity.  
Johnson’s book takes the phenomenon of eureka (originally spelled heureka) and 
examines it through heuristic metaphors. He “invents” the idea of the adjacent possible—
an idea, by the way, very similar to Lev Vygotsky’s notion of ZDP (zone of proximal 
development) as well as Paulo Freire’s notion of “untested feasibility”—to demystify the 
metaphysics so often ascribed to innovation. Another heuristic Johnson crafts to explain 
the origins of innovation is the “slow hunch,” those ideas that are only really fragments of 
ideas and take years, maybe even decades or centuries to actualize into usable insight. 
“Sustaining the slow hunch,” explains Johnson, “is less a matter of perspiration than of 
cultivation. You give the hunch enough nourishment to keep it growing, and plant it in 
fertile soil, where its roots can make new connections. And then you give it time to 
bloom” (78). Johnson observes that all good ideas benefit from other good ideas. How to 
cultivate a slow hunch, then, is to fertilize it with more of the same. But this never 
happens in isolation. When we work alone, Johnson notes, ideas get trapped and thinking 
stymied, and thus “the most productive tool for generating good ideas remains a circle of 
humans at a table, talking shop” (61). Indeed, if one argument stands above all the others 
in Where Good Ideas Come From, it is that good ideas are always borne out of colle tive 
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inquiries. Whether through deliberate collaboration, borrowed inventions, stumbled upon 
partnerships, shared insight, careful feedback, or some combination thereof, innovation is 
never a private affair. 
For teachers and theorists of language and writing, he same principle holds true. In 
fact in the late 1970s and early 1980s the discipline of rhetoric and composition studies 
embraced the idea of collaboration as a central ethic in its understanding of how effective 
writers develop both within and without the spaces of formal instruction. Call it a kind of 
slow hunch, but theorists in writing studies began co ceptualizing the generative capacity 
of collaboration as both a theory and a teaching practice. When in 1984 Kenneth Bruffee 
published his seminal essay “Collaboration and the ‘Conversation of Mankind’” in 
College English, the adjacent possible for welcoming the idea of collaboration into our 
professional discourses was ripe with potential and, in fact, for the next decade scholars 
in rhetoric and composition used critical lenses to examine the idea of collaboration to 
assess both the virtues and vices of how this concept was getting articulated into the 
disciplinary frameworks of composition. Indeed, when one reads early articles about 
collaboration’s role in the teaching of writing, there is an obvious tension balancing 
inquiry into what collaboration is and how it works alongside pedagogical articulations 
about how best to “do” collaboration in practice and what it means to name collaboration 
as such.  
As I will argue over the course of this dissertation, the slow hunches about 
collaboration that scholars in composition studies started to articulate thirty years ago 
never connected in ways that could substantially expand the adjacent possible of how 
x 
 
humanists and other academics envisioned the work of invention and innovation—what I 
call novelty—in the study of writing. In fact, collaboration as such is today little more 
than a corporate buzzword, while on the academic front it at best names a vague ethic for 
cooperation while at worst it denotes a negative quality to our habits of work, which is to 
say that too much collaboration does not bode well for tenure and promotion. 
Collaboration is, after all, not near as rigorous as “individual” work and thus it should not 
count as much. At least this is the conventional wisdom. But we should not be too quick 
to condemn the myopic policies about collaboration hat inform the work of many P&T 
committees because as a whole we embrace the same polici s (if you want to call them 
that) in the ways we approach our teaching practices. That is to say, many of us have not 
been willing to pragmatically reject the romantic notion of individual genius (e.g., 
“performance”) in how we teach and assess our studen s. This is especially true in 
composition studies, which is ironic considering that ours was one of the first fields to 
expansively incorporate collaboration into our disciplinary rhetorics and pedagogical 
philosophies.    
In a way I wish to call this dissertation a slow hunch, one that I have been trying to 
realize for several years. The ideas I develop in these pages—which, as you will see, are 
merely adaptations of borrowed ideas—have benefited from the collisions and 
connections I’ve been able to exploit in my attempt to expand the adjacent possible of 
collaboration in composition studies. Ironically, this is a “solo-authored” work. Of 
course, I might have been the one to render these words into text but I cannot claim these 
ideas exclusively as my own. I had a lot of help. Not only did my advisory committee 
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help articulate the consequences of my slow hunches, but my friend and collaborator, 
John Pell, was there every step of the way as well.The politics of my institution’s 
graduate school dictate that a collaborative dissertation is not an option. I hope one day 
this will no longer be the case.  
At some point even the blackest kettles and pots have to reinvent themselves.  
 
 
 
xii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
 Page 
CHAPTER 
 
 I.  INTRODUCTION: THE IDEA OF COLLABORATION  
  IN THE STUDY OF WRITING  ...................................................................1 
Notes .....................................................................................................19 
 
 II.  A DISCIPLINARY REVIEW OF SOCIAL TURN  
  COLLABORATION...................................................................................22 
Collaborative Nihilism: A Brief Conceptual Sketch ..... ...........................26 
Kenneth Bruffee and “Social Turn” Collaboration ....................................31 
Authority, Consensus, and the Complications of  
     Collaboration...............................................................................46 
The Poles of Collaborative Nihilism in Composition 
     Scholarship .................................................................................61 
Whither Collaboration? The Move Towards Consequence .......................86 
Notes .....................................................................................................88 
 
 III.  FROM STYLE TO INVENTION: RE-CANONIZING  
  COLLABORATIVE COMPOSITION ............................................................90 
The “Style” of Collaboration .....................................................................93 
The Epistemic Mediation of Social Turn Collaboration ..........................103 
Composition and Rhetorical Invention ..............................................110 
Inventing the Collaborative Moment: Kairos and  
     Reflexivity..................................................................................121 
Note ................................................................................................133 
  
 IV.  THE TECHNÉ OF COLLABORATION: TRIANGULATION,  
  RESISTANCE, AND INTERVENTION ..................................................134 
Techné and Collaboration: An Overview ..........................................137 
The Quality of Triangulation ..............................................................143 
The Quality of Resistance ..................................................................153 
The Quality of Intervention ................................................................162 
The Novelty of Theorizing Collaboration...........................................173 
Notes ...................................................................................................176 
 
 V.  THE POST-PROCESS OF COLLABORATION IN  
  COMPOSITION PEDAGOGY ................................................................177 
Post-Process Theory on the Process Horizon ......... .........................183 
 
xiii 
 
From “Non-Foundationalist” to “Externalist” Writing  
     Pedagogy: Some Provisional Guidelines ............................................203 
Collaboration and Externalist Pedagogy ...........................................219 
Coda: Why Teach What is Not Teachable? .....................................228 
Notes ...................................................................................................234 
 
 
REFERENCES .....................................................................................................235 
 
 
1 
 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION: THE IDEA OF COLLABORATION IN THE STUDY OF 
WRITING 
 
 
During my first year as a doctoral student, I responded to a CFP that found its way 
into my email inbox, a call for book chapter proposals for an edited collection. The year 
before I experienced my first 4Cs rejection, but the paper I proposed for that conference 
seemed to fit reasonably well with the subject of this proposed collection. So I threw 
together a two-page chapter proposal without much difficulty and sent it to the editors. 
Their response was both prompt and positive; they found my proposal interesting and 
believed it had potential, although they did have a f w questions. The editors knew I had 
not yet written the full draft, so they requested I sent the first half of the essay for further 
consideration.    
Even though at that point I considered myself a reltively effective writer, suddenly 
the stakes had risen and I doubted my ability to write something that would persuade the 
editors to include it in their collection. I couldn’t shake the feeling that I was faking it, 
because after all I was still a relatively new gradu te student and at best only a novice 
practitioner in the study of rhetoric and compositin. Who was I to think I would write 
something good enough to be included in a scholarly book? Perhaps I didn’t expect the 
editors to be interested in my proposal, but whatever the reason I felt paralyzed at the 
moment to move forward. Therefore I did the only thing I could think of doing: I went to 
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one of my professors and explained the situation. “What I have I gotten myself into?” I 
asked. This professor knew that my friend, John, was also interested in the same subject 
this edited collection was surveying, so she suggested I invite him to collaborate on the 
piece. I like the idea of working with a friend, but I had no idea how to write with another 
person, especially in a situation like this one where the stakes seemed relatively high. 
Nevertheless I asked John to join me on this project. He said yes.   
John and I were already friends, and moreover we shared scholarly interests, so I 
assumed that our collaboration would be easy. In other words, even though neither of us 
had experience writing with another person, we assumed it wouldn’t be that difficult. 
Needless to say, we were inexperienced and naïve. During our first two or three 
meetings, we spent the entire time talking about what we wanted to write, and we even 
put together an outline. But when we tried to actually write, we were stymied. For the 
next handful of meetings, what we planned for as drfting sessions, we spend more time 
talking about how to write together than we actually did writing. More ver we kept 
adjusting the ideas we wanted to render into text, which is to say our conversation 
bounced back and forth between talk about what we wanted to say and talk about how 
best to get these ideas down on the page.  In this way the writing proved to be impossible 
and befuddling. After one laboriously unproductive session, we decided to sit down over 
coffee to rethink our collaboration and how best to turn all of our talk into usable writing. 
We certainly were not at a loss for conversation because we filled page after page with 
ideas about what each of us were noticing about the subject of our essay as it was 
developing through our repeated attempts to write about it. Indeed, we were able to 
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recognize that what at first felt like wasted time together not drafting was in fact a 
necessary phase of our collaboration, one in which we were able to invent both ideas and 
language for those ideas that we could subsequently draw upon in the essay. Even though 
we still didn’t have a draft, we felt confident tha what we were going to write would be 
smart and persuasive.  
Something else we noticed about the collaborative process was that we were getting 
better at anticipating what the other was thinking. That is, during our repeated meetings 
we started to arrive at similar ideas seemingly simultaneously as we fostered 
conversation, and pretty soon we were able to guess how the other would respond to 
certain ideas and observations. In this way, the more we focused on listening to each 
other the more we saw our ideas develop complexity and nuance. 
Motivated as we were, the process of actually renderi g words into text continued to 
be difficult, but we managed to get a draft completed by the date the editors stipulated. 
We were proud of the document (even though so far it was only half of a essay), but we 
were even more proud about discovering the ideas we wer  writing about. Even though 
we didn’t have a recognizable method, we knew it was possible to synthesize our voices 
to invent smart, compelling ideas and arguments. This had been our first experience 
writing collaboratively, and even though we were exhausted, we were also eager to 
continue the work.  
It did not take very long to get a response from the editors. They appreciated us 
taking the time to put together a draft, but after further review they didn’t think it would 
fit well with the rest of the book. That was it. The essay was dead in the water.  
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We had the best intentions to nevertheless complete th  second half of the essay so 
we could send it elsewhere, but it never happened. N arly five years later as I look back 
at that writing, I realize it isn’t nearly as good as we imagined, which is to say I 
understand why our half-written essay wasn’t positively received. I hardly feel 
embarrassed about the ordeal, however, because even though the essay was never 
published (or, for that matter, even finished!) that initial experience of collaboration itself 
had provided me with a new level of confidence as awriter, one built on the knowledge 
that my discourse was somehow strengthened because John and I had collaborated in the 
first place. More specifically, I noticed that when we were able to foster reciprocal 
discourse about a shared object of inquiry, in effect using our collaboration as a method 
for rhetorical invention, it seemed like I was able to articulate ideas that previously, and 
on my own, sounded incoherent. That we never finished t e essay is therefore 
inconsequential, because what we needed to glean from that experience we did: the 
knowledge that successful collaboration has very little to do with material production, 
and that it has everything to do with the discursive relationship collaborators foster with 
one another and the objects of their discourse.  
 
**** 
 
When Joseph Harris published “The Idea of Community i  he Study of Writing” 
twenty years ago, he criticized the “extraordinary rhetorical power one can gain through 
speaking of community.” Using the adjectives “seductive and powerful” to describe the 
rhetorical force of the word “community” itself, he says the term “offers us a view of 
shared purpose and effort” (13). While Harris suggests that “community” is virtually 
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never pejoratively invoked, the thrust of Harris’s argument is directed toward scholars in 
composition who use the idea of community as both a floating signifier and a “stabilizing 
term,” one that is utilized “to give a sense of purpose and effort to our dealings with the 
various discourses that make up the university” (14). In short, for compositionists the 
term functions as a common discursive denominator, for lack of a better phrase, the value 
of which is relative to however one constructs the idea of community in passing. 
Pointing to David Bartholomae’s “Inventing the University” as an example, Harris 
argues that the discourses into which students mustbe ocialized, the ones with which 
they must use to invent the university, are not nearly as stable or adoptable as many 
compositionists makes them sound. Echoing theory suggested by Stanley Fish, Harris 
proposes that “community” should come to reference the different social circles each of 
us always already inhabits. In other words, community need not always imply consensus, 
agreement, or association; nor should it be something we possess or inhabit, let alone 
something we attempt to create or achieve. In fact,Harris offers the metaphor of the city 
as one to replace the metaphor of community: “I would urge an even more specific and 
material view of community: one that, like a city, allows for consensus and conflict, and 
that holds room for ourselves, our disciplinary colleagues, our university coworkers, and 
our students” (20). 
Not long after Harris proposed curbing the idea of community as a commonplace 
metaphor in composition studies, Susan Miller made  v ry similar, if not identical 
argument for ditching “community” as a disciplinary metaphor that informs the work of 
collaboration. Just as Harris proposes the metaphor of a city to better denote the field’s 
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loose associations and contingent discourse practices, so too does Miller use the city 
metaphor to propose how we might understand the associations that collaboration 
instantiates.  
In “New Discourse City: An Alternative Model for Collaboration,” Miller reflects on 
the experience she shared with five freshmen composing an essay that would eventually 
be published in College Composition and Communication. Committed as she was to 
social constructionist notions of collaboration rooted in the metaphors of community and 
consensus, Miller acknowledges that during their meetings together this group of 
collaborative writers acted more like a “committee” instead of a “community.” There was 
substantial negotiation or compromise, and the final dr ft of the essay eventually 
“relocated many of the students’ observations in an appendix” because it became 
impossible to include everyone’s voice in the body f the text. As such, Miller confesses 
“my informed understanding of social constructions f knowledge and language, and the 
students’ practical experience of them, hadn’t been worth a damn, not in any essential 
sense of revising their stance toward educational practice” (289). Later confronted by 
students in a graduate seminar who unapologetically “refused to allow collaborative 
processes to occur” (291), Miller eventually decided that the metaphor of city life was a 
more viable model for understanding collaboration later in this dissertation, but I briefly 
raise her concern for rethinking what collaboration is and should be in order to situate the 
idea of collaboration itself in composition studies. Much like the idea of community, it is 
one that the field of rhetoric and composition has come to value, perhaps even overvalue, 
for reasons that at best appear sentimental, not to mention cursory and uncritical.   
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What I suggest is that the field of composition values an idea of collaboration that has 
remained at best simply an idea, or rather an ideal that social constructionist theory 
helped to institutionalize when we embraced the “social turn” in composition theory 
which suddenly placed primary value on the processes of writing above its product. As 
seen above, Miller confesses to something like a nostalgic feeling of loss, for example, 
when her graduate students rejected the social constructionist discourse of collaboration 
that she used to organize her seminar. Or take for xample what David Smit says about 
the value of collaboration: 
 
Many of the published reports on collaborative learning indicate that rather than 
consensus collaboration may promote a wide variety of points of view; students often 
do not agree in their responses to the work of their p ers, and their responses are often 
quite different from those of their teachers. Thus, collaborative methods seem to have 
created a dilemma. On the one hand, they may unleash irreconcilable differences in 
assumptions, values, and points of view; on the othr hand, the emphasis on achieving 
consensus may result in unnecessary peer pressure to conform to what the group 
decides. Of course, the goal is a proper balance between individual differences and 
group consensus, but given the tension inherent in the method, it seems excessive to 
claim that it is intrinsically better than other pedagogical techniques in achieving a 
change in values. (“Some Difficulties” 48-49) 
 
What Smit draws attention to are the arguments like those posed by John Trimbur in 
“Consensus and Difference in Collaborative Learning” and Greg Myers in “Reality, 
Consensus, and Reform in the Rhetoric of Teaching Composition,” two canonical essays 
in composition studies that suggest why consensus should not be the aim of collaborative 
learning. Of course, Trimbur and Myers are extending the theoretical discussion of 
collaboration introduced by Kenneth Bruffee with his landmark essay “Collaboration and 
the ‘Conversation of Mankind.’” The point I wish tohighlight is that it’s not just the 
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social constructionism of Bruffee to which Smit takes aim, but also the arguments like 
those posed by Trimbur and Myers who suggest that difference and contingency should 
play a key role in how we conceptualize the pedagogical spaces that social constructionist 
theory informs. Smit’s conclusion, similar to but somewhat more pointed than Miller’s, is 
to question why we need “collaborative learning” in the first place, at least when it comes 
to collaborative learning as a specific pedagogical model. “Even if we grant the tenets of 
social construction,” Smit writes, “it is not at all c ear that collaborative methods best 
implement that philosophy” (49). Even though Smit issued these observations about 
collaboration in 1989 during the height of compositi n’s love affair with social 
constructionist theory, his conclusions about the efficacy of collaboration, especially as a 
pedagogical strategy, feel quite contemporary and even recent. 
Scholars in English studies like Daniel Green and Richard Miller have recently 
followed in the footsteps of Smit when it comes to questioning and ultimately 
abandoning certain disciplinary ideals related to literacy education. Green confesses that 
he entered the profession because, as he says, “I understood the job of the English 
professor to involve primarily writing about and teaching literature, activities I had come 
to think of as the twin poles of a vocation both eminently civilized and, as far as I could 
tell, uncommonly satisfying” (273). What Green found, however, is the messy and 
competitive reality of fighting for faculty positions in places where his idealistic take on 
the merits of literary study were practically muted by a corporate “service” mentality that 
rendered the study of literature impractical. “Nothing in the history of literary study or, 
more broadly speaking, in the evolution of the English department, gives much credence 
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to such a nostalgia for the lost purity of the literature curriculum” (276). Green’s solution 
was simply to walk away from the profession, leaving his wrecked ideals aside. Richard 
Miller, on the other hand, while not quitting the university nevertheless experienced a 
similar dissatisfaction with the profession. “If you’re in the business of teaching others 
how to read and write with care, there’s no escaping the sense that your labor is 
becoming increasingly irrelevant.” As he continues, “the vast majority of the reading and 
writing that teachers and their students do about literature and culture might not be all 
that important. It could all be a rather labored way of passing the time” (5, 6). Miller is 
responding primarily to the idealistic notions of liberation and self-actualization that 
social turn epistemologies thrust upon the field of composition in the early 1980s. His 
solution to curbing what might appear to be simply hyperbolic pessimism is to give up 
whatever idealistic mindsets about literacy education with which we enter the profession 
for ones that operate more harmoniously within the bureaucracy of higher education. As 
he explains, “I find it hard to mourn either the passing of these ways of imagining the 
business of higher education or the decline of this r etoric’s power to capture and 
mesmerize higher education’s clientele. Perhaps the hard economic times that are 
unquestionably ahead for the academy will occasion a reconception of the opposition of 
world of thought and the world of work” (169). In effect, Miller suggests we need to stop 
imagining that the university is a site of cultural liberation and personal actualization, and 
start imagining it as a space where learning to read and write in critically engaging ways 
can be used to navigate the bureaucratic terrain of the increasingly corporate and 
globalized marketplace. 
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When it comes to the idea of collaboration in the study of writing, I do not want to 
follow Green and Miller by painting a bleak picture of the prospects for energizing and 
perhaps even dramatically altering how we think about c llaboration and the teaching of 
composition. Nevertheless, whatever idealistic stance the field of composition once 
assumed toward the possibilities of collaboration in the 1980s now seems all but a fuzzy 
memory. In this respect it might seem impractical to engage in a critical review of such a 
generalized idea as collaboration, especially when it comes to how it has been 
conceptualized in our theories of writing and transl ted into pedagogical practices. Like 
Miller, some compositionists are invested in collaborative learning; others such as Smit, 
not so much. Still probably the vast number of scholars and teachers of rhetoric and 
writing are not invested one way or the other.  
It is this last attitude that points to what in this dissertation I call collaborative 
nihilism, a term that names a type of disciplinary stance marked by apathy towards the 
current status of the idea of collaboration in rhetoric and composition studies. It is not an 
attitude one necessary assumes with any amount of critical engagement; rather, it is a 
position most of us simply come to inhabit by virtue of the reality that within the 
academy, especially the humanities, collaborative work is markedly undervalued, and 
thus we learn to forego it as a serious activity. But collaborative nihilism is also 
manifested in what is sometimes a blatant dismissal of collaboration altogether. All of us, 
no doubt, can anecdotally reference some instance or another when someone’s 
collaborative work was challenged on its merits of originality or scholarly rigor.1 As I 
mentioned in the Preface, we know that for many tenur  and promotion committees 
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scholarship that is collaborative doesn’t “count” as much as scholarship that is not (even 
though there is plenty of scholarship that questions the “individual” nature of individual 
scholarship).2 But here I am talking about collaboration as it applies to how we 
conceptualize the work we do with one another in our disciplines and departments; this 
blatant collaborative nihilism also surfaces in how we talk about collaboration in 
discussions of pedagogy as well. Again, many of us need not reflect long to recall 
occasions when the efficacy of collaborative learning was challenged in classroom 
contexts where students openly resisted it, or maybe it simply failed to deliver on 
whatever outcomes we trusted to it. 
In Chapter Two, I will explain how this disciplinary attitude, this condition of 
collaborative nihilism, has emerged from our existing scholarship on collab ration. 
Specifically I will consider how our discipline’s history of collaboration theory stems 
directly from Kenneth Bruffee’s social turn collaboration based on the principles of social 
constructionism. As the title of this dissertation alludes, I will be proposing new theory 
for understanding and enacting collaboration, theory that departs from social 
constructionist epistemology. In Chapter Three, I begin to articulate a pragmatic theory of 
collaboration, one that highlights the discursive relationship that collaborators foster as 
the most critical objective collaborators must engage during collaboration itself. In 
Chapter Four, I explain how we can draw upon the rhetorical concept of techné to 
understand the conceptual work required to actualize the pragmatic theory I propose. I 
call my approach to theorizing collaboration “externalist” because this term points to the 
school of discourse studies that I believe best understands the way that discourse works in 
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the world. Therefore before I continue, it is perhaps profitable for me to explain how I 
understand the term “externalism” and why I am utilizing it as a moniker for the theory of 
collaboration I will develop in these pages. 
In “Externalism and the Production of Discourse,” Thomas Kent explains that most of 
our theories of discourse rely on “the Cartesian clim that a split exists between the 
human mind and the rest of the world.” Cognitive, expr ssivist, and social constructionist 
theories of discourse all support this Cartesian clim and can therefore be labeled as 
“internalist.” Kent continues, “The internalist imagines that a conceptual scheme or 
internal realm of mental states—beliefs, desires, intentions, and so forth—exists anterior 
to an external realm of objects and events. In relation to meaning and language, the 
internalist thinks that we have ideas in our heads,  kind of private language, and then we 
find a public shared language to help us communicate these ideas” (57). Internalist 
theories of discourse therefore support arguments for cultural relativism since what we 
know and how we speak get shaped by and confined to whatever conceptual schemes 
through which we learn to live and work. But Kent points to the problem of skepticism as 
the first major challenge to internalism, especially when it comes to addressing how we 
can account for things like discourse communities, for example, if they are the product of 
shared conceptual schemes. As Kent explains, “When we imagine that separation exists 
between an inner subjective realm of meaning and thoug t, and an outer objective realm 
of objects and events, we obviously cannot explain how it is that we can know anything 
at all about the world outside our own subjectivity” (61). The second objection Kent 
raises concerns the public nature of our discourse p oduction. That is, internalist theories 
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cannot account for how communication occurs between people who do not share 
conceptual schemes. 
Kent thus proposes that we abandon internalist approaches and develop a theory of 
discourse “without getting caught up in the old Cartesian dualisms and paradoxes” (62). 
What we need, in other words, are externalist theories that do not rely on conceptual 
splits and a priori constructions of language to account for our communication. Here is 
how Kent defines externalism: 
 
Externalism defines itself within a philosophical tradition marked off roughly by 
Friedrich Nietzsche, John Dewey, Martin Heidegger, the latter Wittgenstein, W.V. 
Quinn, [Richard] Rorty, and especially Jacques Derrida and [Donald] Davidson. 
Broadly speaking, the externalist takes the position that no split exists between an 
inner and outer world and claims that our sense of an inner world actually derives 
from our rapport with other language users, people we interpret during the give and 
take of communicative interaction. Because language requires the existence of others, 
the public nature of language-in-use presupposes knowledge of other minds and of 
the world in which we operate. Although clear differences exist among externalists 
concerning the public nature of language and meaning, most externalists agree that 
the dualism inherent in internalism cannot tell us much about how language enables 
us to understand others or how language enables us to get things done in the world. 
(62-63) 
 
 
When I utilize the term “externalism” to describe my approach to theorizing 
collaboration, I am therefore referencing this line of discourse theory that presupposes 
there is only one world, to echo Davidson, and we all interact within it and can therefore 
understand and communicate with one another given enough interaction. In Chapter 
Four, I will offer a more detailed account of Kent’s articulation of externalism as I 
discuss how we might use post-process composition theory to understand the pedagogical 
implications of an externalist theory of collaboration.  
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But before I conclude this introduction, I want to spend a few moments discussing the 
goals of this dissertation and what I hope to achieve with a new theory of collaboration. 
First, I believe that rhetoric and composition lacks usable, pragmatic theory that can 
account for the discursive potentialities of collaboration. As I will explain in the next 
chapter, our most popular theories of collaboration are extensions of Kenneth Bruffee’s 
social turn collaboration, which draws on social constructionist theory to present 
collaboration as a type of discursive interaction which functions as an epistemic mediator 
that sustains “knowledge” or “discourse” communities. One of my central arguments 
about this theory is that it proves inconsequential in practice and can only result in the 
collaborative nihilism that I introduced above and will further develop in the first chapter.  
Second, I want to introduce a theory of collaboratin hat not only better accounts for 
the discursive work collaborators engage as collaborators, which will constitute the bulk 
of my writing in Chapters Three and Four, but I also want to promote the work of 
collaboration as a legitimate mode of inquiry through which teachers, scholars, and 
students can engage their intellectual work more generally, which is a clumsy way of 
saying that I believe collaboration makes us better critical thinkers and discoursers. Third, 
and finally, I want to develop an approach to understanding how collaboration can 
account for and represent what a non-foundational writing pedagogy might look like as a 
pedagogy. Collaboration emerged in rhetoric and composition studies as an extension of 
the process-oriented pedagogies that directed attention onto the subjectivities through 
which students actually write and use discourse, and in this way the study of 
collaboration in composition was meant to cultivate our understanding of how to promote 
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pedagogies that allow students to proactively exercis  individual agency in their journeys 
toward becoming effective writers. The move towards embracing collaboration in 
composition, therefore, always was about promoting students’ discursive development as 
communicators, and so I hope to present an interesting discussion of how we might 
revitalize the pedagogical possibilities of collaboration without relying on social 
constructionist theory. 
One of my central arguments in this dissertation is that theoretical complexity can 
actually make us appreciate what sometimes might be considered commonplace 
terminology. Collaboration is just such a term. With that said, I am not satisfied with the 
language of collaboration that currently circulates in our field, and thus a tangential aim 
of this dissertation is to develop a new vocabulary fo  talking about collaboration. While 
each of these aims points to particular sets of problems and professional challenges, this 
last aim to develop a new vocabulary for collaborati n is perhaps the most tenuous. As 
Harris’s plea for reconceptualizing the idea of community in composition suggests, much 
of this work relies on changing the way we actually ta k about community in the first 
place. Unfortunately, not much has changed in the two decades that have passed since the 
publication of his article. In “Rescuing the Discourse of Community,” Gregory Clark 
offers us a reasonable explanation for why “community” has continued as a valued term 
in the teaching of writing: in short, he says, we ne d it. “I remain committed to the 
necessity of a broad concept of community because I believe that anyone’s ideas and 
purposes find value and use when conceived and refined in the context of cooperating 
collectives” (62). In response to Harris, Clark suggests that we cannot simply throw out 
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the baby with the bathwater; in fact, we should be cel brating the many different ways 
compositionists deploy the idea of community in their t aching. As Clark writes, “my 
argument is to describe a discourse that might enlarge nd diversify the concept of 
community by offering a method of discussion—a rhetoric—that includes as equals 
people who differ in their own values and in their power to influence those of others” 
(68).  
If we put Harris’s article next to Clark’s, what finally distinguishes them is that for 
Harris “community” simply names the various interpersonal positions we occupy at any 
given time, and since these positions are obviously myriad and unstable, we should look 
for a better metaphor to describe these relationships. For Clark, on the other hand, 
“community” is what we aim for as an end; it is what we must foster, the thing that 
designates the conditions for equal cooperation within a context of difference. But the 
kicker for Clark is that what makes a community truly democratic is its ability to account 
for otherness. That is, a community built around democratic participation must be able to 
account for the differences that would normally exclude others from that community, if 
“community” in this latter sense refers to Bruffee’s conception of a group of 
constitutionally like-minded individuals.3 In effect, Clark’s formulation of community is 
founded squarely on bringing people together as a peaceful, productive collective; it 
emphasizes the goal of productively working together in proximal spaces of cooperation 
alongside a commitment to their maintenance.  
But herein is where the idea of collaboration in the study of writing seems to have 
floundered. Like Clark’s vision of a community rooted in democratic proximity, for the 
 
 17
vast majority of scholars and teachers in rhetoric and composition “collaboration” is first 
and foremost a proximal marker, a term that designates  kind of proximal democratic 
engagement in which Clark’s idea of community does its work. I will develop this 
argument in the next chapter, but I bring it up here to point out what I believe is the first 
priority of an externalist theory of collaboration, and that is to account for how two or 
more individuals can deliberately foster discourse in order to share perspective, not 
necessarily how to share work. When “collaboration” a d “community” both get 
conceptualized primarily around notions of proximity and consensus, I cannot help but 
think about how the educational philosopher Parker Palmer once humorously defined 
community: “Community is that place where the person y u least want to live with 
always lives” (20). Palmer defines community negatively to underscore the effort 
necessary to maintain the illusion of an impossible ideal. In this way, I believe, for too 
long “collaboration” was positioned disciplinarily as the ideal method through which to 
actualize something like a democratic ethic for doing work connected to social 
constructionist epistemology. When the illusion of that impossible ideal slowly dissolved 
amid the realities of teaching within the competitive, performance-driven arena of higher 
education, like Dorothy’s Wizard, that initial appeal was eventually lost.  
 
**** 
 
At the beginning of this introduction, I recounted my first experience with 
collaborative writing. With that narrative I meant to illustrate the untidy and 
irreconcilably subjective ideas with which I will be wrestling in this dissertation. I do not 
intended to mute the myriad contingencies that will necessarily affect the externalist 
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theory of collaboration I develop once we try to locate its pragmatic consequences in 
experience. The fact of the matter is that all theory is at best a generalized explanation 
that, if successful, can productively anticipate how something in the world will operate. I 
do not present my work here as the last or even the best word on collaboration, but I do 
believe it is a step in the right direction for taking seriously what externalist 
epistemologies offer to those of us in rhetoric andcomposition who no longer find 
productive the internalist mentalities that for so long have directed the production of 
theory in our discipline.  
In the same piece in which Parker Palmer humorously defines community, he also 
notes, and this quite seriously, that the best conceptions of “community” must boil down 
to some capacity for relatedness. “We talk a lot in higher education about the formation 
of inward capacities—the capacity to tolerate ambiguity, the capacity for critical thought. 
I want us to talk more about those ways of knowing that form an inward capacity for 
relatedness” (24). Despite his use of the term “inward,” Palmer is not suggesting that we 
cultivate an internalist-informed capacity for fostering identifications with others. In fact, 
I believe he is appealing to something like an externalist ethic for recognizing how our 
imagined borders of incommensurability need not divide this one world we share. It is in 
this vein that I offer the present study of collaboration theory, because it underscores the 
necessity for considering how any theory of discourse or writing will itself point to a way 
of knowing.  
I want to conclude with Palmer’s words about what we wager whenever we debate 
the aims and methods of academic inquiry because such an observation points in good 
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externalist form the broader consequences of theory building that even the most anti-
idealistic among us cannot deny: 
 
My thesis is a very simple one: I do not believe that epistemology is a bloodless 
abstraction; the way we know has powerful implications for the way we live. I argue 
that every epistemology tends to become an ethic, and every way of knowing tends to 
become a way of living. I argue that the relation between the knower and the known, 
between the student and the subject, tends to become the relation of the living person 
to the world itself. I argue that every mode of knowing contains its own moral 
trajectory, its own ethical direction and outcomes. (22) 
 
Notes 
 
1. Andrea Lunsford and Lisa Ede reflect on the different ways collaborative work is 
“punished” in the competitive spaces of higher education in “Rhetoric in a New Key: 
Women and Collaboration.” Kathleen Blake Yancey andMichael Spooner also consider 
the disciplinary rewards and punishments for collabr tion in their article “A Single 
Good Mind: Collaboration, Cooperation, and the Writing Self.”  
2. Obviously two theorists of importance here are Lev Vygotsky and Mikhail 
Bahktin, see especially the latter’s The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays and Speech 
Genres and Other Late Essays. In composition theory, see Thralls, “Bahktin, 
Collaborative Partners, and Published Discourse”; Rither and Vipond, “Writing as 
Collaboration”; Lunsford and Ede, “Collaborative Authorship and the Teaching of 
Writing”; and Roen and Mittan, “Collaborative Scholarship in Composition: Some 
Issues.” 
3. Clark’s position is one I’d call optimistically anti-idealistic and it represents for the 
discipline of composition specifically what Bill Readings proposes for higher education 
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in general in his book The University in Ruins, which was published two years after 
Clark’s article. There Readings argues that universti s as a whole are slowly assuming 
the status of transnational corporation that peddles egrees like widgets while trafficking 
in the currency of “excellence,” a vague signification that marks the highest degree of 
quality in educational marketing. According to Readings, the problem with 
conceptualizing the university in terms of community is that our modern tendency to 
universalize experience turns the idea of community i to a false ideal since it 
presupposes a “shared human capacity for communication” (182). Furthermore, if 
fostering community (or communities—of academics, students, citizens, social activists, 
etc.) is the social function of the university is to “pretend to be the institution that is not 
an institution but simply the structure you get if transparent communication is possible” 
(183).  
But if we can embrace the idea the university is where thinking occurs beside other 
thinking—without holding fast to notion that we are thinking as a unified community—
then we can begin to describe the university as something like a “community at loose 
ends,” a more accurate moniker for the space of university actually represents. In a 
community at loose ends there is no authoritative master, and the differences between “I” 
and “you” are caught up in a network of relational ob igations that require everyone to 
constantly recognize that our common humanity doesn’t mean we will ever fully 
understand the depth of our responsibility to others (185, 189).  
Whereas Readings essentially posits that the University should exist as a 
ideologically neutral space where teachers and students learn beside one another in a 
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community of dissensus, Clark argues for what is essentially the same idea—that a 
community of dissensus marks the necessary conditios for democratic cooperation—but 
instead of talking about the university as whole, he is simply addressing the discipline of 
composition. Nevertheless, both Clark and Readings hold an optimistically anti-idealistic 
ethic. It is the supposed necessity of this network, be it the cooperative collective Clark 
calls for, the discourse community Bartholomae names, or the “city” that Harris 
proposes, that squarely grounds the metaphor of community into the disciplinarity of 
composition. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
A DISCIPLINARY REVIEW OF SOCIAL TURN COLLABORATION 
 
 
Although social construction has a venerable history in twentieth-century thought 
and although writers in a number of fields are engaged in an effort to develop the 
disciplinary implications of a nonfoundational social constructionist 
understanding of knowledge, that history remains largely unacknowledged and 
the effort fragmented. Terminology proliferates. The result is that in some cases 
positions not only similar but mutually supportive s em alien to one another. 
            - Kenneth Bruffee, “Social Contruction, Language, and the Authority of 
Knowledge: A Bibliographic Essay” 
 
  
As a critical term in the field of rhetoric and composition studies, “collaboration” has 
assumed a catch-all status that has, ironically, allowed theorists and practitioners to 
deploy it in decidedly uncritical ways. To call something “collaborative” is tantamount to 
saying nothing particular at all, except perhaps that wo or more people have worked 
together in some capacity. Indeed, to invoke the idea of collaboration is to invoke a 
floating signifier the referent of which exists in whatever conceptualization of the social 
one brings to bear on the idea of sharing work. For scholars in rhetoric and composition, 
the idea of collaboration has become inextricably linked to the idea of collaborative 
learning, which as a pedagogical concept tends to beg more questions than it presumably 
answers. This latter point is one that David Smit addressed in his attempt to understand 
what it means when teaching is described as collaborative. “I find it difficult to sort out 
the claims of collaborative theorists so as to discover just what kind of pedagogy they are 
recommending when they champion the benefits of collab rative learning.” He continues 
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by acknowledging that theorists of collaboration “can cite an impressive body of theory 
and evidence to support their claims”; nevertheless, Smit questions “whether this body of 
theory provides an adequate basis for a collaborative pedagogy and whether it clearly 
demonstrates that collaborative methods improve writing” (“Some Difficulties” 45-46). 
Composition’s interest in collaboration and collaborative learning gained disciplinary 
traction in the 1970s and 1980s at the same time when open admissions policies were 
ushering in an increasingly diversified student body while in philosophy and the social 
sciences theories of social construction were also starting to emerge. Within composition 
studies the work of Kenneth Bruffee represents the crucible of this interaction between 
open admissions policies and social constructionist epistemology. The above epigraph, 
taken from “Social Construction, Language, and the Authority of Knowledge: A 
Bibliographic Essay,” reflects what is ostensibly a common thread that links all of 
Bruffee’s scholarship to an attempts to unify disparate iterations of social constructionist 
theory in order to articulate a categorical imperative for understanding the social origins 
of knowledge as rooted in conversation. “Social construction assumes,” writes Bruffee in 
this essay, “that thinking is an internalized version of conversation. Anything we say 
about the way thinking works is conversation about another conversation: talk about talk” 
(777). It is out of the social constructionist metaphor of knowledge as conversation that 
Bruffee shapes his philosophy of collaboration and collaborative learning, one that to 
date has had a profound effect on how we talk about c llaboration and the teaching of 
writing. For example, it is Bruffee’s bibliographic essay along with his landmark 
“Collaborative Learning and the ‘Conversation of Mankind’” that Susan Miller, in her 
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own essay about collaborative learning, cites firstin her list of influences “that comprise 
current standard tests of collaborative pedagogy in composition theory” (283).  
John Trimbur and Harvey Kail further attest to the impact Bruffee has played in our 
understanding of collaboration when they position him centrally as one who recognized 
the value of collaborative learning in the beginning years of open admissions: “The 
joining of practical rhetoric with collaborative learning pedagogy is an interesting story in 
itself, one that is both specific to Bruffee and germane to higher education reform in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s” (“Forward” xxi). It is worth quoting Trimbur and Kail at 
length to share their take on A Short Course in Writing, the textbook Bruffee first 
published in the early 1970s that articulated a pedagogy rooted in collaborative activity 
(the textbook was re-published in 2007 as the first volume in the Longman Classics in 
Composition book series): 
 
In his review of the original manuscript of A Short Course, Richard Beal, the most 
prominent English editor at the time, told Paul O’Connell, who published the first 
edition at Winthrop in 1972, that Bruffee could eith r alter the book and sell a lot of 
copies or publish the book as is and make history. What Beal predicted has indeed 
come to pass. As A Short Course appeared in subsequent editions (the second from 
Winthrop in 1980; the third in from Little, Brown i 1985; and the fourth from 
HarperCollins in 1993), it has influenced, far out f proportion to its sales, the actual 
practices of writing instruction and, more broadly, of educational reform in U.S. 
college composition. (xix) 
 
 
There is much to say about the important contributions of Bruffee to the field of 
composition, especially in regard to the role he played in shepherding the idea of 
collaboration into critical perspective. But despite what Bruffee and those who 
contributed to our understanding of collaborative learning achieved in the 1980s and 
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early 1990s by way of extending the scholarship on collaboration, it is evident that the 
terministic status of collaboration is today much like that of “interdisciplinarity,” the 
latter of which Louis Menand discusses in his recent book The Marketplace of Ideas. 
“There are few terms in twenty-first-century higher education with a greater buzz factor,” 
writes Menand. “No one, or almost no one, says a word against it. It is invoked by 
professors and by deans with equal enthusiasm” (95). Certainly the idea of 
interdisciplinarity is more popular today than the id a of collaboration ever was, but 
“collaboration” certainly had a buzz factor at one time, and this matters precisely because 
the popularity of collaborative learning as a pedagogical watchword, connected as it is to 
the “social turn” in composition theory, has evolved in such a way that today 
collaboration seems like old news. Thus am I able to suggest, as I do above, that to say 
something is collaborative is tantamount to saying nothing particular at all.  
I want to suggest neither a retrospective reeling-in of sorts to account for the myriad 
ways collaboration has been articulated disciplinarily nor a nostalgic stroll down roads of 
terministic clarity that never existed; for as Smit evidences, to call something 
“collaborative” has always proved problematic upon close inspection. Rather, I suggest 
that as professionals in rhetoric and composition—whether teachers, researchers, 
theorists, or graduate students—we should consider how a popular epistemological 
theory has influenced how we talk about an equally popular pedagogical model. To this 
end, I believe that the discourse of collaboration ca be renewed, that its evocations can 
rise above “exertions of mechanical skill,” to echo Emerson when describing our 
sluggard intellects in “The American Scholar.” Additionally, I believe we can use 
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pragmatist philosophy to understand collaboration csequentially. But the purpose of 
this present chapter is to examine how our field’s scholarship on collaboration has 
primarily revolved around the politics of social constructionist theory, and that despite 
important criticisms that have interrogated what collaboration is and how it works, there 
has been no attempt to question the foundational assumptions about social 
constructionism that have been utilized to inform our basic assumptions about what it 
means to “collaborate” with others. Consequently, the cumulative result of this 
scholarship on collaboration has been manifested discipl narily into an attitude I call 
“collaborative nihilism,” a term that, as I pointed out in the Introduction, names the 
combination of both apathy and meaninglessness that the current status of the idea of 
collaboration in rhetoric and composition studies rflects; it also points to why, as I 
explain above, collaboration has fizzled in its disciplinary value as a critical term for how 
we understand the work of composition. My review of the scholarship on social turn 
collaboration is relevant because it explains why as an idea “collaboration” today has no 
pragmatic value for compositionists outside its utility as a vague gesture that points 
toward certain unquestioned assumptions about knowledge and discourse that I will 
discuss at length below.   
Collaborative Nihilism: A Brief Conceptual Sketch 
“Movements of thought involving vague concepts,” wrote I.A. Richards in 1932, “can 
have a power and coherence which analysis would destroy. And once analysis is 
introduced, the especially troublesome problems of logical machinery…we use in 
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analysis are on our hands” (39). “Collaboration” certainly qualifies as a vague concept, 
but is it worth engaging the “troublesome problems” of such an inquiry? Some of us are 
invested in pedagogies of collaborative learning, others of us not so much, while still 
probably the vast number of scholars and teachers in rhetoric and composition are not 
invested one way or another. Collaboration for thislast contingency is simply a word that 
means too many different things for too many different people to warrant critical 
examination. This last attitude points to what I am calling collaborative nihilism, a term 
that names a type of disciplinary stance marked by apathy and meaninglessness towards 
the current status of the idea of collaboration in rhetoric and composition studies. I am 
using the term collaborative nihilism in the tradition of Cornel West who has made direct 
and nuanced appeals to various type of cultural nihilism he has observed through his 
experiences as a theologian, pragmatist philosopher, educator, and political activist.  
Beginning with Race Matters and Prophetic Thought in Postmodern Times in 1993 
and extending through Democracy Matters in 2004, Cornel West developed a conception 
of nihilism both contemporary and inclusive that he applied, first, to describe the black 
experience in America, and next, to classify America’s collective disillusionment with 
democracy, namely our nation’s failure to manifest its core democratic principles in its 
public policies and discourses. In Prophetic Thought in Postmodern Times, West defines 
nihilism as “self-paralyzing pessimism” and the “lived experience of meaningless and 
hopelessness and lovelessness” (18). A decade later in D mocracy Matters, West writes 
“This monumental collapse of meaning, hope, and love primarily resulted from the 
saturation of market forces and market moralities in black life and the present crisis of 
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black leadership,” but he continues, “nihilism is [now] not confined to black America.” 
At present America suffers from a “political nihilism,” the felt experience of 
“disillusionment with the American democratic system” (26, 27). One facet of this 
political nihilism West dubs entimental nihilism. For example, “Many newspeople are 
deep believers in the principle of the free press and the special role it’s meant to play in 
our democracy, and yet that belief all too often amounts to sentiment because they fail to 
act more consistently on that principle” (37). Sentimental nihilists are those “willing to 
sidestep or even bludgeon the truth or unpleasant or unpopular facts and stories, in order 
to provide an emotionally satisfying show” (36). In the end, West says sentimental 
nihilism “is content to remain on the surface of problems than to pursue their substantive 
depths” (38-39).  
So in the present context, collaborative nihilism can refer to those attitudes of 
frustration and disillusionment when it comes to fostering an interest in theories and 
practices of collaboration. But it primarily references the more pervasive disciplinary 
unproductiveness that has resulted from a failure to cri ically engage unquestioned 
assumptions about collaboration and collaborative learning that are manifest in our 
literature on the social nature of composition and discourse production. After all, 
scholarship in rhetoric and composition that directly investigates our theoretical 
understanding of collaboration has practically fallen by the wayside. There were two 
edited collections in the early 1990s (Writing With [1994]; New Visions of Collaborative 
Writing [1992]) that explored the theoretical dimensions of collaboration, but practically 
nothing of substance since then. Here I want to add another quality to the idea of 
 
 29
collaborative nihilism, one that distinguishes it a bit from West’s positi ning of nihilism 
as primarily an attitude. Specifically, I believe it can also point to a certain type of 
recognition, in particular when it comes to the status of collaboration as a pseudo-
concept. In The Mysterious Barricades: Language and Its Limits, Ann Berthoff, 
borrowing from Richards and Vygotsky, warns us to be wary of “gangster theories” that 
rely on “killer dichotomies” and “pseudo-concepts.” To understand the function of 
gangster theories is to understand how they emerge from what at one point is critical 
inquiry that eventually just stops being critical. “A common sequence is for a theory to 
move from statements of the self-evident, based on incontrovertible fact, to 
pronouncements of absolute truth and then, gradually, to qualified and restricted 
application, not logically different from the original.” Berthoff continues, “A gangster 
theory can start out as a reasonable analogy, with ambiguities noticed and limitations 
recognized, but then it will be ‘strengthened’ by being pushed to an extreme, the 
qualifications dropped, the principles formulated as law” (16). As an example of what is 
pseudo-concept, one of the conceptual consequences of a gangster theory, she turns to the 
idea of discourse:  
 
Discourse, for instance, has become a pseudo-concept in Vygotsky’s sense: it has 
gathered to itself many analogous or at least comparable ideas and terms, but there 
has emerged no criterion by which to differentiate th  members of this new class. The 
field of application of this pseudo-concept is virtually limitless; discourse can mean 
language, procedure, culturally determined attitudes, historically determined 
conventions, unconscious habits, deliberate habits, ra ional conventions 
unconsciously followed, arbitrary conventions delibrately deployed. Discourse 
analysis has thus become a safe house for gangster theories. (17) 
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Obviously we could replace “discourse” with “collaboration” here and the latter’s status 
as a pseudo-concept would be clear. But it is not just that collaboration can mean too 
many different things for too many different people that fuels collaborative nihilism; 
rather it is that “collaboration” is often deployed in our disciplinary discourses as if this 
word is self-interpreting, even though, echoing Richards, we recognize that with some 
careful analysis and practical inquiry, the “power and coherence” of collaboration as a 
critical term would fall apart. 
What follows in this chapter is a review of Kenneth Bruffee’s social turn 
collaboration, my attempt to trace how exactly a social constructionist epistemology 
informs his articulation of collaborative learning. Next I will offer a brief overview of the 
most relevant scholarship that complicated Bruffee’s r ndering of both the methods for 
and purposes of collaborative learning. I will show that even though important criticism 
furthered our discourse on collaboration, it neverth less failed to seriously question the 
social constructionist mooring to which it had been ti d.  Finally, I will offer a two-part 
discussion that explains what I am calling the poles f collaborative nihilism in 
composition scholarship—a heuristic distinction that locates scholarship in relationship to 
one of two conceptual poles, ones that roughly can be labeled “theory” and “practice.” 
What I will demonstrate is that when collaboration s primarily conceptualized through a 
social constructionist epistemology, it can only be rendered theoretically as an over-
determined quality of our discourse or pedagogically as a teaching mechanism that 
functions much like a tool teachers can deploy at will. The cumulative result of this 
theory-practice conceptual split, I argue, is that we are left with untenable theory and 
 
 31
elective pedagogy, which leads collaboration to the place where it now resides in our 
critical vocabulary: as a pseudo-concept that can mean just about anything that involves 
the work of more than one person.  
Before I continue, let me return I.A. Richards and what he offers by way of his 
practical criticism, the theoretical orientation that undergirded his New Rhetoric. As 
Berthoff notes, Richards opposed “systematic procedures and experimental techniques” 
as methods for testing theory; instead, “He wanted to develop what he called a ‘natural 
history of opinions’ (later, of ‘meaning’)” based on the pragmatic principle that, as 
Richards worded it, “How we use a theorem best tells us what the theorem is” (Richards 
23). I have already described my work in this chapter as an experiment in practical 
inquiry. By “practical inquiry” I mean to play off Richards’s notion of practical criticism, 
which in part calls for us to consider how we use a theory as the best test for what a 
theory is, or stated more pragmatically, what difference a theory makes. At this point, to 
best see how the idea of collaborative learning took r t in composition studies—how it 
has been used—I now turn to Bruffee.  
Kenneth Bruffee and “Social Turn” Collaboration 
I wrote ‘Collaborative Learning and the “Conversation of Mankind”’ to redirect the 
way we think about teaching literature and writing. It was the groundwork for almost 
everything I have done since. 
- Kenneth Bruffee, Comment to his essay in The Norton Book of Composition 
 
 
The social constructionist-informed theories of collaboration at our disposal in 
composition studies ultimately position collaboration on opposite ends of a theory-
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practice dichotomous pole, on one end of which collab ration is collapsed into over-
determined theory that leaves no room for nuance and fallibility, on the end of which 
collaboration is situated tactically as a pedagogical tool teachers utilize in the classroom. 
When the meaning of collaboration can be explained  both categorical and qualified 
terms, and when no attempt is offered to question what difference this bifurcation makes, 
collaboration has no practical meaning. 
Before I review those specific works that have contribu ed to the polarity of 
scholarship on collaboration in the study of composition, it is first necessary to examine 
the principles of social constructionist epistemology that have been utilized by 
compositionists to explain the nature of collaborati n itself. An implicit component of my 
argument here is that we cannot study the scholarship on collaboration without also 
studying the social turn in composition, because to rec gnize how our field understands 
collaboration is to also recognize how we understand social constructionism. Coming to 
terms with how collaboration has been theorized in composition studies must begin with 
properly situating the work of Kenneth Bruffee in relationship to this theory since his 
work has most explicitly connected collaboration to this social turn in composition. 
Therefore in this section I offer an introductory pimer to social turn collaboration via a 
review of how Bruffee appropriates social constructionist principles to construct a theory 
of collaborative learning.  
In the penultimate chapter of Collaborative Learning: Higher Education, 
Interdependence, and the Authority of Knowledge, th  second edition of which was 
published by Johns Hopkins in 1999, Kenneth Bruffee b gins with a reminder that the 
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purpose of higher education is to “reacculturate” sudents into academic communities that 
maintain certain discursive requirements for membership. This is, in fact, an argument 
Bruffee makes throughout the book: “College and university education should help 
students renegotiate their membership in the knowledge communities they come from 
while it helps them reacculturate themselves into the academic communities they have 
chosen to join” (231). The means through which thisgoal of reacculturating students’ 
membership into academic communities requires what Bruffee calls a “nonfoundational 
curriculum.” 
 
The goal of such a curriculum is to help students uderstand their academic studies—
of mathematics, chemistry, sociology, English, whatever—as reacculturation, and 
specifically as reacculturation into communities in which knowledge is a construct of 
the community’s constituting language or form of discourse. Along with this basic 
expertise in the workings of language and other symbolic systems, furthermore, 
necessarily goes a basic expertise in how people live and work well together. (231) 
 
 
At this point Bruffee explains what are three necessary phases through which a 
nonfoundational curriculum moves students. In the first phase, students should be 
directed to recognize how they are already members in certain communities of 
knowledgeable peers; in the second phase, students learn how to interrogate which of 
their beliefs and the beliefs of their peers have be n socially justified and in which 
particular communities; in the third and final phase, tudents are instructed in the 
discursive techniques of justifying belief to better engage those particular knowledge 
communities in which they are seeking membership and to recognize that knowledge 
itself is produced, or constituted, through a knowledge community’s discourse (232-36). 
These phases and the particular vocabulary Bruffee tilizes to describe the work of each 
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phase represent a fairly precise articulation of what collaborative learning is meant to 
achieve when it is informed by the principles of social constructionist epistemology.  
When the first of edition of Collaborative Learning was published in 1993, Bruffee 
had already established himself as the principle theorist of collaborative learning in 
composition studies. Virtually every piece of scholarship in the discipline that has 
highlighted collaboration in one respect or another has explicitly drawn from or at least 
referenced Bruffee’s work; moreover his articles on c llaboration have been copiously 
used in disciplines outside of composition. For example, after one brief search I found 
Bruffee cited in the following journals: Computers and the Humanities, Journal of 
Geography in Higher Education, Journal of the Learning Sciences, College Teaching, 
The Urban Review, Journal of Adult Development, and The Classical Journal, just to 
name seven sources I found after a cursory search.1 Today Bruffee’s name is synonymous 
with the study of collaboration and its theory, even though he doesn’t identify as a 
theorist.2  
The focus on collaborative learning that marks Bruffee’s disciplinary footprint in 
composition is not just the product of his appropriation of collaborative learning theory 
gleaned from the likes of British pedagogues Edwin Mason and M. L. J. Abercrombie, 
which is usually where discussions of Bruffee’s work and those who inspired him begin. 
No doubt, Mason and Abercrombie play an important role in locating how Bruffee’s 
interest in collaborative learning developed, but I argue the tradition of collaborative 
learning theory sparked by Bruffee is primarily theresult of his translation of social 
constructionist epistemology into pedagogical theory. Indeed in one of his earliest articles 
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about the social nature of learning, “The Structure of Knowledge and the Future of 
Liberal Education” (1981), Bruffee casually mentions Mason and Abercrombie’s names 
only once, and only in the article’s final paragraph to boot. The names that do appear 
prominently in the article are all used to explain what Bruffee calls the “revolution in our 
conception of knowledge” (178). Einstein’s theory of relativity, Heisenberg’s uncertainty 
principle, and Goedel’s argument that mathematics is not a self-validating system of 
knowledge are the theories out of which Bruffee sketch s his argument for reimagining 
what knowledge is and how it gets produced. The result of this “revolution” Bruffee 
chooses to articulate quite poetically: 
 
Knowledge must be regarded as a social entity today because we have no other 
alternative. All our touchstones, ancient and modern, a e gone. Whether we like it or 
not, our knowledge is no longer hitched to the stars. What we know and how we 
know it—at best a lumbering wagon—is drawn by ourselves alone. (181) 
 
 
It is because of this “unhitching” of knowledge that Bruffee then suggests we need to 
reevaluate the role of “peer group influence” in the classroom. He concludes by 
suggesting that collaborative learning might be the “practical means” of revitalizing 
liberal education according to this social turn in our collective epistemological moorings 
(186). At the end of his essay, Bruffee casually suggests that Mason and Abercrombie’s 
work might be “roughed out” as a guide for conceptualizing what collaborative learning 
looks like pedagogically. Nevertheless, collaborative learning as such was for Bruffee the 
natural consequence of heeding this “revolution” in the conception of knowledge. 
Bruffee’s 1984 article, “Collaborative Learning and the ‘Conversation of Mankind,’” 
acted as the catalyst for scholars in composition to heed the pedagogical implications of 
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social constructionist epistemology and its significance for understanding collaboration. 
At the beginning of this essay Bruffee points to what at the time appeared as a practical 
problem in conceptualizing the work of collaboration. Despite what was ostensibly 
heightened interest in collaborative learning at the then recent CCCC and MLA annual 
conventions, Bruffee observed that within both of these professional contexts 
“collaborative learning is discussed sometimes as a process that constitutes fields or 
disciplines of study and sometimes as a pedagogical tool that ‘works’ in teaching 
composition and literature” (635). That collaboration was understood both as a theoretical 
orientation and as a pedagogical mechanism, and usually in only one of these frames of 
reference at a time, prompted Bruffee to recognize the frustrations inherent in 
understanding collaborative learning in the first place. It is, of course, ironic that the 
problem Bruffee names at the outset of this landmark essay is one that I argue still 
persists; nevertheless, Bruffee’s observation about the lack of consistency in how 
collaborative learning is understood in English studies established the disciplinary 
positioning that allowed him to forward collaboration not as its own subject of study (that 
is, as a pedagogical theory that exists in a vacuum) but as the logical extension of a social 
constructionist epistemology that explains how knowledge is not an inherent property of 
nature, the mind, or anything else for that matter, but a product of conversation. 
The term “conversation” is perhaps the most important watchword for a social 
constructionist epistemology because it represents the action through which belief gets 
socially justified. The notion of “socially justified belief” is another critical phrase for 
which to account because knowledge within a social constructionist epistemology is 
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socially justified belief. The discursive space of c nversation is a social space; it is where 
ideas and observations get forwarded, discussed, and debated. When conversation 
continues to “justify” any of these ideas or observations, they become “beliefs,” those 
concepts that count as knowledge within a particular discourse community. But a social 
constructionist epistemology must also account for how discourse itself functions as 
discourse—as the meaningful exchange of verbal and symbolic gestures; and it is through 
an explanation of the difference between “normal” and “abnormal” discourse that such an 
account is provided. These key terms—“conversation,” “socially justified belief,” 
“normal” and “abnormal discourse”—for Bruffee become the critical vocabulary he 
utilizes to justify the social constructionist princ ples of collaborative learning, to which 
he also adds another critical term, “consensus.” 
Certainly the most important figure from whom Bruffee shapes his basic 
understanding of social constructionist epistemology is Richard Rorty.3 It was in Rorty’s 
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979) where Bruffee was introduced to the concept 
of socially justified belief. Rorty’s sketch of what he called “epistemological 
behaviorism” used the notion of socially justified belief to challenge philosophers to 
recognize “knowledge as a matter of conversation and of social practice, rather than as an 
attempt to mirror nature” (171). Rorty’s anti-foundationalist epistemology emphasized 
that the notion of socially justified belief represents the most tenable starting position for 
epistemological inquiry since it does not rely on the faulty belief in a metaphysical split 
between mind and nature that undergirds Cartesian epistemologies. “We have considered 
it to be a universal truth,” writes Bruffee explaining the epistemological paradigm social 
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constructionism replaced that constructed knowledge as kind of “matter” with which 
human beings fill their minds. Such a theory “assumes that knowledge is a mental 
construct…it draws its authority, on one hand, from the quality of that mental construct 
and, on the other hand, from the quality of the reliability of mental constructs’ reference 
to a reality external to the mind” (“Scholarly Community” 231). This Rortian 
understanding of Cartesian epistemology Bruffee folds into his social constructionism in 
order to position, like Rorty, the social justification of belief as the primary factor in 
negotiating the fluidity of knowledge.4 
Bruffee had already formulated a working interpretation of Rorty’s social justification 
of belief by 1982 when he published an article thatoutlined the implications of this 
concept for resolving how educators debate the purpose of liberal education. On one 
hand, Bruffee explains, “some of us tend to feel that e purpose of education is mainly to 
provide students with a world to understand, whereas other of us tend to feel mainly that 
the purpose of education is to help students develop ways to understand the world” 
(“Liberal Education” 96-97). Instead of debating from one or the other of these camps 
and thus risk what he viewed as the stymieing effects of circular argument, Bruffee 
implicitly forwards an altogether different question about how both goals might be one in 
the same if we “replace post-Cartesian epistemology with another concept of knowledge 
equally powerful and more appropriate to our present and future educational needs” (99). 
Turning to a review of Rorty’s social constructionism, Bruffee explains that knowledge 
can be easily situated as “what we are justified in believing.” Here is how he explains the 
social justification of belief: 
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In this concept of knowledge all three terms are oprative: social, justification, and 
belief. The definition assumes that each of us maintains BELIEFS about the world 
that are private and particular to ourselves….The second operative term in a Rortean 
definition of knowledge, JUSTIFICATION, has to with what must be done to turn 
beliefs into knowledge. Private, particular beliefs are not knowledge. They become 
knowledge only when they are justified or shown capable of justification….To justify 
a belief does not mean to establish a relationship between ourselves and some 
individual we believe to be most knowledgeable, betwe n ourselves and the object 
known, or between ourselves and some ideal reality or ouchstone of truth. To justify 
a belief is to establish a certain kind of relationship among ourselves and among the 
things we say. This insistence that justification is a matter of conversation among 
persons brings us to the third operative term in a Rortean definition of knowledge: 
that the justification of belief is a SOCIAL process. (104-05) 
 
 
What Bruffee (mis)takes from Rorty is a philosophical argument for theorizing 
collaborative learning as the pedagogical model for actualizing socially justified belief in 
classroom learning, and although he doesn’t word it this way here, Bruffee nevertheless 
shapes what becomes an important premise for his later articulations of collaborative 
learning. “If I say, then, that knowledge is socially justified belief,” he writes later in this 
same essay, “we seem to be saying that knowledge results from acknowledgement, he 
mutual agreement among knowledgeable peers that a belief expressed by a member of 
that community has been socially justified or is socially justifiable” (106). The social 
justification of belief therefore functioned for Bruffee as the epistemological starting 
point in which to ground a pedagogical theory that positioned consensus as the practical 
goal of conversation in small group work.  
Whereas Rorty provided Bruffee with a philosophical explanation of how knowledge 
is the product of socially justified belief that gets negotiated through conversation, it is 
Thomas Kuhn who first articulated for Bruffee a clear xplanation of how knowledge is 
the product of group consensus. Indeed, in his monograph Bruffee outright declares that 
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collaborative learning follows “the Kuhnian assumption that knowledge is consensus: it 
is something people construct interdependently by talking together” (133). This is, of 
course, a misreading of Kuhn’s “paradigms” which the latter meant to reference 
paradigmatic practices and not just ways of talking. Nevertheless, ever since Bruffee 
began publishing defenses of social turn epistemology, especially as it related to the work 
of a liberal education, Kuhn occupied a central place in these explications. “The 
implication of this indeterminacy of knowledge most important for modern higher 
education,” writes Bruffee in reference to The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, is that 
“the very ‘laws of nature’ are ‘discovered’ and remain in force through consensus. 
Scientific knowledge is what is accepted by an assenting community of scientists” (“The 
Structure of Knowledge” 181). Just like Rorty, Kuhn is manifest in Bruffee’s 
explanations of collaborative learning according to social constructionism. In “Liberal 
Education and the Social Justification of Belief,” for example, he explains the idea of 
conceptual change according to Kuhnean perspective: 
 
Even in the most sophisticated, complex, and demanding sorts of thinking human 
beings ever undertake, it seems, “the path from object to [us] and from [us] to object’ 
still ‘passes through another person.” Several of Kuhn’s illustrations demonstrate this 
social or collaborative nature of adult thought….Kuhn gives the hypothetical example 
of two members or factions of a scientific community trying to reconcile 
incompatible assumptions on which their work is to pr ceed. Incompatible 
assumptions cannot, of course, be reconciled throug experimentation. The rules of 
experimentation are defined by those very assumptions. Incompatible assumptions 
can be reconciled only through debate. And in that debate, Kuhn explains, scientists 
must rely on techniques that are neither “straightforward, [nor] comfortable, [nor] 
part of the scientists’ normal arsenal.” Because of the extraordinary nature of the 
debate, in fact, evidence of the collaborative nature of learning is available to us  
(102)  
 
 
 
 41
What is particularly interesting about this early explanation of Kuhn’s importance to the 
project of collaborative learning is how Bruffee recognizes that an exceptional kind of 
discourse is needed to overcome communicative stalemate if debate is to lead to any 
resolution, to any new knowledge. By 1986 when Bruffee published his bibliographic 
essay on social constructionism in College English, he had discovered how to 
characterize Kuhn as a visionary figure of sorts who anticipated the social turn in 
epistemology that Rorty would formalize with Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. In 
“Collaborative Learning and the ‘Conversation of Mankind,’” easily Bruffee’s most 
important essay for the field of rhetoric and compositi n, he asserts “For us as humanists 
to discover in Kuhn and his followers the conceptual rationale of collaborative learning is 
to see our own chickens come home to roost” (646). Even though Kuhn becomes 
something of a tangential figure for social turn collaboration—an important tangential 
figure for sure, if such a role is possible—Bruffee’s recognition in Kuhn that exceptional 
discourse is needed to overcome stalemated debate gains its theoretical footing in Rorty, 
who, using Kuhn’s conception of normal science, constructs the roles of normal and 
abnormal discourse as the means through which knowledge is socially challenged. 
Normal discourse refers to what a particular group considers standard habits of 
discourse.  For Bruffee, like Rorty, in order to understand normal discourse one must 
recognize how knowledgeable peers are the agents of this discourse. “A community of 
knowledgeable peers,” explains Bruffee, “is a group who accept, and whose work is 
guided by, the same paradigms and the same code of values and assumptions.” And 
echoing Rorty (who is building from Kuhn), Bruffee xplains that in normal discourse 
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there is general consensus about what counts as a question, and argument, a relevant 
contribution, and sound criticism (“Collaborative Larning” 642-43). In other words, 
normal discourse generally marks the uninterrupted flow of conversation among 
knowledgeable peers. By way of example, in “Collabor tive Learning and the 
‘Conversation of Mankind’” Bruffee explains, “The essay I am writing here is an 
example of normal discourse in this sense. I am writing to members of my own 
community of knowledgeable peers. My readers and I (I presume) are guided in our work 
by the same set of conventions about what counts as a relevant contribution, what counts 
as a question, what counts as having a good argument for that answer or a good criticism 
of it” (643). What is important about Bruffee’s interpretation of normal discourse is that 
it gets positioned as the discursive space in which collaborative learners negotiate their 
apprenticeship into the knowledge communities in which they hope to become members. 
“Collaborative learning provides the kind of social context, the kind of community, in 
which normal discourse occurs: a community of knowledgeable peers.” He continues, 
“This is one of its main goals: to provide a context in which students can practice and 
master the normal discourse exercised in established knowledge communities in the 
academic world and in business, government, and the prof ssions” (644). But it is not 
enough however to simply say that knowledge is the product of conversation among 
knowledgeable peers because as such this explanation leaves little room to account for 
paradigm shifts (when a knowledge community’s basic sumptions are replaced with 
new ones) or the creation of new knowledge (when indiv dual members of a knowledge 
community contribute something novel to the conversation). Here Bruffee uses Rorty’s 
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concept of abnormal discourse to show that conversation is not simply the uninterrupted 
flow of normal discourse; instead, the epistemological space of conversation is riddled 
with stops and starts and negotiations among its participants. In normal discourse 
knowledge is simply circulated through the exchange of conversation, and while debates 
about what counts as knowledge will occur, there is always a set of accepted 
epistemological assumptions from which discoursers argue; in abnormal discourse an 
unconventional idea is injected into the normal discourse of a community that must then 
be accounted for in relation to that community’s normal discourse. With his formulation 
of how groups of knowledgeable peers engage in “normal” conversation to sustain 
knowledge, and when abnormal discourse is introduce to the conversation to create new 
knowledge, Bruffee has the basic outline of social turn collaboration conceptually 
sketched. 
So what, then, is social turn collaboration exactly? The short answer to this question 
is simply to say that it is how collaborative learning, explained in the work of Bruffee, 
has come to be theorized in composition studies according to these central components of 
social constructionist epistemology. A slightly longer answer can be found in reviewing 
an article Bruffee published in 1987 titled “The Art of Collaborative Learning” in the 
magazine Change, a publication for educators and other professionals i  higher 
education. There, Bruffee recounts to readers a recent experience reading a colleague’s 
book manuscript. He remembers how he carefully readthe draft, marking it up in the 
margins, and then composed a thoughtful six-page lett r offering revision suggestions 
before sending the manuscript back to its author. Bruffee explains that he “learned a lot 
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reading his [colleague’s] book” and “[they] both learned something talking out the 
stickier points in it” (42). In short, this is what collaborative learning is about: engaging 
in focused “conversation” to arrive at consensus about some question, problem, or idea. 
Collaborative learning is not just what professionals like Bruffee and his colleague do 
when talking through a book manuscript, however, and Bruffee explains this much when 
he articulates that when teachers utilize collaborative learning, “Students learn better 
through non-competitive collaborative group work than in classrooms that are highly 
individualized and competitive” (44). At stake in collaborative learning is therefore the 
shared authority that collaborators grant each other; when teachers give up some of their 
“traditional” authority, collaborative learning is most successful. At the end of this 
article, he writes: 
 
Because we usually identify the authority of knowledg  in a classroom with the 
instructor’s authority, the brief hiatus in the hierarchical chain of authority in the 
classroom that is at the heart of collaborative learning in the long run also challenges, 
willy-nilly, our traditional view of the nature and source of knowledge itself. 
Collaborative learning tends, that is, to take its toll on the cognitive understanding of 
knowledge that most of us assume unquestioningly. Teachers and student alike may 
find themselves asking the sorts of questions Abercrombie asked. How can 
knowledge gained through a social process have a source that is not itself also social? 
(47) 
 
 
In the end, this is Kenneth Bruffee’s social turn collaboration; it is collaborative learning 
theorized and deployed with the express purpose of giving students the opportunity to not 
only re-acculturate themselves into a new academic community, but to also recognize 
how this new knowledge, and all knowledge for that m tter, is socially rooted in 
conversation, and as “members” of a conversation they are able to use their discourse to 
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change this knowledge and add to it. Bruffee has also referenced at multiple points the 
work of Clifford Geertz and Stanley Fish, but what e takes from these latter thinkers is 
further theoretical evidence that knowledge is a “nonfoundational social artifact,” such 
as, for example, when a group of literary critics “e tablishes an interpretative language” 
that functions as a normal discourse, which in turn“embodies the interpretation that the 
community accepts, and it literally constitutes the community” (“Scholarly Community” 
232, 234).5 
In 1986 when he published “Social Construction, Language, and the Authority of 
Knowledge: A Bibliographic Essay,” Bruffee gave compositionists, rhetoricians, and 
literary theorists what has become one of the most recognizable definitions of social 
constructionism in English Studies: “Social construction understands reality, knowledge, 
thought, facts, texts, selves, and so on as community-generated and community-
maintained linguistic entities—or, more broadly speaking, symbolic entities—that define 
or ‘constitute’ the communities that generate them” (774). While not as poetic as 
explaining that “our knowledge is no longer hitched to the stars” and is “at best a 
lumbering wagon…drawn by ourselves alone,” the evoluti n in theoretical explanation 
Bruffee made in the half-decade that separates these two summary attempts at explaining 
social constructionist thought testifies both to his persistence as a theorist and the 
scholarly environment in which social constructionist epistemology flourished in the 
1980s and 1990s. Indeed, the first line of Patricia Sullivan’s review essay in College 
English where she critiques Bruffee’s Collaborative Learning reads, “Social 
constructionism has become the default theory of the nineties” (950); and this just a few 
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years after Donald Stewart’s 1988 proclamation in Rhetoric Review: “the era of the social 
constructionists is just beginning” (58). While there were certainly challenges to Bruffee 
that questioned some of his terminology and his claims about the ends of collaborative 
learning, they nevertheless left unquestioned the basic social constructionist argument 
that knowledge is socially justified belief that exists within the discursive boundaries of 
knowledge communities, ones in which new members mut be apprenticed before they 
can assume the privileged status of knowledgeable peers.  
Authority, Consensus, and the Complications of Collaboration 
Donald Stewart’s remark about the era of the social constructionists is actually not a 
proclamation; it is critique that questions both the project of collaborative learning and 
the soundness of social constructionist theory. This social turn in composition theory fails 
to deliver on “the educational panacea that its advocates imply,” writes Stewart. Even 
though collaborative learning might reinvigorate strile learning environments and 
encourage student engagement, Stewart asserts “there is a point beyond which I won’t 
go” (67) when it comes to crediting collaboration pedagogically. One of those points is 
what Stewart sees as a “rather flexible definition of the word collaboration, specifically 
its lack of a clear distinction between influence and collaboration” (66). But he also 
questions the histories of collaborative learning ad social constructionism, at least those 
that framed collaboration as a novel pedagogical str tegy. For Stewart the values 
espoused by social turn collaboration advocates are neither new nor particularly 
revolutionary, and he cites a number of historical examples from the history of 
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composition to show that certain of our forebears recognized and wrote about the social 
principles espoused in collaborative learning.  
Despite its status as a “default theory,” to echo Sullivan, or its popularity in 
discussions about collaborative learning, everyone in composition did not embrace the 
hype that was social constructionist epistemology in the eighties and nineties. In a 
response to Bruffee’s bibliographic essay, for example, David Foster says “What 
undermines Bruffee’s claims on behalf of social constructionism is his uncritical 
eagerness to herd together profoundly divergent thikers on both sides” (“Comment” 
709). As Stewart moreover evidences, there were also critics who questioned what they 
viewed as old news—collaborative learning—tethered to social turn composition theory. 
But the scope of this criticism was much narrower than the impression Stewart’s critique 
might suggest. In fact, the most vocal discussions about collaborative learning (and, by 
default, the social constructionist ideals it premised) focused on how best to articulate 
what are and should be the outcomes of collaborative learning and how best to facilitate 
collaboration pedagogically in the rhetorical spaces of peer-response, seminar 
discussions, and small group work. The ideas most debated in these discussions 
questioned the role of consensus in collaborative learning and invoked problems 
associated with the concepts of normal and abnormal discourse. The problem of how to 
negotiate authority in collaboration also surfaced, such as what counts as power and how 
it can best be shared. Additionally, scholars raised mportant flags that signaled the need 
to address the role of trust that collaborative learning seemed to assume (or take for 
granted). 
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One of the most anthologized of these attempts to complicate our field’s 
understanding of collaborative learning is John Trimbur’s “Consensus and Difference in 
Collaborative Learning” (1989). At the time, Bruffee’s explanation of consensus as the 
goal of collaborative learning remained largely unqestioned, partly because of the way 
Bruffee uncritically situated consensus as a type of benign agreement. In response 
Trimbur used his article to complicate the idea of consensus and signal how so simple an 
outcome is unrealistic, not to mention coercive andmarginalizing. 
Trimbur suggests that “consensus” should remain a central term in our discourse 
about collaborative learning, but in order to complicate the role it plays in our 
understanding of collaboration, we should use it heuristically to locate differences among 
collaborators that make consensus an impossible destination to begin with, at least insofar 
as the concept remains unproblematized. “Consensus,” writes Trimbur, “can be a 
powerful instrument for students to generate differences, to identify the systems of 
authority that organize these students, and to transform the relations of power that 
determine who may speak and what counts as a meaningful statement.” (603). Note that 
Trimbur does not question the function of consensus as a goal for collaboration; he 
simply wishes to complicate what consensus means in collaboration. More precisely, he 
challenges the argument that collaborative learning appeals to totalitarian thinking and 
forced conformity. Consensus does not have to equal conformity because it is through the 
social interaction required in collaborative learning that we are empowered as
individuals.  
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Trimbur implies that consensus-reaching can work towards the democratic principles 
that Bruffee asserts are realized in collaborative learning: “Bruffee sees collaborative 
learning as a part of a wider movement for participatory democracy, shared decision-
making, and non-authoritarian styles of leadership and group life.” Trimbur continues,  
 
From the late seventies to the present, Bruffee has asked what it means to reorganize 
the social relations in the classroom and how the decentering of authority that takes 
place in collaborative learning might change the way e talk about the nature of 
liberal education and the authority of knowledge and its institutions. (605) 
 
 
Collaborative learning can be used to counter hegemony in the classroom, especially as it 
pertains to the distribution of power between teachrs and students. So when students can 
use their attempts at reaching consensus to understand the differences among them that 
make consensus impossible, they are, in effect, negotiating the power relations that 
mediate our interaction with others, and not just in the classroom, but all of the time.  
Another argument Trimbur makes rejects Rorty’s positi ning of “abnormal” 
discourse as the corrective mechanism that ensures that knowledge remains fluid and 
open-ended: 
 
For Rorty, the term conversation offers a useful way to talk about the production of 
knowledge as a social process without reference to metaphysical foundations. Rorty’s 
notion of conversation describes a discourse that has no beginning or end, but no 
crisis or contradiction, either. Cut loose from metaphysical moorings and 
transcendental backups, the conversation keeps rolling f its own accord, reproducing 
itself effortlessly, responsible only to itself, sanctioned by what Rorty sees as the only 
sanction credible: our loyalty to the conversation and our solidarity with its practices. 
All we can do is continue the conversation initiated before we appeared on the scene. 
(606) 
 
 
Abnormal discourse supposedly destabilizes the conversational flow of normal discourse, 
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but as Trimbur explains, “at just the moment Rorty seems to introduce difference and 
destabilize the conversation, he turns crisis, conflict, and contradiction into homeostatic 
gestures whose very expression restabilizes the conversation” (608). According to 
Trimbur, Rorty “identifies abnormal discourse with the romantic realm of thinking the 
unthinkable, of solitary voices calling out, of the imagination cutting against the grain,” 
or in other words, “Rorty makes abnormal discourse the activity par excellence not of the 
group but of the individual” (607).  
Instead of relying on a Rortian distinction between normal and abnormal discourse, 
Trimbur positions the social interaction necessary to locate “difference” in collaboration 
as the abnormal function (if we can still use that term ) in collaborative learning. That is, 
Trimbur’s argument is that collaborative learning becomes meaningful through a group’s 
attempt at consensus, and this “represents the potentiality of social agency in group life” 
(603). 
While Trimbur offers a significant challenge to how we conceptualize just what 
exactly is the work of consensus in collaborative learning, and even though he does reject 
the social constructionist principle of abnormal discourse as it is articulated by Rorty, he 
nevertheless upholds the social constructionist claim that knowledge is mediated through 
the conversational interaction among members of discourse communities. “Collaborative 
learning can help students generate transitional lagu ge to bridge the cultural gap and 
acquire fluency in academic conversation,” Trimbur wrote in the essay “Collaborative 
Learning and Teaching Writing,” which appeared four years before “Consensus and 
Difference.” Following Bruffee, Trimbur tentatively concedes that “the function of 
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collaborative learning is to recontextualize composing and to externalize the process by 
which writing acceptable to an interpretive community is generated and authorized” (101, 
100). So while Trimbur does extend how we understand successful collaboration to work 
in a classroom environment through his critique of abnormal discourse as a critical 
component in collaborative learning, the extent of this critique does not go beyond what 
is essentially a repositioning of consensus as a complicating factor that makes 
collaboration purposeful. In other words, Trimbur demonstrates that collaborative 
learning is not a self-explanatory pedagogical theory; it requires critical explication to 
understand. But the essential purpose of collaborative learning as a method for mediating 
the shared knowledge of a community, as it is outlined in Bruffee’s social turn 
collaboration theory, nevertheless remains in place.  
Where Trimbur sees potential for complicating the id a of consensus while still 
maintaining its general purpose as an aim in collabr tion, Greg Myers surmises that 
consensus is too often a negative effect of unchallenged ideology. In the latter’s “Reality, 
Consensus, and Reform in the Rhetoric of Composition Teaching” (1986), collaborative 
learning, specifically the teaching of writing through collaborative methods, is positioned 
as a pedagogy that relies too heavily “on an appeal to the authority of consensus, and an 
appeal to the authority of reality” (155).  Pointing specifically to how Bruffee and Peter 
Elbow have relied on the ideas of consensus and a reified notion of reality, Myers uses a 
rudimentary conception of ideology to show the shortcomings of these appeals: 
To explain why I find these appeals problematic, I need to draw on an indispensible 
piece of Marxist jargon, the concept of ideology. I am not using the word the way it is 
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commonly used to criticize any systematic political be ief….I am using it in the sense 
established by Marx, and modified by twentieth-century Marxists, to describe the whole 
system of thought and belief that goes with a social and economic system, the thoughts 
that structure our thinking so deeply that we take them for granted, as the nature of the 
real world. The concept has been much discussed by Marxists because it helps explain 
the apparent stability of the capitalist system, despit  all its contradictions. It helps 
explain why people who are oppressed seem to go along with their oppression; the 
ideology of the oppressive system gives them the structures through which they make 
sense of their world. (155-56) 
For Myers the pedagogical implications of social constructionism must be examined 
alongside its political implications. That is, despite whatever supposedly anti-
authoritarian objectives collaborative learning reaches for pedagogically, the risk of 
reproducing oppressive ideological systems in which such collaborative learning takes 
place will only undermine the best of these pedagogical intentions. What troubles Myers 
in works like Elbow’s Writing Without Teachers and Bruffee’s articles on collaborative 
learning is how the concept of difference seems to be rendered unimportant once students 
and collaborators share a common goal.  
Thus the ideology Myers wants students to resist is represented by the “economic, 
racial, and sexist injustices” that are “fundamental and systemic” in so much of 
America’s ideological infrastructure. In this way he questions the claim that “reality is 
always a social construction” because if we support this claim, “then to accept the reality 
we see now is to accept the structure of illusion our system gives us. Worse it is to see 
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reality as something natural, outside our control, rather than to see it as something that we 
make in our actions in society” (157). When it comes to consensus, Myers wonders if 
what actually counts as consensus sometimes is simply what seems most natural within a 
perceived ideological structure, and it is in this way that Myers connects the social 
constructionist notions of consensus and reality to criticize what ultimately might not be 
“reformed” teaching at all, but instead just a styli ically pseudo-novel way of 
reproducing ideology. “But while Bruffee shows that reality can be seen as a social 
construct,” Myers writes, “he does not give us any way to criticize this construct. Having 
discovered the role of consensus in the production of knowledge, he takes this consensus 
thing that just is, rather than a something that might be good or bad” (166). To Bruffee’s 
credit, however, he relies on Rorty’s idea of abnormal discourse as a corrective tool, but 
perhaps Myers simply does not believe abnormal discourse matters within an oppressive 
ideological system that silences such discourse from the start. 
Myers’s ideological critique of consensus in collaborative learning is extended by 
John Schilb in “The Sociological Imagination and the Ethics of Collaboration,” an essay 
in which Schilb points to the work of Myers, Trimbur, Stewart, David Smit, and Bill 
Karis who all note “how consensus may amount to compliance with unjust power” (107). 
Building on one recommendation offered by Lisa Ede and Andrea Lunsford in their 
research study on practices of collaborative writing, Singular Texts/Plural Authors, 
Schilb says that we should be fostering “dialogic” forms of collaboration as teachers of 
writing in order to challenge those contexts of collaboration that might “impinge upon 
women, people of color, and other historically victimized groups” (107). Schilb mentions 
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that the term “collaboration” once was almost exclusively associated with treason—
“collaboration” with the enemy—and he amplifies this word’s prior history to 
demonstrate how even our pedagogical renderings of collaboration as a democratic, anti-
authoritarian teaching strategy might uphold oppressiv  ideologies that Myers, for 
example, raises concerns about. Drawing from C. Wright Mills’s 1959 book The 
Sociological Imagination, Schilb proposes that collaborative learning should not just 
examine the differences that make consensus impossible, like Trimbur argues, but also 
how the struggles students encounter with collaborative learning might be particular 
extensions of larger sociological struggles. “I propose that we have our students consider 
how their ‘collaborations’ might be seen by others as being distant from the darker sense 
of the words or as sliding toward it.” Schilb continues, “when we have our students 
‘collaborate’ with one another in our classrooms, and prepare them to ‘collaborate’ in 
their workplaces, we should encourage them to study how their activities connect to 
struggles for freedom in the larger world” (106).  
While both Myers and Schilb question the social constructionist ethic of “consensus” 
by way of questioning the ideological and sociological implications of collaboration in 
the writing classroom, there remains in both of these important critiques an understanding 
that collaboration somehow pedagogically represents the ocial conditions necessary for 
the creation of knowledge. In other words, Myers and Schilb are critical of what 
collaboration might do if it is uncritically deployed in the classroom without first 
considering the social contexts in which this collaboration is to transpire. That is, the 
types of collaborative learning specifically discussed by Myers, Schilb, and Trimbur are 
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the types of collaborative learning most associated with collaboration in composition: 
small group work, peer response sessions, and group writing projects. All of these, we 
must remember, happen within the disciplinary spaces of a classroom that is managed by 
a teacher. In this way, collaboration is a style of teaching through which teachers choose 
to engage their students, even if this engagement is i d rect. Myers and Schilb are right to 
point out that there are ideological considerations teachers must take into account with 
collaboration, but this is true of any pedagogy. 
Within a social constructionist paradigm students egage particular discourse 
communities as apprentices and potential co-creators of knowledge. Social 
constructionism, adds Schilb, “does constitute a significant advance over the unduly 
individualistic models of the composing process that predominated in the seventies,” and 
it “spur[s] us to undertake wide-ranging analyses of the networks in which acts of 
collaboration take place and have their effects” (108). While its critical vocabulary 
should be interrogated from time to time, especially when it comes to what it means to 
engage the social processes of knowledge production, these scholars demonstrate that 
collaborative learning is connected to social constructionism in such a way that makes 
discussion of either one impossible in isolation from the other.  
In an attempt to direct critical attention back towards the actual interactions of 
collaboration, David Bleich published “Collaboration and the Pedagogy of Disclosure” 
(1995). He specifically focuses on the “other challenges” posed by collaboration, ones 
that “emerge less from ideological considerations than from pragmatic difficulties in 
schools. Increasingly diverse classroom populations evince distances among students as 
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well as between students and teachers” (43-44). The problems inherent in collaborative 
learning are for Bleich those problems that make simply talking to one another 
sometimes difficult: 
 
Even among culturally homogeneous students and teachers, we know that both 
sharing and working together are not simply a matter of “opening up” or “expressing” 
ourselves, but above all require the slow, gradual b ildup of trust and understanding. 
Because each site of collaboration is different, there can be no formula with which to 
instruct every group or class….At this stage in our p rsuit of fulfilling collaborative 
work styles in the academy, I think a pedagogy of scholarship, and a criticism of 
disclosure are needed. I call this a “pedagogy of disclosure” both to be brief and to 
emphasize teaching….At issue for us now is the project of moving our habits of 
sharing and confiding, of even analytically exploring our inner feelings and thoughts 
from their traditional venues of complete “privacy” to the classroom, to which, under 
conditions of disciplined collaboration and circumspect thought-sharing, we seek to 
bring this additional resource. (44) 
 
 
A pedagogy of disclosure is one in which both students and teachers are encouraged to 
“disclose” what might at first appear to be sensitive personal information (cultural 
traditions, political affiliations, ethical stances, religious beliefs, etc.) in such a way as to 
encourage conversation among these types of differenc s—ones that might even seem 
incommensurate with opposing stances.  
Unlike those by Myers and Schilb, Bleich’s contribut on to the literature on 
collaboration underscores the undeniable exigence that must be accounted for in 
classroom-based pedagogies: the role of teachers as both the managers of and participants 
in the collaborative “conversations” that social turn composition so highly values. Of 
course, simply disclosing personal information without rhyme or reason can have 
negative effects, and this is why Bleich repeatedly stresses that teachers must help 
construct the right moments when appropriate levels of discourse are safe. “Such 
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teaching,” Bleich contends, “can maintain the necessity of understanding the collective 
within the subjective, and the subjective within the collective” (47). What else is 
noteworthy about Bleich’s “pedagogy of disclosure” for collaborative learning is its 
implicit argument that our education is ultimately influenced by the individuals with 
whom we interact in order to know things. And while this account of collaboration does 
avoid overreliance on social constructionist principles, Bleich nevertheless illustrates 
what this pedagogy looks like through a discussion of “modes of disclosure,” types of 
particular interactions that upon close inspection are set up as types of discourse 
situations that, much like Rorty’s abnormal discourse, artificially create the conflicts 
necessary for disclosure to remedy. 
The final piece I want to review here is Susan Miller’s “New Discourse City: An 
Alternative Model for Collaboration,” because here th author attempts to not so much 
extend social constructionist principles and metaphors, but instead to circumvent them for 
the purpose of introducing just what the subtitle of her essay suggest, an alternative 
model for conceptualizing collaboration. Interestingly, Miller begins her essay admitting 
that she once harbored a “pre-social-constructivist” b as against collaboration because she 
conflated it with cheating and plagiarism. As her experience developed, however, Miller 
came to associate collaborative learning with various types of workshop scenarios and 
explains that along the way she “was predisposed to accept the tenor of the varied and 
individually developing arguments that comprise the standard tests of collaborative 
pedagogy in composition theory” (283). Citing as influences Bruffee, Karen Spears, 
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Trimbur, Lunsford and Ede, Anne Ruggles Gere, and Bleich, Miller explains what 
exactly she has learned about social constructionis collaboration. 
 
“Collaborative teaching” easily became not a mere tchnique to produce a better text 
for evaluation against my standards and meanwhile to provide an analogue to school 
recess in class, but theorized “collaborative learning” and “collaborative writing.” I 
agree, on the Johnsonian basis of the experience of my senses, that most ideas and all 
published texts result from the presence of more than one person. I am aware that 
learning done in discussion and engagement with others is retained better than the 
results of isolated study. As a theorist, I accept tha ideas and texts reiterate and 
displace other ideas and other texts in social interac ions that comprise intertextual 
exchange, not individualistic or inspired referents. I know that “meaning” resides in 
language rather than in extrinsic referents, and that agreements about meanings and 
about the significance of texts are produced by negotiation about words and cultural 
purposes, not agreements about a truthful, or valid, rrangement of an unmediated 
“reality.” (284) 
 
 
Miller testifies to her commitment to collaboration in principle as well as to the basic 
social constructionist argument about the relationships between knowledge, conversation, 
and communities of knowledgeable peers. She indeed admits that the various 
connotations of collaboration which get manifested in notions of “community,” 
“conversation,” “dialectic,” “sharing,” and “respecting man voices” are “the pedagogic 
equivalents of a philosophical commitment to the socially constructed nature of 
knowledge” (284). What Miller proposes in her essay, however, is a model for 
collaboration that, not unlike Trimbur’s argument, still adheres to these basic principles 
but accounts for the unavoidable conflicts and struggles with authority to be accounted 
for as part of the normal, healthy workings of collaborative engagement.  
Using as a case study the essay Miller composed with five freshmen students which 
was eventually published in College Composition and Communication, she wishes to 
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explore how a “new logic” of collaboration might bed veloped around the metaphor of 
the city instead of the community. Collaboration works according to a two-part 
configuration, she says. “One is the metaphor of social ‘community’ that identifies itself 
at least temporarily as constituting a body with common goals, and the other is exemplary 
practices that are proposed as socio-political alternatives to modern ‘individualism’ and 
its capitalist and masculinist pedagogic manifestations” (285). The challenge with this 
model is located in questions about how the individual is “altered” through these 
exchanges. To what extent, asks Miller, “is ‘community’ either descriptive or desirable?” 
Does the pedagogy of collaboration here represent a “genuine alternative” to how we 
think about knowledge and discourse, or does it constitute a “reproductive ‘alter-[the]-
native,’ a way of extending the colonizing educational project of fitting students to 
participate in newly diverse demographics within an old individualistic culture of identity 
politic?” (285).  
When it came to her experience working with students o  the composition of their 
collaborative essay, Miller notes that “my informed understanding of social constructions 
of knowledge and language, and the students’ practical experience of them, hadn’t been 
worth a damn, not in any essential sense of revising their stance toward educational 
practice” (289). After recounting the various conflicts and roadblocks Miller encountered 
among these students, she testifies that social constructionist models of collaboration 
were undermined “insofar as the students…neglected or actively refused to identify 
themselves as communities, or ‘groups’” (292). The solution for Miller is found in 
reconceptualizing the community model of collaborati n into one that better reflects the 
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discursive practices of multiple voices who most negotiate the conflicts of collaboration. 
Her “new discourse city” model is one that calls on c llaborators to conspire together but 
recognize that like life in the city, our exchanges with others are structured around an 
attempt to maintain movement and the mutual exchange that keep a city alive, but to do 
so while recognizing that a city is not a community, at least not in the sense that social 
constructionists describe the idealized collaborative groups that are the models of their 
community-focused pedagogy. The “discursive model” of new discourse city 
collaboration, Miller writes,  
 
would celebrate four qualities of urban societies: t would allow for differentiation 
without exclusion: appreciate variety, encourage rotic attraction to novel, strange, 
and surprising encounters; and—as Bender and Young argue (if differently)—value 
publicity in ‘public spaces…where people stand and sit together, interact and mingle, 
or simply witness one another, without becoming a unified community…’ (299)  
 
 
Just like Trimbur, who argued that accounting for the differences among us helps move 
collaboration towards a more realistic goal of compromise and consensus (instead of an 
idealist rendering of uncomplicated consensus), Miller believes the urban metaphors 
implied through a city-centered model of collaboration offer us a way to account for and 
appreciate the differences that make community sometimes impossible to actualize.  
While certainly not exhaustive in its scope, this review of how social turn 
collaboration has been complicated by theorists in rhetoric and composition testifies to 
what has become the problematic use of collaboration as a pedagogical descriptor and 
organizing concept for theoretical principles that many in composition have used to 
understand the social dimensions of knowledge and its location in discourse or 
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“conversation.” However, in the end what ultimately gets complicated is how the idea of 
collaboration can be expressed without unmooring it from the social constructionist 
paradigm that Bruffee’s scholarship practically initiated. The result is what, as Miller’s 
piece shows, has come to be our best attempts at making collaboration relevant: 
extending and replacing certain of our metaphors to somehow better explain how 
collaboration demonstrates the social construction of knowledge. For Miller in particular, 
she wanted a better model to explain how those essential social constructionist ideas she 
recounts in the beginning of her essay might translate pedagogically through explanation 
of how we negotiate conflicts and account for differences in collaboration. 
This leads us to what I call the poles of collaborative nihilism, a term I described 
earlier in this chapter to explain how collaboration gets bifurcated into the exclusive 
categories of theory and practice. Accordingly, we can organize most of the scholarship 
on collaboration and collaborative learning around these two poles, the points of which 
represent a kind of “killer dichotomy,” to borrow yet another term from Berthoff. The 
next and final section of this chapter explains the poles of collaborative nihilism and 
demonstrates why we need a better starting point tha  social constructionism to explain 
the work of collaboration. 
The Poles of Collaborative Nihilism in Composition Scholarship 
But we should not let our enthusiasm for this social view lead us to accepting social 
construction of knowledge as something good in itself.  
 - Greg Myers, “Reality, Consensus, and Reform in the Rhetoric of Composition 
Teaching” 
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It is somewhat of a commonplace to question the dichotomous split between theory 
and practice, the purely abstract from the functionally practical, and this is true especially 
in a field like rhetoric and composition where pedagogy has always remained important 
to its scholarship, thus creating an urgency of sorts t  understand the practical 
applications of theory. Paulo Freire is perhaps the best known pedagogue to 
compositionists who explains the pedagogical imperative through his notion of praxis, 
“reflection and action upon the world to transform it.” Praxis names the necessary 
combination of critical reflection and applied performance; it marks the conditions 
necessary to resolve oppressor-oppressed contradictions. “To achieve this goal,” writes 
Freire in his now trademark Marxist idiom,  
 
the oppressed must confront reality critically, simultaneously objectifying and acting 
upon that reality. A mere perception of reality notfollowed by this critical 
intervention will not lead to a transformation of objective reality—precisely because 
it is not a true perception. (51, 52) 
 
 
Over the years American educators have ironically shaped Freire’s oppressor-oppressed 
distinction into a new type of killer dichotomy in the work of how we conceptualize the 
power dynamics in our systems of modern education. We can see this dichotomy at work 
in some iterations social turn collaboration, especially in the early attempts to situate 
collaborative learning as an alternative mode of learning that takes authority away from 
the teacher. Besides what is only a vague social-interventionist imperative for 
collaborative learning in such justifications, when situated next to Freire this reworking 
of authority distorts what he viewed as the dialectical relationship between oppressor and 
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oppressed. It was not that there is a clear “oppresso ” who has all the power and wields it 
against a completely helpless and hapless “oppressed.” The oppressor-oppressed binary 
in the work of Freire represents the relational dynamic that restricts all subjects from the 
liberating work of problematizing the cultural conditions that constrain critical inquiry 
(and for Freire, literacy education) through which to actualize consientização.   
When it comes to how collaboration has been theorizd n rhetoric and composition, I 
believe as a discipline we lack the “critical consciousness” represented by Freire’s 
concept of praxis—that mediating relationship that uses reflection and action to 
conceptualize the consequences of a contingent princi le or theory in order to develop a 
sense of its experiential efficacy; how to make theory into “true perception.” The chief 
reason for this is that there is a clear theory-practice dichotomy at work in how 
collaboration gets explained in scholarship according to a social constructionist 
paradigm. As I have suggested, it is possible to organize the scholarship on collaboration 
heuristically around two dichotomous poles—poles that roughly represent the difference 
between theory and practice conventionally understood. We can examine these poles of 
theory and practice according to how they have emerged from 
When social turn collaboration is theorized in scholarship, it usually is explained as 
the methodological imperative resulting from the aphorism that knowledge is socially 
constructed. Collaboration becomes synonymous with conversation—at least insofar as 
“conversation” is positioned in the social construcionist framework provided by Bruffee, 
who, echoing Michael Oakshott, refers to philosophical discourse as the “conversation of 
mankind.” Collaboration in this context gets rendered as a natural process of in the 
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production of knowledge. The problem with such a theoretical positioning, of course, is 
that it is practically untenable as theory. To say that all writing is collaborative, or that 
knowledge is the production of conversation, which is mediated by collaborative 
discursive engagements with the world, none of these descriptions allows collaboration to 
actually be anything other than an effect of something else. That is, collaboration just 
happens; it is not something we can control. In social turn collaboration theory, this 
imperative is manifest; this collaborative imperative—if I may use this term—is what 
marks the condition of collaboration around its “theory” poll.  
Around the other poll, the “practice” poll, collaboration is something; or rather, it is 
something particular: a type of engagement that signals a specific type of interaction that 
is required for the social construction of knowledg to be realized through conversation. 
In other words, collaboration on this side of the dichotomy is explained through specific 
types of activity that usually are organized according to specific tactical configurations of 
students in proximity. Here we see scholarship that debates how best to organize and do 
collaboration in classroom settings where, according to the social constructionist 
imperative, learning will be achieved through the conversational interactions among 
students and between students and teachers.  
When situated heuristically around contradictory polls, it is easy to recognize the 
paradoxes at work when our theories of collaboration are translated into “practice” 
through recipe-style scholarship that explains how best to implement the processes of 
collaborative learning—processes that, according to the theory at least—are already at 
work in our discourse. Below I offer a brief review of how particular pieces of 
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scholarship can fit into this theory/practice dichotomy to illustrate the poles of 
collaborative nihilism. By no means exhaustive, the pieces I have chosen to include are 
used representatively to illustrate how collaboratin is conventionally explained 
theoretically as a default function in the social construction of knowledge or it tactically 
as a pedagogical strategy for teachers to implement. 
Collaboration as Theoretical Imperative 
Robert J. Connors likened the social turn in composition theory to a Kuhnean 
revolution. Indeed, he begins his Forward to Greg Clark’s Dialogue, Dialectic, and 
Conversation: A Social Perspective on the Function of Writing (1990) with this assertion: 
“Revolutions in composition studies are a dime a dozen” (ix) and then offers something 
of a poetic reflection about how composition studies has arrived at this new social 
constructionist paradigm. The “shift” for Connors occurred at one of those particular 
“free-for-all crowdfests where college comp types go for free food and booze at CCCC” 
and there it all became perfectly clear: the theories of writing that positioned language 
and composition as an isolated, inner-born outgrowth of mind and creativity were wrong. 
“This bunch of people was the whole situation, the sine qua non, that without which 
nothing you had been trying to say—or BE—for years and years now would have any 
meaning” (ix-x). Here is a sampling of this reminiscence: 
 
For a long time—who knows what metaphysical dream we were living?—we had 
been scratching around with fragments, isolated elem nts, sequestered theories, 
disconnected atoms. Assumption: you can learn about something by taking it to 
pieces. Assumption: putting pieces together makes a whole. Assumption: the Self 
creates significance. Assumption: numbering and ordering systems create self-
evident, objective meanings. Assumption: the writer is an Artist, alone, supreme…(x) 
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By the end of his Forward, Connors reigns in the romanticism and stiffens his tone. 
While a revolution has occurred, we are not out of the realm of questions. “This social 
constructionist deal doesn’t solve too many problems for us, does it?” For teachers of 
composition, we are “where the rubber meets the road” and as such, “Our teaching will 
have to reflect these social-constructionist ideas or not” (xi).  
Connors’s brief Forward to a relatively brief book, for Clark’s text is direct and 
demanding in its exactitude, represents what is perhaps the natural zenith of social 
constructionist thought when it comes to explaining how the theory works in 
composition. Social constructionism doesn’t solve all our problems, says Connors, but it 
does help give us a better idea about the origins of our knowledge in discourse. While 
still a little mysterious, social constructionism is oddly comforting in its non-reliance on 
metaphysical foundations and ideal Forms. We still have to work out the details, in other 
words, but at least we know we are moving in the right direction.  
In Dialogue, Dialectic, and Conversation, Clark outlines in more detailed language 
what this direction looks like. Social constructionist theory shows us that we 
communicate “neither to present reality nor to transmit it, but to constitute it”; and 
moreover, communication is at rock bottom “a collaborative process through which a 
community of people construct a shared understanding of their common experience that 
provides the foundation for their continued cooperation” (1, 2). When social 
constructionist theory is taken at face value, then t re is no discourse that is not 
collaborative because all knowledge is mediated by the conversation shared among 
knowledgeable peers. Collaboration, then, is the discursive imperative of social 
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constructionism insofar as social constructionists u e “collaboration” to describe the 
discursive mediation of knowledge through conversation. Such is the working premise of 
Clark’s social constructionist epistemology on which he establishes the three-part 
description of how discourse works in a knowledge community. 
The title of his book reflects this three-part description, terms that Clark suggests 
many assume to be different words for the same thing. But these terms imply important 
distinctions, he says, at lest when it comes to therizing the social dimensions of our 
discourse production: 
 
The term dialogue describes the cooperative shape of that process [of discursive 
exchange], an exchange of discourse that is characterized by its participants’ 
consciousness of each other, by their conscious efforts to interact cooperatively. The 
term dialectic, by contrast, describes its collaborative function, how that process of 
exchange enables people to construct together assumptions and agreements they can 
share. The familiar term conversation describes that process itself, the natural 
experience of cooperative, collaborative interaction hrough which people enact the 
essence of communication. (xvi) 
 
 
Reviewing his book for Rhetoric Review, Elizabeth Ervin observes that if the aim of 
Clark’s project “lies in his curious insistence that dialogue, dialectic, and conversation 
are not the same things, and that tendencies to equate them are facile and 
oversimplified—and on this point Clark simply does not deliver” (368). Ervin’s criticism 
illustrates that when social constructionism is plumbed for all it’s worth, the results will 
always fall back on equivocation and conflation. As Ervin points out, even if Clark is 
occasionally “overzealous,” he still “nearly numbs us…by relentlessly bombarding us 
with words like sustain, transcend, negotiate, cooperate, collaborate, share, consensus, 
and compromise” (368).  
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Such is the case for “collaboration” in Clark’s rend ring of how to explain the social 
dimension of our discourse production. According to Clark’s schema, dialectic is 
collaborative because meanings become sharable throug  the give-and-take of dialogue, 
which requires a kind of cooperation or collaborative goodwill, while the idea of 
conversation encompasses the whole process. As Clark puts it, “The familiar term 
conversation describes the process itself, the natural experience of cooperative, 
collaborative interaction through which people enact the essence of communication” 
(xvi). Obviously Ervin’s confusion is not unfounded when it comes to differentiating 
concepts like collaboration from others like consensus, cooperation, and compromise. 
Regardless, the point here is how “collaboration” functions theoretically for Clark, and 
thus we turn to the book’s most concise statement about discourse:  
 
In communicating we collaborate with others in constructing and continually 
reconstructing from our commonality the community that enables us, both 
individually and collectively, to survive and progress, a community comprising 
people engaged in an ongoing process of renegotiating the beliefs and values—and, 
consequently, the action—they can share. (1) 
 
 
 As one can see, collaboration isn’t so much something in itself for Clark as it is a default 
condition of something else, that something else her b ing communication. But if all 
communication is collaborative, then what does it mean, pragmatically, to value 
collaboration? 
Less than a year before Clark published Dialogue, Dialectic, and Conversation, 
James A. Reither and Douglas Vipond published “Writing as Collaboration” in College 
English, an essay that like Clark’s book demonstrates what is the logical result of social 
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constructionist theory that uses collaboration to explain the production of discourse: that 
all discourse is ultimately collaborative. For Reither and Vipond, however, their aim is to 
understand how the “revolution” in composition studies “produced by social 
constructionists theories” might actually translate practically into our teaching, for as they 
note, this revolution has produced “little substantive change in either course design or 
classroom practice” (855). Noticing the ambiguity inherent in simply describing writing 
as a social process, Reither and Vipond contend that such an idea “does not tell us much 
at all about what people do when they write or about what students might do to learn to 
write” (856). Their proposal is to replace descriptors, switching “social” with 
“collaborative,” since the latter better implies what the social looks like in the practice of 
writing. “Thinking of writing as a collaborative process gives us more precise ways to 
consider what writers do when they write, not just with their texts, but also with their 
language, their personae, their readers” (856). 
My question is, does it? Such arguments seem to encurage a grand theoretical 
narrative that leaves little room for nuance. Reither and Vipond’s essay is significant in 
this regard because they acknowledge collaboration’s presumed status as an unavoidable 
condition of our discursive engagement with the world. Their aim is to articulate how we 
can recognize this imperative collaboration in the realms of our practice. I use the term 
“realms” deliberately because this is how Reither and Vipond propose we recognize the 
collaborative condition of our writing. Specifically, they propose that the collaborative 
nature of writing can be understood as composing three separate but related practices that 
directly apply to the work of composition instruction. As they explain, “These different 
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ways can be thought of as comprising different forms, or realms, of collaboration, three 
of which are especially important: coauthoring, workshopping, and knowledge making” 
(858). To explain how these realms of collaboration function to give meaning to the 
“social” nature of writing, the authors reflect on a occasion when Vipond collaborated 
with Russell A. Hunt on an essay that was eventually published in the journal TEXT. 
Reither and Vipond use this experience as a case study—their term—to illustrate how 
writing and collaboration are inextricable.  
The first realm of collaboration that Vipond and Hunt engaged was of course the 
literal process of co-authorship, one of the “salient advantages” of which was the 
“synergy” this co-authoring venture harnessed. Certainly an unfortunate term that 
invokes the jargon of a corporate teambuilding seminar, their understanding of “synergy” 
is fair enough: these writers “were able to accomplish things together that neither could 
have accomplished alone” (858). Even though Vygotsky’s theory of ZDP seems to be a 
better, more reasonable (and non-mysterious) explanation than a reference to “synergy” 
for why collaboration results in work that is greatr than its individual parts, nonetheless 
the interaction required to mutually render discourse into written text is for these authors 
the first realm of how we can conceptualize writing as collaboration. Next is 
workshopping, the second realm, and this level of collaboration involves the processes of 
appropriately shaping a text for a specific discourse community. 
 
Hunt and Vipond’s colleagues consciously ‘conspired’ with the authors, not only to 
ensure that the article argued accepted knowledge claims (for, after all, their ultimate 
project was to advance knowledge in the field), but also to help them write a piece 
that would withstand the scrutiny of journal editors and reviewers, the official 
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representatives of the discipline. To help Hunt andVipond get their piece published, 
the trusted assessors functioned as stand-in reviewrs and editors. (859) 
 
 
Here the idea of peer review, a concept the authors conflate with workshopping, 
collaboration is utilized as the critical term to describe the nature of this activity. So far 
collaboration exists in the actual interaction of two writers composing a single document, 
but it also exists when these writers give their drafts to others to review. The third realm 
of collaboration is “knowledge making,” the most ess ntial marker of collaborative 
engagement: 
 
[The] third realm of collaboration, however, is essntial. We call it knowledge 
making. Hunt and Vipond collaborated with others who had written and spoken 
before them as, collectively, they constructed and reconstructed the field of 
knowledge in which their project found a fit. That field exists solely because writers 
have made public their thinking about literary reading. Those who have published 
statements about literary reading have combined their knowing with that of all others 
who have participated in the conversation; collectively, their statements make up the 
pool of knowledge that is the field. Hunt and Vipond, in writing their article on 
literary reading, tossed their thinking into a pool f knowing—they strove to make 
their own contribution to knowledge-already-existing. In adding their bit to 
knowledge about literary reading, they participated in the process of collaborative 
knowledge making. (860) 
 
 
So as this last description of collaboration-as-knowledge making is presented, even the 
act of “tossing” one’s own contribution into that pool of knowledge-already-existing gets 
to count as collaboration, or at least a form of it. So what is not collaboration for Reither 
and Vipond? The answer is nothing—everything is collab rative when it comes to 
writing. Of course, when put into a pragmatic frame, another way of saying this is that 
collaboration, because it is everything, actually means nothing, nothing in the sense that it 
can be examined consequentially as a specific approch to the study of writing. If writing 
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is collaboration, i.e., all writing has inherent collaborative structures to it, then it does 
very little good to call on us to transform how we understand composition because there 
is, really, nothing to change. In other words, Reith r and Vipond essentially thrust 
themselves under their own critical light, putting their description of collaborative 
writing, or really their description of writing in general, within a social constructionist 
framework that leaves no room for their theory to translate into practical action.   
The final essay I will briefly review to illustrate he over-determined status of 
collaboration in terms of its theoretical orientation towards social constructionism 
appeared in the 1992 collection New Visions of Collaborative Writing, edited by Janis 
Forman. In “Bakhtin, Collaborative Partners, and Published Discourse: A Collaborative 
View of Composing,” Charlotte Thralls extends our working theory on collaboration by 
using Bakhtin’s theory of dialogism to account for the “collaborative impulses” inherent 
in writing. “The purpose of this essay,” Thralls explains,  
 
is to develop the claim that all writing is inherently collaborative. More specifically, 
this essay seeks to show how texts, whether individually or jointly authored, should 
be considered collaborative to examine how this collab ration works.(64) 
 
 
Turning to an explication of Bakhtin’s theory of the communication chain, Thralls 
underscores the centrality of “the other” in the process of speech communication. We do 
not merely listen to others with passivity, explains Thralls; instead our response to others 
are prompted by the dialogic interactions that Bakhtin implies through his conception of 
“partner-interlocutors” (66). Dialogue is therefore a connected series of utterances that 
point both backwards to particular discursive prompts and forwards to potential 
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discursive responses. “Every utterance is linked to others through dialogue,” Thralls 
explains, and “in the utterance we see the responsive ature of language.” She continues, 
“To communicate is to engage dialogic partners. To speak—to write—demands 
collaboration with others in a communication chain” (66). It is here where Thralls not-so-
subtly conflates dialogism with collaboration, situating the latter as a descriptive 
alternative for the former.  
In the remainder of her essay Thralls explains how we can understand different types 
of utterances to work in the process of examining published discourse. There are, for 
example, author utterances, editor utterances, and reviewer utterances that all contribute 
to the dialogic (i.e., collaborative) structure of a text. In the end, Thralls argues that as 
writing instructors we should “teach our students the collaborative activity inherent in all 
writing, rather than reserve instruction on collaboration to those situations involving 
plural authorship” (65). At most, then, what we can “teach” is theory—in this case a 
brand of Bakhtinian dialogism—in the hope that once this theory is understood, students 
will be able to harness it while grappling with their own struggles to render discourse 
onto the page. I’m not sure what difference this is upposed to make outside of the way 
students are oriented to the stuff of composition, because essentially what Thralls 
achieves is a renaming of Bakhtin’s dialogism for cmpositionists. By the conclusion of 
her essay, Thralls, like other social constructionists, finds a way to conflate terms. 
Dialogism is basically collaboration, and speech communities are basically discourse 
communities.  
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In all three of these examples of scholarship, collaboration is situated as an 
unavoidable consequence of social constructionist theories of discourse. I should 
underscore what I believe are sincere attempts by these scholars to explain collaboration 
in ways that are both accessible and utile. In other words, these scholars’ commitment to 
and belief in collaboration is commendable, and certainly these books and articles have 
helped to make collaboration a recognized disciplinary practice in composition studies. 
Yet taken as whole this theory leave little room for pragmatic negotiation. Collaboration 
may be open to different interpretations, as evidenced by these three different 
explanations, but there is nothing contingent about the underlying theory that fuels the 
collaborative imperative itself that is a holdover from social constructionist epistemology. 
So what difference does it make? What is collaboration, then, if it is simply a descriptive 
marker that describes the social construction of discourse? The theoretical imperatives of 
collaboration, according to a social constructionist framework, render collaboration 
untenable as theory when it comes to the “practical inquiry,” as understood by Berthoff, 
that is necessary for making our theories pragmatic because no conceptual space is left 
for identifying collaboration as something other than our general conversational 
intercourse with others. 
Collaboration as Pedagogical Tool 
When collaboration is not positioned in scholarship as a theoretical imperative linked 
to a social constructionist epistemology, it is usually positioned pedagogically as a type or 
style of teaching and learning. That is, when collaborati n is not explained theoretically 
as natural extension of the social constructionist notion of conversation, it is instead 
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explained as a particular type of pedagogy that involves particular types of tactical 
configurations among students and teachers.  
One example of this tactic-oriented approach to explaining collaboration is Muriel 
Harris’s 1992 College Composition and Communication article, “Collaboration Is Not 
Collaboration Is Not Collaboration: Writing Center Tutorials vs. Peer-Response Groups.” 
Harris attempts to shape a taxonomy to categorize typ s of collaboration in the hope of 
explaining that “collaboration” is not always “collaboration,” to play off her title. She 
specifically emphasizes the difference between collab ration as it often takes place in 
peer-response groups (like one might encounter in an FYC course) and collaboration that 
occurs during a writing center session, or “tutorial” as Harris then called them. It is thus 
towards clarifying and defining distinctions in what counts as collaborative work that 
Harris sets out as the aim of her article. At several points Harris defines collaboration, 
although none of her definitions appear systematic. “Collaboration, a process writers 
engage in and teachers facilitate,” she writes, “is firmly entrenched in our thinking about 
the teaching of writing. But the term is also used as a blanket tossed over a variety of 
activities that are not identical, thereby blurring useful distinctions” (369). And this is the 
exigency, obviously, for the her essay—how to distingu sh between types of 
collaboration so that it is not simply a “blanket tossed over a variety of activities.” They 
term she uses I want to draw attention to here is “activities.” 
For Harris, collaboration is essentially a way to tactically organize students according 
to certain prestructured discursive situations—those situations being either a peer-
response type scenario in a classroom or a tutorial scenario in a writing center. Harris 
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goes on to explain how peer-response differs from a tutorial in the writing center. For 
example, here she comments on the general conversational nature of each type of 
“collaborative” situation: 
 
The emphasis on general skills in response groups rather than individualized concerns 
in tutorials also explains why the collaboration is different in each setting. In the 
response group, there is back-and-forth conversation intended to offer mutual help as 
writing groups work together in a give-and-take relationship. Generally, all are 
expected to benefit both from the responses they receiv  about their writing and from 
the practice they get as critical readers of the discourse of other writers. In tutorial 
collaboration, however, students are asked only to respond to their own texts. (373) 
 
 
Implicit throughout Harris’s essay are two assumptions about the idea of collaboration as 
it applies to the teaching of composition. First, collaboration occurs through two primary 
modes or activities, peer-response and one-on-one tutoring. Second, although this 
assumption is not as blatant as the first assumption, Harris also assumes that the work of 
a composition class is to develop an individual’s writing ability. In other words, what gets 
produced in a composition course are single-authored texts by students who, although 
they might “collaborate” with one another and with writing center tutors during the 
preparation of their draft, nevertheless “compose” th ir papers by themselves and 
therefore can be counted as single authors.  
 
Both tutoring and response groups are student-centered approaches that rely on 
collaboration as a powerful learning tool to promote interaction between reader and 
writer, to promote dialogue and negotiation, and to heighten writers’ sense of 
audience. (369) 
 
 
But Harris also comments on the idea of collaborative writing, a concept that 
obviously bears on the work of writing center tutorials and peer-response groups. 
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“Although there has been some confusion in the use of ‘collaboration’ to refer both to 
collaborative writing and collaborative learning about writing, collaborative writing is 
now identified as writing involving two or more writers working together to produce a 
joint project.” She continues, “When writing collaboratively, each may take 
responsibility for a different portion of the final text, and there may be group consensus 
or some sort of collective responsibility for the final product” (369). What is important to 
notice here is how Harris essentially rejects the mantra of process-oriented pedagogy that 
says process (and not product) should be the focus f writing pedagogy in a composition 
classroom. That is, for Harris “collaborative writing” begins with its product, a text that is 
“jointly” produced; therefore, collaborative writing can take place, in theory, between 
people who have never met, let alone interacted with one another.  
Even when we extend charity to Harris’s two-part taxonomy, her distinctions still 
come across as fastidious. I too can understand the esire and even the value of outlining 
the differences between the discursive space of a writing center session and a peer-
response session, however it is difficult to understand why the idea of collaboration must 
be used to categorize these types of interaction. By the end of Harris’s essay she doesn’t 
privilege one “form” of collaboration over the other, but she simply asserts, “Given the 
advantages and disadvantages of tutoring and group w rk, then, there is indeed solid 
argument to be made for helping our students experience and reap the benefits of both 
forms of collaboration” (381). Collaboration is thus situated as a pedagogical tool from 
the outset of Harris’s work, and even though it is a “powerful” tool, it is a tool 
nonetheless. 
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Like any tool understood as such, collaboration is useful insofar as it helps us achieve 
particular ends, but to a certain extent tools are interchangeable. I don’t need a hammer to 
effectively drive a nail into a wall so that I may hang a picture; I can just as easily find 
something around the house that might stand in for the hammer, like the antique iron I 
use as a bookend. Similarly, as a tool “collaboratin” s useful insofar as a composition 
instructor deems it helpful in achieving certain pedagogical ends. For Harris, some of 
these ends include promoting interaction between writers and readers, encouraging 
dialogue and negotiation (although I am not sure how this latter goal is any different from 
promoting interaction between writers and readers) and developing a heightened sense of 
audience (369). These are outcomes that pedagogically might be achieved through any 
number of specific scenarios according to any number of philosophies, so why does 
“collaboration” matter here? Harris’s formulation of c llaboration as a tool makes it that 
much easier for teachers of writing to reject it. Tools are interchangeable and therefore, 
depending on the situation, arbitrary.  
In “Portfolio Evaluation, Collaboration, and Writing Centers,” Irene Clark follows in 
the footsteps of Harris and articulates a distinction between types of collaboration in 
order to defend the work of writing centers. Framing her article in a discussion of how 
the Freshmen Writing Program at USC adopted a portfolio grading rubric and how this 
requirement translated into a new onslaught of students into the writing center, Clark 
attempts to answer those critical questions that inform how professionals negotiate the 
ethical terrain of managing writing center tutorials. Two of these questions are: “What do 
we mean when we assert that writing centers “assist” students in becoming better 
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writers?” and “What are the ethical limits of such assistance?” (516). Knowing what 
“counts” as responsible assistance obviously bears upon the work of successful writing 
center tutorials, for as Clark notes, “too much assistance is not only counterproductive, 
but can result in a form of collaboration that strains ethical boundaries” (516). When it 
comes to the idea of collaboration itself, Clark observes that the term is “often bandied 
about among compositionists without a great deal of reflection or acknowledgment of the 
difficulty of incorporating it into composition pedagogy” (519). Taking into 
consideration that Harris, too, recognized a certain amount of ambiguity at work when 
teachers invoked the idea of collaboration, it is interesting that Clark essentially argues 
the same point and attempts a similar method at remedying this ambiguity.  
When it comes to this first part, Clark’s recognition of collaboration’s ambiguity, I 
think it is worth quoting Clark. And considering my own emphasis in this chapter on 
explaining how collaboration gets rendered pedagogically according to social 
constructionist epistemology, the following is particularly relevant. 
 
But what do we really mean when we say that we believ  n “collaborative learning?” 
A strict examination of the concept suggests that true collaboration can occur only 
when collaborators are part of the same discourse community. As I have noted 
elsewhere, true colleagues regularly “collaborate” by discussing their work with one 
another, assisting one another by suggesting sources, t ading drafts, perhaps even 
polishing style in another’s drafts….This type of what may be termed “collegial” 
collaboration aims to assist the author in perceiving conceptual or perhaps stylistic 
blind spots that are unavoidable for even experienced, ompetent writers. (520) 
 
 
“True” collaboration can mean something as simple as suggesting a source to a colleague, 
but it might also mean simply talking about ideas together, and “perhaps”—I guess in 
extraordinary circumstances—“polishing style” in someone else’s manuscript. Besides 
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Clark’s catchall use of “collaboration” to describe all these different types of interaction 
between colleagues, it is also interesting to note that Clark tacitly implies that 
collaborators don’t actually help one another invent content for a draft; the most direct 
influence on another’s writing we have might be through “polishing,” e.g., cleaning up a 
text. I must admit that descriptions such as this one baffle me, but then again within such 
a pedagogical discussion nothing is not collaborative, at least when we are dealing with 
social constructionist theory. But this now leads to the second aspect of Clark’s article I 
want to discuss, and that is her method of distinguishing between types of collaboration. 
Unlike Harris who attempts to distinguish between collaboration in writing center 
tutorials and collaboration in classroom peer groups, Clark aims for an ethical distinction 
in her schema, and this is the difference between “legitimate” collaboration and 
“illegitimate” collaboration. At first Clark conflates collaboration with assistance, but she 
also implies several other ethical distinctions, such as “true” collaboration and “collegial” 
collaboration and their obvious corollaries: untrue and hostile collaboration. These latter 
two ideas might help further illuminate Clark’s explanation of legitimate and illegitimate 
collaboration—or “assistance”: “Illegitimate assistance…substantially effaces or 
overrides the student’s own contributions to a text…[and it] not only fails to help the 
student’s development but also renders the student vul erable to charges of inadvertent 
plagiarism.” On the other hand, 
 
According to what has come to be established writing center “lore,” legitimate 
collaboration is primarily directed at developing the student’s writing process and at 
improving the student’s understanding of how texts operate in terms of their readers 
and the expectations of an appropriate discourse community. With this aim in mind, 
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tutors can, for instructional purposes, make or suggest changes in a text; however, 
they must make sure that the student’s own contributions remain predominant. (520) 
 
 
By far the most important implication in Clark’s rendering of legitimate vs. illegitimate 
collaboration is on how she positions illegitimate collaboration as “assistance” that blurs 
or obscures the individual voice of a single composer.  Conversely, legitimate 
collaboration is assistance that somehow improves th  quality of that individual voice. In 
other words, for Clark collaboration comes down to how it gets interpreted by the ones 
assessing the work, and in a writing class only indiv duals compose papers and therefore 
the “individual talent” is what matters most, to echo the title of an essay by a poet whose 
most famous piece, “The Wasteland,” has been accused of plagiarism. Of course, Clark 
might say this is just a case of Eliot’s editor’s illegitimate collaboration. Regardless I 
believe my point is obvious: while clearly writing from a social constructionist 
foundation, Clark nevertheless concerns herself with the work of differentiating types of 
collaboration—the ethical and unethical—that make individual work either legitimate or 
illegitimate.  
Clark’s article points to what is a necessary evil for some teachers of composition, 
and that is the messy work of assessment and evaluation. Of course it is easier to talk 
about the strengths and weaknesses of writing without actually having to attach a grade to 
it, but grade we must and Clark’s discussion, while extending on the work of Harris, also 
builds on work by Harvey S. Wiener in 1986 in his College English article “Collaborative 
Learning in the Classroom: A Guide to Evaluation.”  
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From the very beginning of Wiener’s article, collaboration is situated as a learning 
“method” that represents the pedagogical consequence of a “new paradigm” in 
composition theory brought about, largely, by the work of Bruffee and the latter’s 
appropriation of social constructionist theory cobbled together from the work of 
Vygotsky, Piaget, Abercrombie, Rorty, and Kuhn (52). But instead of accepting this new 
paradigm unproblematically, Wiener poses that Bruffee’s model, “built on the delicate 
and necessary tension between theory and practice, may not, I suspect, have guided much 
of what teachers are calling collaborative learning today” and then he suggests that as a 
profession composition studies has yet to establish “any standards for judging our 
attempts to implement the evolving concept of teaching and learning as a social act” (52, 
53). The purpose of Wiener’s article is therefore pragmatic insofar as he attempts to 
articulate a utilitarian essay for compositionists to understand the work of collaboration in 
the classroom.  
Wiener offers his readers a set of heuristic markers that can in theory be used to 
evaluate the successfulness of collaborative learning, thus he practically situates 
collaboration as a something that can be seen and evaluated as such. According to Wiener 
the central marker of successful collaborative group work is found in the group’s ability 
to reach consensus. “The group’s effort to reach consensus by their own authority is the 
major factor that distinguishes collaborative learning for mere work in groups” (54). He 
further explains how consensus is what distinguishes collaborative group work from 
“mere” group work: “Students put into groups are only students grouped and are not 
collaborators, unless a task that demands consensual learning unifies the group activity” 
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(55). It is important to observe that Wiener essentially equates collaborative learning with 
consensual learning, explaining that the former is an example or consequence of the 
latter. Herein is where we can see a nihilism emerging—the kind that will allow critics of 
collaboration to argue that “collaborative learning” is not always a preferable mode of 
organizing a pedagogy.  
Nevertheless, Weiner situates collaboration as something that can be organized and 
deployed by a teacher, who, by the way, has three rol s he or she must play when 
managing the collaborative learning underway in a classroom. The teacher must be task 
setter, manager, and synthesizer. As the task setter, a t acher composes a clear “written 
task” that collaborators can collectively read. A clearly written task makes it easier, says 
Wiener, for collaborators to come to consensus about the task ahead of them because 
there is a common starting point from which the group can proceed as a group. 
 
A good written statement of task will probably have a number of components: general 
instruction about how to collaborate in this particular activity; a copy of the text, if a 
single text is the focus of the collaboration; and questions appropriately limited in 
number and scope and offered in sequence from easier to more complex, questions 
requiring the kind of critical thinking that leads to sustained responses from students 
at work in their groups. (56) 
 
 
Notice here how, first, collaboration is organized in terms of the specific configuration of 
a task via the instructor’s specific instructions. But it is not enough for a teacher to simply 
create a task appropriate for collaboration, for she must also successfully manage the 
collaborative environment as students engage in ther group work. Indeed, the teacher is a 
“classroom manager” when it comes to collaborative learning, and Wiener offers a 
paragraph worth of questions about the layout and organization of the collaborative 
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environment for the teacher-manager to evaluate during times of collaboration. Wiener is 
careful to articulate that as a manager, the teacher should not micromanage groups when 
collaboration is underway. He explains that teachers “can easily undermine the 
development of that authority and confidence” that is the purpose of collaborative 
learning in the first place” (57-58). Wiener then turns his attention to how one can 
evaluate a teacher’s ability to manage classroom collaboration: 
 
An observer can learn a great deal about prior instuction by watching how students 
engage in the group task. The noise level in the room, the arrangement of furniture, 
the ease with which the groups are formed, the tone of conversation among students, 
the nature of reports emerging from groups all indicate how much the class has 
practiced efficient collaborative schemes in the past. Evaluators, therefore, should 
note very carefully how students behave in their groups as a signal of the teacher’s 
advance preparation. (58) 
 
 
I can’t help but consider the arbitrariness of these valuative conditions listed by Wiener 
when it comes to considering the theoretical thrust of ocial constructionist collaboration. 
Specifically, I wonder how we can count these organizational and cosmetic features of a 
classroom as evidence for collaboration? At best, these represent the specific markers of 
how one teacher believes group work should proceed. Other than that, these conditions— 
these markers of successful collaboration—can be rejected at will for what, rightly so, 
some teachers might consider to be arbitrary decisions about classroom management. 
But the tactical nature of collaborative pedagogy only gets more specific for Wiener 
as he concludes his series of evaluative measures by in isting that the final role the 
teacher must play in the collaborative classroom is that of synthesizer: 
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Once the groups finish their work, it is important for each recorder to share the 
group’s consensus with the rest of the class. With th s done, the teacher must help the 
class as a whole to make sense and order out of thesom times conflicting and 
contradictory reports. Writing the points raised by each group on the chalkboard or on 
a transparency for the overhead projector (or asking recorders themselves to do this) 
allows everyone to discuss and evaluate the conclusion arrived at by the groups. (58) 
 
 
In the end, collaboration here is reduced to a kindof classroom activity, something the 
teacher plans, organizes, manages, and synthesizes for her students. Hardly does this 
sound like the kind of organic, socially constructed l arning that is advocated by 
Bruffee—that is, here the “practice” of collaboration seems completely arbitrary, a mere 
style of pedagogy that might in theory promote the kind of learning that, thinking 
nihilistically, always already takes place according to a social constructionist theory of 
learning:  
 
The critical underlying principle for evaluators is that in the collaborative learning 
classroom the instructor is in no sense a passive figure. Collaborative learning is not 
unstructured learning: it replaces one structure, th  traditional one, with another, a 
collaborative structure. (61) 
 
 
What is particularly nihilistic in Wiener’s final formulation is that collaborative 
learning can ultimately be evaluated by considering the instructor’s ability to organize a 
“collaborative structure” in the classroom, the kind outlined by Wiener in his explanation 
of the tactical moves that instructors should follow t  create an effective and efficient 
collaborative learning environment. 
In a way I have reserved some of my most pointed criticism for Weiner’s article, 
although like my point above about those essays that render collaboration as the 
theoretical imperative of social constructionism, I wish to extend some charity to 
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Weiner’s piece. But then again, to a certain extent his article represents a paradigmatic 
iteration of collaboration scholarship that falls smack on top of the “collaboration as 
pedagogical tool” pole in my dichotomy of collaborative nihilism. In all three of these 
examples what matters is how collaboration becomes not omething but some thing that 
functions as a pedagogical tool. As I’ve already noted, tools are to a certain extent 
arbitrary: replaceable, convenient, and optional.  
Whither Collaboration? The Move Towards Consequence 
The notion of collaboration has not only generated an important body of research and 
pedagogical innovation, but the term ‘collaborative’ has now entered into the 
discourse of studies of writing as a part of the conventional wisdom. The value of 
collaborative learning and collaborative writing has t ken on a kind of self-evident 
and self-valorizing status.  
- John Trimbur & Lundy A. Braun, “Laboratory Life and the Determination of 
Authorship” 
 
 
Cornel West said that nihilism is troubling in our times. At the risk of hyperbole, so 
too is the collaborative nihilism that prevents collaboration from being more than an 
over-determined theory or a particular pedagogical configuration for those of us in 
composition studies. When we survey the different ways collaboration has been 
explained over the past thirty years, it is clear th t we don’t “know” too much about it 
except for those theoretical claims that connect it to the social production of knowledge. 
When in orchestra, the iterations that explain, describe, and justify collaboration that I 
have here reviewed meld into an explanation of collab ration that bifurcates it into either 
tactical or theoretical terms, and while some of these scholars try to explain the 
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pedagogical value of social turn collaboration, what we end up with are contradictory, 
over-simplified, and in some case just outright badexplanations. From the pragmatist 
position I occupy, all of our discourse cannot be collaborative because collaboration 
would make no difference. Moreover, collaboration ca not be anything from 
recommending a book to a friend, polishing the style on a colleague’s manuscript, 
tutoring a writing student, synthesizing the various levels of consensus that small peer 
groups arrive at in class, to borrowing discourse fom sources unconscious to my 
immediate apperception according to Bakhtinian theory.  
So, whither collaboration?  
No. 
In the prophetic pragmatism for which West has become a modern prophet, there is a 
necessity for hope and optimism. For without hope all we have is nihilism, but for the 
prophetic pragmatist our nihilism can become an invaluable reminder that our ideas and 
beliefs must be continually informed through practical inquiry that shows us what 
consequences these ideas and beliefs yield. The purpose of this chapter has been to 
engage in an overview that sets up the practical inquiry I propose with this dissertation: 
not only to reinvigorate our critical study of collaboration, but also to instantiate the 
pragmatic experiment of trying out some new beliefs about collaboration to see if they 
might not yield better results. This new belief must begin at where I leave off here, which 
is a proposal for us to try, as much as it is possible, to divorce collaboration from its 
social constructionist moorings. In the next chapter I offer what might be a better starting 
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position for conceptualizing what is the work of collaboration, which, as the title of my 
next chapter stipulates, involves the work of rhetorical invention.  
Notes 
1. See Carol L. Winkelamm, “Electronic Literacy, Critical Pedagogy, and 
Collaboration: A Case Study for Cyborg Writing” (Computers and the Humanities 29.6 
[1995]: 431-48); Susan W. Hardwick, “Humanizing theT chnology Landscape through a 
Collaborative Pedagogy” (Journal of Geography in Higher Education 24.1 [2000]: 123-
29); Timothy Koschmann, “Computer Support for Collaboration and Learning” (The 
Journal of the Learning Sciences 8. 3-4 [1999]: 495-97); Sue Ellen Atkinson, 
“Collaboration: That Awful ‘C’ Word” (The Urban Review 31.2 [1999]: 173-83); 
Christopher W. Lovell and John Nunnery, “Testing the Adult Develop Tower of Babel 
Hypothesis: Homogeneous by Perry Position Collaborative Learning Groups and 
Graduate Student Satisfaction” (Journal of Adult Development 11.1 [2004]: 139-50); and 
Mark F. Williams, “Collaborative Learning in the College Latin Classroom” (The 
Classical Journal 86.3 [1991]: 256-61). 
2. In “Liberal Education, Scholarly Community, and the Authority of Knowledge” 
(1985), Bruffee identifies himself as primarily a literary critic. Additionally, in his 
response to the JAC interview with Richard Rorty, Bruffee argues that social 
constructionism is not a theory and therefore it has no theorists: “Rorty is not a ‘theorist.’ 
Neither am I. Social construction is not a theory. It is a way of talking, a language, a 
vernacular. Least of all is social construction a ‘theoretical rationale for collaborative 
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learning.’ It is a way of describing collaborative learning” (236). Whether or not Bruffee 
accepts the title, his work is used in composition studies as theory; moreover, it seems 
little more than splitting hairs to differentiate btween “theoretical rationale” and “a way 
of describing” something.   
3. Bruffee interestingly admits that he willingly accepted Richard Rorty’s critical 
vocabulary for describing social constructionism. As he writes,  
 
Reading the JAC interview with Richard Rorty makes me realize once again why I 
adopted him as one of my heroes ten years ago. By ‘him’… I don’t mean the whole 
warty man, with whom I am barely acquainted. I mean the language of a lot of what 
he has written and said…his language, more than that of anyone else I know, has 
given me ways of saying things that I have been unsuccessful trying to say myself. 
(“Response” 236) 
 
 
4. In an interview with Gary Olson published in JAC, Richard Rorty questions—sort 
of—the label “social constructionist.” I say “sort f” because Rorty assents to Olson’s 
explanation of Bruffee’s definition of social constructionism. See “Social Construction 
and Composition Theory: A Conversation with Richard Rorty.”  
5. Bruffee references Geertz and Fish in “Liberal Education, Scholarly Community, 
and the Authority of Knowledge,” as well as in “Social Construction, Language, and the 
Authority of Knowledge: A Bibliographic Essay.”  
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CHAPTER III 
 
FROM STYLE TO INVENTION: RE-CANONIZING COLLABORATIVE 
COMPOSITION
 
In the previous chapter I offered a conceptual sketch of collaborative nihilism, what I 
defined as an attitude marked by apathy and meaningless when it comes to critical 
engagement with the catch-all status of “collaborati n” as a critical concept in rhetoric 
and composition studies.  The nihilistic quality of this attitude points to what I perceive as 
our disciplinary unproductiveness at crafting new theories of collaboration not tied to 
epistemologies that link collaboration to social constructionism, a move demonstrated by 
the popular conflation of collaboration with conversation. I also offered a disciplinary 
review that begins with an extensive reading of Kenneth Bruffee’s scholarship on 
collaboration, what I call his social turn theory of c llaboration.  I then transitioned into a 
two-part review of literature that illustrates the t oretical binaries of collaborative 
nihilism that explain collaboration in either stricly pedagogical terms as a teaching tool 
and classroom strategy, or as an over-determined quality of our discourse, one that 
functions much like an epistemological fiat that underscores the collaborative impulse 
that fuels (all) our communication with one another. I concluded the chapter by 
explaining that the nihilistic status of collaboration in rhetoric and composition has 
resulted from this forced coupling of tactics-based p agogy with otiose theory, deflating 
collaboration as a critical term in writing studies. 
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What I want to suggest in this current chapter is that we need pragmatic theory to help 
conceptualize both the purposes and possibilities of collaboration in the study of writing, 
especially for those of us in rhetoric and compositi n who are invested in questions about 
the relationship between epistemology and discourse: For instance, what do our gestural 
interactions with one another and the world tell us about how we know things and 
communicate them? And how do we encourage students to view collaboration in terms of 
one’s rhetorical ability to manipulate discourse?  Expanded possibilities for collaboration 
should further how we imagine the work of compositin tself both within and outside 
university contexts. So if collaboration is to be consequential, we need theory that 
explains the deliberate engagement between individuals with the world for which 
collaboration might account without falling back on the theoretical imperatives of social 
constructionism. Further, if collaboration is to be something more than merely a 
pedagogical or corporate buzzword to denote various types of cooperative group work, 
we need a pragmatic definition that can conditionally explain collaboration without 
imposing tactical guidelines. 
As the title of this chapter suggests, to begin the work of fostering a pragmatic theory 
of collaboration it is first necessary to re-canonize collaboration rhetorically as an 
inventive art. Instead of positioning collaboration n stylistic terms to denote some type of 
tactical configuration, one that is utilized merely as a method for sharing work, 
collaboration theorized rhetorically under the rubric of invention enables us to imagine 
collaboration as an inventive art marked by the reflexive relationship that individuals 
foster with one another to anticipate novelty. There are a handful of terms that need 
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unpacking here: Why does collaboration need “re-canonization,” especially when 
rhetoricians like Karen Burke LeFevre have already used the idea of collaboration to 
theorize invention? How does the idea of “reflexivity” figure into collaboration? And 
what do I mean by “novelty”? Most importantly, what do I mean by “collaboration” if 
one of the purposes of this chapter is to offer a redefinition of this slippery concept? 
To address this last concern first, let me offer a working definition of collaboration, 
one that I call pragmatic and consequential, and one that I will begin to explicate in this 
current chapter. Collaboration points to the ways in which interlocutors use reflexive 
dialogue to intervene in and enhance the progression of their interaction with an object 
of discourse. I use the concept of novelty to identify “what” collaborators produce 
through their interaction with objects of discourse, which are simply new ways of 
thinking about and articulating ideas in the world. It will be in the next chapter where I 
discuss in detail what it means to “intervene in and e hance” the progression of our 
interaction with “objects of discourse,” but I offer this redefinition of collaboration at the 
onset of this current chapter to establish the terminology to which I will be turning as I 
discuss what it means to “re-canonize” collaboration for the work of composition.   
I explain the need for this re-canonization by positing that social constructionist 
theories of collaboration limit our ability to explain collaboration other than stylistically 
as a particular proximal configuration of individuals sharing work. In other words, if 
collaboration is an imperative function of our discourse, which is what happens in social 
constructionist theory that conflates collaboration with conversation, then a rhetorical 
explanation of what collaboration is and how it works must always fall back on 
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discussions of style because there is nothing actually to invent (or “represent”) outside of 
the knowledge of a community’s normal discourse. Additionally, if collaboration can 
only denote a particular style of engaging the already-at-work processes of our 
communication with one another, then collaboration is at best temporary engagement 
with others limited by the episteme of a particular “discourse community.” 
Understanding the relationship between collaboration-as-style and how this social 
constructionist approach supports an epistemic theory of rhetoric therefore underscores 
why collaboration, if a pragmatically viable theory is to support it, should be theorized 
under the rhetorical canon of invention.   
After I review what it means to “re-canonize” collaboration from style to invention, I 
discuss the relationship between social-epistemic rheto ical theory and social 
constructionism. I then review existing definitions of rhetorical invention to suggest how 
we can identify a pragmatic opening for understanding collaboration in terms that 
position rhetorical invention as a discursive activity we enter into with others, and I turn 
to the sociologist George Herbert Mead for explanatio  in this regard. In the last section 
of this chapter I discuss the kairos of collaboration alongside the idea of reflexive 
dialogue, both of which are important concepts for understanding collaboration 
pragmatically. 
The “Style” of Collaboration 
In their article “Collaboration and Concepts of Authorship,” published in PMLA in 
2001, Lisa Ede and Andrea Lunsford remind scholars in English about “the socially 
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constructed nature of writing—its inherently collaborative foundation,” and how it 
“functions as an enthymemic grounding for much contemporary research in the 
discipline.” In an endnote corresponding to this statement, Ede and Lunsford offer a short 
list of scholarly work and further qualify what they mean by the “inherently 
collaborative” nature of writing. “Collaboration is a key term for composition studies,” 
they write, “where it can refer both to collaborative learning activities, such as peer 
response and group problem solving, and to the actual practice of cowriting texts and 
negotiating power among members of workplace writing groups” (355, 364). Indeed, in 
the collection Keywords in Composition Studies, Maureen Daly Goggin says that 
“collaboration signifies not only the phenomenon of two or more authors working on a 
single project but also extends to the view that all writing is collaborative” (35). Finally, 
in her overview of collaborative pedagogy in A Guide to Composition Pedagogies, 
Rebecca Moore Howard observes that since “composition studies includes pedagogy as a 
central concern, collaboration holds a particular fascination for the discipline,” and then 
reminds her readers, much like Ede and Lunsford, that many professionals in composition 
“go so far as to assert that all writing is collaborative” (54-55).  
While all of the above claims similarly posit that as a discipline composition 
recognizes the “inherently” social dimension of writing, it is harder to discern just how 
the idea of collaboration itself is supposed to unite, even if only tentatively, the many 
different ways the social character of writing can be explored theoretically in composition 
scholarship, not to mention pedagogically in the teaching of writing. That is, what does it 
mean to link collaboration ontologically to the notion of writing, which the above claims 
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do, while at the same time illustrating collaboration n practice with various tactical 
configurations of individuals working in proximity? Collaboration just is, in other words, 
but it is two or more people deliberately engaged in some kind of cooperative activity. 
Here is the theoretical problem that prompted my discussion of collaborative nihilism in 
the first chapter: the rendering of collaboration in theory that makes no pragmatic 
difference for how we conceptualize the work of teaching writing in practice. 
If all writing is collaborative, and if collaboration is manifested through such various 
activities as peer response, group work, and co-writing, then what difference does it make 
to say, as Ede and Lunsford do, that the “social dimension of writing—its inherently 
collaborative foundation—functions as an enthymemic grounding for much 
contemporary research in the discipline”? As I did in the previous chapter, I want to call 
attention to a contradiction inherent in the social onstructionist view of collaborative 
learning that presents collaboration pedagogically as primarily a tactical configuration of 
individuals working together. If collaboration just is; if it “functions as an enthymemic 
grounding” for how we understand the nature of writing, then our discourse production in 
general must be understood to be dependent on the various ways we interact with and 
respond to other discourse producers with whom we are in contact. As illustrated above, 
we can look to various types of pedagogical activities hat configure individuals into pairs 
and groups to therefore see collaboration at work. The problem with this explanation of 
collaboration, however, is that it relies on a relativistic epistemology for explaining how 
we come to know and interact with the world.  
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Beginning with Bruffee’s articulation of collaboration theory in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, compositionists have used social constructionist claims about the 
relationship between knowledge, thoughts, texts, selve , and the “discourse communities” 
that produce them to situate collaboration as a pedgogical model that somehow 
embodies the always-already happening processes of communication and knowledge 
production.  Indeed, Bruffee helped to establish the argument that the epistemic practices 
of a discourse community are what shape and give meaning to what we are able to 
communicate. Consider, for example, what he wrote in “Collaboration and the 
‘Conversation of Mankind’”:   
 
To the extent that thought is internalized conversation, then any effort to understand 
how we think requires us to understand the nature of conversation; and any effort to 
understand conversation requires us to understand the nature of community life that 
generates and maintains conversation. Furthermore any ffort to understand and 
cultivate in ourselves the kind of thought we value most requires us to understand and 
cultivate the kinds of community life that establish and maintain conversation that is 
the origin of that kind of thought. To think well as individuals we must learn to think 
well collectively—that is we must learn to converse w ll. (421) 
 
 
It is largely through this progression of warrants about the nature of conversation leading 
to his claim about the connection between thinking well and conversing well that Bruffee 
establishes the foundation for how collaboration would be theoretically conceptualized in 
composition studies. Specifically, collaboration understood through tactical 
configurations of individuals in conversation somehow demonstrates the social 
constructionist claim that our knowledge is dependent upon the discourse communities 
that shape and give meaning to what we know and how we communicate. Even though 
Bruffee doesn’t actually utilize the term “discourse community” in his early work, he 
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does explicitly argue that social constructionist theory views knowledge and language as 
inseparable, even identical (“Social Construction” 778). In Keywords in Composition 
Studies, Peter Vandenberg offers a general gloss on this basic function of a discourse 
community. He quotes Bruce Herzberg who explains that  
 
language use in a group is a form of social behavior, that discourse is a means of 
maintaining and extending [a] group’s knowledge andof initiating new members into 
the group, and that discourse is epistemic or constitutive of the group’s knowledge. 
(Vandenberg 68).  
 
 
While there has indeed been much scholarship that questions both the goals and 
methods associated with collaboration and the constitution of “community,” some of 
which I reviewed in the Introduction and Chapter One, Bruffee’s conceptualization of 
social constructionism is still very much at work in the myriad conversations about 
collaborative learning that his work helped to initiate in composition studies, in part 
evidenced through Herzberg’s explanation of discourse. Situating knowledge and 
discourse as “epistemic” and “constitutive” of a community has the double effect of 
situating discourse communities as both the sources of and limits to what we can know 
(and speak of) in advance. James Paul Gee unequivocally lays out just such a conclusion: 
 
Discourses are not mastered by overt instruction (even less so than languages, and 
hardly anyone ever fluently acquired a second languge sitting in a classroom), but by 
enculturation (“apprenticeship”) into social practices through scaffolding and 
supported interaction with people who have already mastered the Discourse….This is 
how we all acquired our native language and our home-based Discourse. It is how we 
acquire all later, more public-oriented Discourses. If you have no access to the social 
practice, you don’t get the Discourse, you don’t have it. (“Literacy, Discourse” 7)  
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Utilizing the notion of discourse constitution (which is also at work in Herzberg’s 
quotation), Gee says “various Discourses…constitute us as persons,” but he quickly 
follows with a qualification, asserting that these discourses “are changing and often are 
not fully consistent with each other.” In other words, with various discourses come 
conflicting notions of value and belief that at best an individual can only acknowledge 
but never resolve; therefore, “there is no real sense i  which we humans are consistent or 
well-integrated creatures from a cognitive or social viewpoint, though, in fact, most 
Discourses assume that we are (and thus we do too, while we are in them)” (7). Theories 
of social constructionism fail precisely here when attempting to resolve ontological 
claims about the collaborative nature of writing with pedagogical strategies for enacting 
collaboration in practice. As Gee unabashedly demonstrates, social constructionists 
cannot help but theorize discourse as Discourse with a capital-D, as something like a 
metaphysical sphere of practice one enters into, or as some kind of cultural possession 
one slowly comes to acquire. Accordingly all discourse is collaborative because “in” 
discourse we are enculturated “through scaffolding a d supported interaction.” But herein 
lies the rub: through our pedagogical practices of collaboration we can only really mimic 
individual agency—play at being free and deliberate us rs of discourse—because what 
we can know, how we speak, and to what limit we actu lly communicate is ultimately 
determined by the discourses from which we are constituted. In other words, novelty is 
impossible because what we are able to communicate has been predetermined by the 
discursive limits established by the epistemic practices of a discourse community. 
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The problems inherent in accounting for the production of discourse using social 
constructionist theory have already been thoroughly critiqued by rhetoricians such as 
Thomas Kent (“On the Very Idea”), Stephen R. Yarbrough (After Rhetoric and Inventive 
Intercourse), and literary theorist Stanley Fish (“Anti-Foundationalism”), although Fish’s 
own version of social constructionism has itself undergone a similar critique 
(Dasenbrock, “Do We Write”; Yarbrough, After Rhetoric). According to Kent’s analysis 
in his essay “On the Very Idea of a Discourse Community,” social constructionist theory 
cannot reasonably account for two central questions that arise from its foundational claim 
that discourse communities account for and justify their own categories of knowledge. 
The first of these questions underscores the problem of how a discourse community can 
reasonably establish the authority to argue what counts as knowledge if knowledge itself 
changes from community to community. Secondly, if one must be a member of a 
discourse community to fully participate in and engage that community, then how can 
one recognize other discourse communities outside of one’s own? Indeed, Kent 
concludes that social constructionism is always liable to justified criticism about its 
ultimate position as a theory of cultural relativism:   
 
By claiming that our knowledge of the world is relative to a conceptual scheme, 
social constructionists endorse the Cartesian notio that a split exists between an ‘in 
here’—usually thought as mind or subjectivity—and a “out there”—usually thought 
as world or objectivity—a split that is mediated by a network of social conventions, 
mental categories, or simply loosely-held beliefs. When they accept this position, 
social constructionists run headlong into a well-know  and, I believe, insurmountable 
problem of relativism that, in turn, leads inexorably to a debilitating form of nay-
saying skepticism. (426) 
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Moreover as Stephen Yarbrough points out in Inventive Intercourse, social 
constructionists replace the metaphysical gap cognitive theorists assert exists between 
mind and reality with one that exists between culture and reality, and in both cases 
language is the mediating factor (57). Still more, Kurt Spellmeyer takes notice of a 
“missing step” in the philosophy of social construcionism: “the step between the premise 
that perceptual schemas give shape to experience and the conclusion that communities 
make them.” As he continues by way of example, “If the tree and the watcher [someone 
looking at the tree and imaging the idea of a tree at the same time] are both givens of a 
particular schema, then communities—collective associati ns of watchers—must be 
givens in exactly the same way, made by the schema, not makers of it. And if everything 
is a construct, then nothing, strictly speaking, can be constructed” (158).  
Lest I come across as, one, an unwavering critic of social constructionism who 
refuses to extend charity and play Elbow’s “believing game” with its key theorists, or 
two, as someone who simply wishes to beat a dead horse with criticism that has already 
been well-articulated, let me remind readers that reviewing the theoretical shortcomings 
of social constructionist theory is necessary to esablish a pragmatic motive for 
questioning the state of collaboration theory in comp sition studies today. It is obvious 
that social constructionist theories of collaboration need to be replaced with an 
orientation that can account for discourse production devoid of metaphysics while 
simultaneously acknowledging the deliberate work of collaboration itself in practice, as 
something two or more individuals purposely pursue as they interact with and not 
through discourse.   
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As I have demonstrated, collaboration has been comfortably established within a 
social constructionist framework that positions it as a mediating force through which 
writing (and discourse in general) is automatically produced and as a tactical 
configuration individuals assume in response to a cmmon task. So in pedagogical terms 
collaboration gets manifested through various forms of group work that somehow enact 
the already-active communication within a discourse community, the conceptual scheme 
that sanctions what can and cannot be discursively authorized by its members. Using 
Yarbrough’s conclusion about Fish’s take on the teaching of writing, “if the doctrines of 
social constructionism are true then it logically follows that everyone who teaches 
composition is already doing what can be done to help students improve their writing” 
(After Rhetoric 221); and thus we need theory that can account for collaboration as a kind 
of deliberate activity. If collaboration just is, if at the end of the day it simply names one 
take on the social construction of knowledge, then p dagogically collaboration can never 
be more than simply an activity, something teachers do to keep their students engag d. 
Put another way, collaboration becomes at best simply a means to divide labor, to 
delegate responsibility, and to play at what is already at work pushing our discourse and 
shaping our writing. 
Following Yarbrough’s logic, such a view necessarily leads us to conclude that 
teachers of writing can at best only utilize collaboration tactically to help demonstrate to 
students how they already learn. In other words, collab ration does not promise to make 
us better writers, it just encourages us to practice more deliberately the skills that shape 
us into authorized members of a discourse community. That is to say, if individuals do 
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emerge from collaboration better writers, that is because they were able to connect the 
internalized discursive practices of a “community of knowledgeable peers” (to echo 
Bruffee) with their own practical attempts at deploying the appropriate skill sets that 
mark a discourser as an authorized member of that community.  
We have thus arrived at a point where I can again pose my question about Ede and 
Lunsford’s assertion about the “social dimension of writing”: What difference does it 
make? How does such a claim in theory actually justify our discipline’s dominant 
pedagogical approaches (largely tactical ones) to collaboration in practice? To me, it 
makes no difference. To echo Michael Spooner and Kathleen Blake Yancey, “if our 
theory must call all writing collaborative, then ‘collaboration’ becomes moot and useless 
as a theoretical construct” (“A Single Good Mind” 56). Insofar as collaboration remains a 
theoretical arm of social constructionism, in practice here remains no reason to give up 
collaboration as a pedagogical category to simply name specific kinds of classroom 
activities that involve multiple individuals working together. Really, the only work 
necessary for teachers is to decide which collaborative ctivities to use and how best to 
deploy them. Again, there is no difference at stake in theory; there is no actual 
consequence. At the end of the day, a social constructionist can really only forward 
collaboration to designate a particular style of learning because if collaboration just is, 
then all we can do pedagogically is dress it up or dress it down to decide the best 
configuration through which to construct those tactical engagements that will promote the 
specter of collaborative learning. In this way teachers will always remain what social 
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constructionism positions them as: classroom managers who must defer to the 
conventions of discourse communities to determine what pedagogy to pull of the shelf.  
The Epistemic Mediation of Social Turn Collaboration 
As I have argued, for social constructionists the ideas of conversation and 
collaboration function synonymously to describe how the members of a discourse 
community share particular conventions that make that discourse community a 
community in the first place. Remember that Kenneth Bruffee, for example, implores his 
readers to recognize how collaborative learning “provides the kind of social context, the 
kind of community, in which normal discourse occurs: a community of knowledgeable 
peers” (“Collaborative Learning” 644).  From the social constructionist perspective, 
collaboration enacts how knowledge is generated and maintained through the normal 
discourse of a knowledge community’s conversation. Within the field of composition 
studies this perspective on the epistemic function of discourse first gained popularity in 
the early eighties, but rhetoricians and discourse philosophers (especially in 
communications studies) have been engaged in scholarly debate about epistemic rhetoric 
at least since 1967 when Robert L. Scott published his short but celebrated article “On 
Viewing Rhetoric as Epistemic,” which was then, as William Harpine notes, “a new, 
radical way to understand rhetoric” (337). As Harpine explains, “Scott’s article is 
founded in a concept of argumentative justification in rhetoric, viewed as an alternative to 
analytic logic” (335). Or as Jeffrey L. Bineham explains, “At base, Scott’s assertion that 
‘rhetoric is epistemic’ implores scholars to rethink the relationship between 
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discourse…and the processes and substance of knowledge.” Scott’s thesis forwarded the 
argument that what we know is inextricably tied to how we communicate.  “Epistemic 
rhetorical theory,” continues Bineham, “advances propositions about both how people 
know and the nature of what they know. It has, in sum, epistemological and ontological 
implications” (43).  
In Bineham’s article, “The Cartesian Anxiety in Epistemic Rhetoric: An Assessment 
of the Literature,” he explains that one approach to studying rhetoric as epistemic 
embraces “the social knowledge theory,” and he points to Thomas Farrell as its 
paradigmatic theorist (49). Nearly a decade before Bruffee asserted that the work of 
collaboration required individual discoursers to deliberate over a problem until consensus 
is reached, Farrell had already articulated a rhetoical theory of knowledge that hinged on 
the role of consensus. In “Knowledge, Consensus, and Rhetorical Theory” (1976), Farrell 
suggested that if the idea of “knowledge” is to be linked to rhetoric it must be 
conceptualized socially as that which comprises “conceptions of symbolic relationships 
among problems, persons, interests, and actions, which imply (when accepted) certain 
notions of preferable public behavior” (4, emphasis in original). Social knowledge, then, 
represents the characteristics of what Kuhn would ca l normal science and implies that a 
certain amount of consensus is needed to authorize whatever counts as “preferable public 
behavior.” But Farrell’s conception of the epistemic function of rhetoric rests on what he 
calls a “peculiar kind of consensus”: 
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That is to say, it rests upon a consensus that is attr buted to an audience rather than 
concretely shared. This means that such knowledge does not rest upon agreement 
which is both fact and known to be fact. The assumption of agreement may be 
counterfactual. Some people may, in fact, disagree with what is attributed. Yet it is 
this assumed understanding of agreement—as an hypothesis, rather than fact—which 
makes rhetorical argument possible. (6) 
 
 
Farrell’s observation here is quite straightforward: to a certain extent social knowledge is 
a fiction, something discoursers appeal to as members of a social body to establish that 
social body’s identity. In other words, it doesn’t matter whether everyone actually agrees 
on a certain point or shares an exact belief; what mat ers is that one’s audience agrees that 
agreement is, generally speaking, not only a possibility ut also an assumed necessity if 
that social body is to share in some type of collectiv  identity. For a theory of epistemic 
rhetoric, it is the collective identity of a community that social knowledge helps to 
delineate. The idea of social knowledge therefore se ves a particular rhetorical function: 
it makes possible room for the discursive give-and-take that makes actual consensus so 
difficult. As Farrell continues: 
 
Rather than being fixed, permanent, and static, therefore, social knowledge is 
transitional and generative. As individual problems are encountered and, through the 
frustrating incrementalism of human decision-making, managed or resolved, new 
problems emerge; and with these, new knowledge may be attributed, based 
reasonably upon the collective judgments which have previously been made. Not only 
does social knowledge provide a context of relevance for artistic proof in collective 
inference-making; it also establishes social precednts for future attributions of 
consensus in situations which have yet to be encountered. (9-10) 
 
 
Farrell basically explains in epistemic rhetorical terms how social constructionists 
theorize the production of knowledge through the relationship between normal and 
abnormal “science” (for Kuhn) or “discourse” (for Rorty). There are “established social 
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precedents” that function to guide “future attributons of consensus” when “new 
problems emerge.” Theories of epistemic rhetoric thus inform the social constructionist 
paradigm that explains collaboration as the always-already discursive mechanism that 
maintains the conversation of a knowledge community. That is, meaning is circulated 
through the “normal” discourse shared by knowledgeable peers until “abnormal” 
discourse, discourse that for some reason does not harmonize “normally” with the 
existing talk, prompts that community to assess thi abnormality to determine if and how 
their normal discourse must be adjusted to incorporate whatever interruption has 
disrupted the original conversation. If that knowledg  community deems the abnormal 
discourse legitimate, not only will it then be folded into that community’s normal 
discourse, but by default it will also alter that community’s knowledge, since knowledge 
is mediated via that abstract mechanism Oakshott firs  called the “conversation of 
mankind.”  
The social precedents, whatever one chooses to call them, are what collectively make 
up a community’s episteme, the body of knowledge a community shares through the 
give-and-take of its discourse. No matter an episteme’s ethereal quality, explains Farrell, 
it nevertheless plays a primarily “affective or normative impact upon decision-making” 
for that social body; it provides discoursers with w at he terms a “zone of relevance” for 
situating assumptions and deducing reasonable conclusions (10, 11). In a later essay, 
Farrell explains that social knowledge is “rule-like in form,” which suggests “a regularity 
found in the ongoing patterns of human experience.” To conceptualize social knowledge 
as rule-like “is important to the view of rhetoric as a practical art” because it accounts for 
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personal responsibility and one’s ability to either conform to or deviate from such norms 
(“Social Knowledge” 331, 333). A similar theory is posited by James Herrick, another 
prominent epistemic rhetorician in communication studies, who asserts that  
 
rhetoric’s epistemic function in society can be seen in some ways to be the result of 
its benefit of testing ideas…once an idea has been tested thoroughly by a group, 
community, and society, it becomes part of what these groups take to be knowledge. 
(qtd. in Harpine 336) 
 
 
For Harpine, however, claiming that rhetoric is epistemic relies on definitional 
assumptions that theorists like Scott, Farrell, and Herrick take for granted. As he 
explains,  
 
When theorists say that rhetoric is epistemic, do they mean that persuasion has an 
epistemic quality? Do they mean to distinguish communication that is persuasive, or 
will they allow any communication to count as rhetoric? How broad, or how narrow, 
a conception of rhetoric is necessary in order to make sense of the claim that rhetoric 
is epistemic? (340) 
 
 
It is here, I believe, where we can link epistemic rhetorical theory to social 
constructionism in the development of social turn collaboration theory in composition 
studies. 
What compositionists call “social-epistemic” rhetoric essentially refers to the 
epistemic rhetorical theory developed by the likes of Scott and Ferrell applied to the 
social constructionist theory that Bruffee’s scholarship explicates. One of social-
epistemic rhetoric’s proselytizers, James Berlin, folds epistemic rhetoric into what he 
calls a “transactional” theory of rhetoric, which, as one can see, restates how 
compositionists have come to understand the idea of a discourse community: 
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Epistemic rhetoric holds that language is the key to understanding the dialectical 
process involved in the rhetorical act. Knowledge do s not exist apart from language. 
Thus, the task of the interlocutor is not simply to find the appropriate words to 
communicate—to contain—a nonverbal reality. Language, instead, embodies and 
generates knowledge, and there is no knowledge without language. For epistemic 
rhetoric, language is not, however, a single, monolithic entity. Within each society 
there is a host of languages, each serving as the cent r of a particular discourse 
community. (Rhetoric and Reality 166-67) 
 
 
Berlin describes the dual-function of language within a discourse community; first, it 
mediates knowledge, which is to say even though words do not “contain” knowledge, the 
language practices of a discourse community neverthel ss manage beliefs that count as 
knowledge; second, it is through language that we generate knowledge in the first place. 
As Berlin continues: 
 
Each community—whether made up of biologists, composition teachers, 
autoworkers, ward members, or baseball fans—is built around a language peculiar to 
itself so that membership in the group is determined by the ability to use the language 
according to the prescribed methods. The specialized anguage can serve an 
inclusionary function because it prescribes and enforces assumptions about external 
reality and the relationship of its members to this reality. Knowledge of what is “real” 
to the group can only be displayed by using its language. (167, emphasis added) 
 
 
In Berlin’s estimation, to understand social-epistemic rhetoric is to understand how 
members of a community can relate to and interact with that which exists outside of the 
community—“external reality”—and it explains the socially constructed nature of what 
that community believes about itself, what Berlin would by extension logically call 
“internal reality,” although he doesn’t say this above. Again, we see a Cartesian split 
between an “in here” and an “out there,” one that must be bridged to fully appreciate the 
complexity of one’s relative positioning in the world. But here is also where collaboration 
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plays a role (within social constructionist epistemologies), because as Bruffee explains 
throughout his scholarship on collaborative learning, the purpose of collaboration as a 
pedagogical tool is to help acculturate new members into an already existing discourse 
community with its own language conventions and meanings—its own epistemic reality. 
If knowledge is both generated and maintained through the language practices of a 
discourse community, then the only way to gain entrance into a community is to share in 
the same language practices, which in turn is a prerequisite for sharing the same 
knowledge. Collaboration is therefore a pedagogical method through which the internal 
talk of a discourse community is externalized so as to allow new members access to these 
language, (and, by default, knowledge) conventions. So when Bruffee posits his 
definition of social constructionism, the one in which he asserts that social 
constructionism understands concepts such as “reality” nd “knowledge” as “community-
generated and community-maintained linguistic entities,” Richard Rorty, the one from 
whom much of Bruffee’s definition of social constructionism is built, when presented 
with Bruffee’s explanation responds with uncomplicated acknowledgement that 
“yes…[this]seems true enough” (Olson 4). 
Collaboration is therefore something that can really only occur within discourse 
communities, because collaboration according to a rheto ical epistemic theory is simply 
the process through which such communities maintain knowledge. Again, note how 
according to Berlin epistemic theories explain langua e as the lens through which 
communities view an “external” reality. Even though social constructionism is in theory 
non-foundational, just as is the epistemic rhetoric that marks the type of discourse these 
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communities share, implicit in these theories is an idea that situates discourse 
communities in isolation from one another as a serie  of microcosms, of little worlds, that 
each view reality and knowledge in different terms. In other words, social 
constructionism does have unacknowledged metaphysical foundations: abstract entities 
like “language” and “culture.” In this way it becomes hard to distinguish just how much 
agency members of discourse communities actually have to invent the novel concepts and 
perspectives that, according to epistemic rhetoric, ur language both mediates and 
generates.  
Composition and Rhetorical Invention 
The above review of social-epistemic rhetoric and its relationship to social 
constructionist theory is important because just like with the latter, within epistemic 
rhetorical theory a metaphysical gap gets posited, one that separates an external reality 
from an internal one. For social-epistemic theories language is therefore a tool, something 
that exists and is made meaningful through its instrumental use within particular 
discourse communities. Moreover, the language of these communities actually shapes the 
reality these communities experience. This is, after all, how social-epistemic rhetoric gets 
presented in the literature, and thus an inside/outside binary is manifested. We get stuck 
in a certain sense, confined to the reality that our language allows us to experience 
because we cannot get outside our language to examine the larger Reality within which 
our communities (and their languages) are only a microcosm. 
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It is this metaphysical dilemma that social-epistemic rhetoric and social 
constructionist theory can at best only exacerbate and consequentially invite charges of 
supporting a philosophy of cultural relativism. This is why no pragmatic difference exists 
between the theoretical imperatives of social constructionism, social-epistemic rhetoric, 
and the pedagogical attempts at making this theory tenable through tactics-based 
explanations of collaborative learning in action. All collaboration does within these 
theories is demonstrate somewhat more explicitly what we already do. In this way, 
collaborative learning becomes a kind of self-defeating pedagogy that will work only to 
the extent that our expectations about how our students should discourse are met through 
how our students actually do discourse. If these expectations are not met, then it becomes 
easier to set aside collaboration for some other pedagogical strategy.  
As I suggest at the beginning of this chapter, the work of re-conceptualizing 
collaboration must begin with defining collaboration as a form of rhetorical invention. 
“The term invention has historically encompassed strategic acts that provide the 
discourser with direction, multiple ideas, subject matter, arguments, insights to probable 
judgments, and understanding of the rhetorical situation,” explains Janice Lauer. “Such 
acts include initiating discourse, exploring alternatives, framing and testing judgments, 
interpreting texts, and analyzing audiences” (2). When it comes to the idea of rhetorical 
invention in the study of composition, Karen Burke LeFevre’s definition offers 
rhetoricians and teachers of writing a fairly expansive explanation of this idea. She 
describes rhetorical invention as the attempt to be both wise and eloquent:  
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Conceiving rhetorical invention as a search for wisdom—a search for analyzing 
subjects, audiences, and problems as well as generating and judging ideas, 
information, propositions, and lines of reasoning—aligns rhetorical invention closely 
with inquiry or with ‘invention’ in the generic sense. (2) 
 
 
In Lauer’s survey of theories of invention, I vention in Rhetoric and Composition, she 
classifies LeFevre’s approach as falling under a social constructionist paradigm because 
it “characterized invention as a dialectical process in which the individual and the socio-
culture are coexiting and mutually defining” (100). Indeed, the thesis forwarded by 
LeFevre is that invention, “conceived broadly as the process of actively creating as well 
as finding what comes to be known and said in the discourse of any discipline, is, I think, 
best understood as occurring when individuals interact dialectically with socioculture in a 
distinctive way to generate something” (33).  
In Invention as a Social Act, LeFevre points to how invention is often conflated with 
conceptions of “individual introspection,” a process by which “ideas are created in the 
mind of an atomistic individual and then expressed to the rest of the world.” Or as she 
alternately words this idea, “Invention is [often] regarded as an unfolding, a manifestation 
of an individual’s ideas, feelings, voice, personality, and patterns of thought.” She 
explains that such individualized, “Platonic” conceptions of invention sketch an 
“incomplete picture” and forwards her own thesis about the social act of invention. As 
she explains, “rhetorical invention is better understood as a social act, in which an 
individual who is at the same time a social being interacts in a distinctive way with 
society and culture to create something” (1). LeFevre is careful to caution that a social 
theory of invention does not completely undermine or contradict Platonic theories, 
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especially when it comes to conceptualizing the rolof individual agency; but she 
suggests that rhetorical theory has come to understand how cognitive acts take place 
within social environments, so that to theorize inve tion socially simply offers a wider 
rhetorical context for understanding how invention  
 
occurs through the socially learned process of an internal dialogue with an imaged 
other, and the invention process is enabled by an internal social construct of audience, 
which supplies premises and structures of belief that guide the writer. (2) 
 
To understand invention as a social act, including those Platonic theories that 
privilege the inventive power of the individual, LeFevre creates a four-part continuum 
that situates rhetorical approaches to invention in a l ear relationship to one another. On 
one end are “Platonic” theories, followed by “Internal Dialogic” theories, which she 
describes as theories that explain invention as a process that “is affected and indeed made 
possible by an ‘otherness’ that is dynamically present in each I” (54). The third realm of 
invention she describes, the “Collaborative” approach, is distinctive because its theories 
posit how the physical presence of others is necessary for invention. Finally, “Collective” 
theories of invention, characterized by the work of Emile Durkheim, explain invention as 
dependent on supra-collective forces and entities lik  cultures, bureaucracies, and 
organizations.   
LeFevre’s social act perspective on invention through which she constructs her 
continuum easily translates into how other social constructionists theorize communicative 
interaction. For example, consider Kenneth Gergen’s four-part taxonomy that categorizes 
how we discursively negotiate conflict. First, we can imagine “internal others,” the 
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process through which we attempt to understand how our identity is composed of a 
multitude of voices that shape how we respond. Or we might seek to understand the 
“conjoint relations” that keep arguments taut through the discursive impasse of two 
“conjoined” discoursers who have yet to remedy their conflict. In other words, writes 
Gergen, “I may be able to locate ways in which it is not you alone who is to blame, but 
our particular pattern of relating” (157). Third, he suggests exploring “group realities” by 
which we recognize that “there is a way of seeing ourselves not as singular individuals 
but as representatives of groups, traditions, families, and so on” (157-58). Fourth, and 
finally, we might understand what it means to participate in “the systemic swim,” the way 
in which we participate in and construct wider social patterns that help us to locate 
meaning (158). The similarities between Gergen’s taxonomy and LeFevre’s are 
significant, and not just in the way each taxonomy follows a similar sequence of 
categories. Rather we should notice how both Gergen and LeFevre attempt to corral 
incommensurable social theories as simply different it rations of a single, cohesive 
explanation. For Gergen it is that we can understand all of our discursive conflicts in 
terms of how others construct us as individuals, and for LeFevre all four approaches she 
describes ultimately account for the social dynamics through which we create meaningful 
relationships with the world via rhetorical acts of invention. As theoretical models, both 
taxonomies certainly offer a convenient method for comparing and contrasting what are 
large and multifaceted philosophical traditions, but this convenience is also their 
shortcoming, for obviously the categories constructed within these taxonomies rely on 
generalizations of complex theoretical traditions.  
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We can examine, for example, how LeFevre constructs the “Collaborative” arm of 
invention on her continuum to see this kind of generalization at work. I focus on this 
particular branch of her social act theory of inventio  because with it she reviews how 
some theorists suggest how the interactions between and among individual agents are a 
necessary condition for the work of invention to be undertaken in the first place. The 
quintessential “Collaborative” theorist for LeFevre is the sociologist George Herbert 
Mead. According to Mead’s gestural theory of communication, explains LeFevre,  
 
One person acts, and in the act of making the gesture, calls out for a response in the 
other. Something new is created here…. New meanings are thus brought into 
existence by means of a social interaction involving a symbolic gesture and a 
response. (62) 
 
 
LeFevre correctly observes that Mead’s perspective “ akes the invention process out of 
the mind of the individual and into the interaction f real people, where it may be defined 
as an act, a response of another individual to an initiator’s gesture.” But when it comes to 
how LeFevre uses Mead’s theory to explain what makes this particular approach to 
invention collaborative, she relies on the mediating presence of a tangible product or 
specifically outlined activity, something collaborators actually make or a specific process 
they follow, to illustrate the practicality of collaborative invention:  
 
In contract negotiations or business proposal writing, for example, two or more 
rhetors collaborate to invent, and in fact, to negotiate, a text. One person may suggest 
an idea; the other responds; the response becomes a gesture to the first speaker, who 
then generates another idea; the other responds again, nd so on. (62-63) 
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Unfortunately while LeFevre’s description of Mead’s theory is more or less accurate, her 
description of the discourse collaborators share doesn’t explain the purpose for which she 
says this discourse occurs, which is “to invent, and in fact, negotiate, a text.” The point 
here is that LeFevre’s description of “collaborative” invention not only fails to actually 
explain what pragmatic difference Mead’s theory of c mmunicative interaction makes 
when conceptualizing the work of invention, but it also conflates collaboration with 
conversation, just as Bruffee’s theory does. That tese collaborators are talking through 
“contact negotiations or business proposal writing” seems inconsequential within 
LeFevre’s explanation of invention; what matters is imply how we conceptualize the talk 
itself as a kind of conversation.  
Stephen Yarbrough has suggested that LeFevre’s inclusion of Mead in her continuum 
of invention theories is inappropriate, namely because within such a framework there 
leaves no room for Mead’s “collaborative” invention to yield pragmatic consequences 
different from the consequences of other approaches to invention on the continuum. As 
he explains:  
 
I need to emphasize that Mead’s explanation of discourse lies on no such continuum. 
It differs radically from other theories LeFevre places on that continuum because each 
of these, unlike Mead’s theory, subscribes to the same old metaphysical 
distinctions—language/reality, subject/object, mind/world, culture/nature, and so 
on—and therefore each not only is subject to deconstruction but, more importantly, 
also has no pragmatic effects. (Inventive 18) 
 
 
It is important to single out Mead because his approach to theorizing communication is, 
as Yarbrough suggests, significantly different than other theories LeFevre includes on her 
continuum. One important difference in Mead’s theory is the belief that we exist in only 
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one world, and it is through our interactions with one another that we continue this 
common world. As Yarbrough explains Mead, “Belief in schemes of dual or multiple 
worlds that function according to conflicting laws deprives us of the tools we need to 
come to terms together” (19).  
For Mead the world is made meaningful through the ongoing progression of conduct, 
and Mead uses the term “gesture” to name this conduct. As Donald Bushman explains, 
“He [Mead] describes the uses of language as ‘a conversation of gestures,’ with the term 
gesture referring to all human social activity, any ctivity that is sensed by another and 
that evokes a response in another” (“Conversation” 254). Mead believes we use gestures 
in anticipation of certain responses, and when our anticipations are not met we must 
revise our gestures, and it is in this way that Mead xplains how communication works: 
 
Communication is a social process whose natural history hows that it arises out of 
cooperative activities…in which some phase of the act of one form, which may be 
called a gesture, acts as a stimulus to others to carry on their parts of the social act. It 
does not become communication in the full sense, i.e., the stimulus does not become a 
significant symbol, until the gesture tends to arouse the same response in the 
individual who makes it that it arouses in the others. (Selected Writings 312) 
 
 
From Mead’s pragmatist standpoint, communication is the word that signifies when 
gestures have become meaningful, when human interaction becomes intentional and 
conduct is deliberative. From this perspective, Mead is able to argue that it is through 
conduct that truth is created.  
As a concept “truth” is significant here because it denotes a kind of end; it is 
something that gives our actions purpose. In true pagmatist form, however, Mead does 
not believe truth is something that exists outside of xperience, that it is something to 
 
 118
which our beliefs must correspond. Instead, truth for Mead is a concept that represents 
the test of belief itself; it is what makes the ability for certain beliefs to provoke actions 
that sustain the continuance of the common world. As he explains,  
 
The criterion of truth does not then transcend experience, but simply regards the 
conditions of ongoing experience which has become problematic through the 
inhibitions of the natural processes of men. The solution of the problem lies entirely 
within experience and is found in the resolution of inhibitions. (342) 
 
 
Put another way, “Truth expresses a relationship between the judgment and reality…the 
relationship lies between reconstruction, which enables conduct to continue, and the 
reality within which conduct advances” (338). Embedd  in this approach to truth is the 
idea of mutually conditioning conduct; it is through our mutual actions with others that 
problems arise and are solved. Experience is the realm of this interaction; it is not 
something that exists separate from the cooperative ctivities of a group of interlocutors. 
Yarbrough sees a connection here between his use of th word discourse and Mead’s use 
of the word experience. “According to Mead,” writes Yarbrough, “human interaction 
within the world, what I call discourse, must be understood as being always already part 
of the world and not as a different kind of entity and over against other entities” (14). 
Truth therefore cannot be located outside the realm of experience, the realm of discourse, 
because that is where all of our interaction with the world takes place.  
I offer this (what might seem tangential) explanation of Mead’s theory of gestures 
because it departs significantly from LeFevre’s conclusions about language and, by 
extension, her conclusions about rhetorical invention. First, Mead suggests that what we 
call language can be folded up into his much more general term “gesture,” which simply 
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denotes those things we intentionally deploy like marks and noises when interacting with 
others to foster communication. So words, body movements, sounds, signs, all of these 
things can be conceptualized as gestures we use for communication. Gestures are what 
we use to interact with one another and the world, an  the meaning of a gesture arises 
through the process of communicative interaction itself. For LeFevre, however, language 
is a symbolic communication system. In the process of coming to understand invention as 
a social act, LeFevre writes,  
 
I ask that we give serious consideration to two main conclusions. First, language 
should be viewed as an active force in the way we constitute—not simply copy—
reality; language thus plays an active role in how we perceive and think and invent. 
 
 
Like social constructionist theory before hers, LeFevre cannot separate the concept of 
language as a constituting force apart from the concept of knowledge as an epistemic 
system of beliefs that exist within mutually defining discourse or knowledge 
communities. Just take LeFevre’s second conclusion she wants readers to consider: 
“Second, language should be viewed in its development and its use as a dialectic between 
individual and social realms” (96).  
LeFevre’s basic premise that invention is a social act is not in itself incorrect, nor is it 
an unhelpful way to begin thinking about the sociality inherent in how we come to make 
sense of and interact with the world, including other people. But like other social 
constructionists, LeFevre relies on the idea of language as a system, as a scheme that 
defines and gives meaning to our gestures. Mead, on the other hand, suggests that our 
gestures are not systematic but rather habitual. He would not suggest, as LeFevre does, 
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that language should be understood as a dialectic, a kind of reasoning, that individuals 
negotiate within “social realms,” as if the boundaries of such realms are what fuels the 
opposite end of the dialectical process of communication. Instead he would say that 
language is gestural, that we interact with other people and not abstract social realms, and 
that language is not systematic because appealing to an abstract symbolic system of 
meaning will not always help us overcome the practic l problems of communicating with 
others.  
The point here, of course, is that to conceptualize our gestures (parole) as arbitrarily 
connected to a system of meaning (langue) that exiss over and above the ecology of 
relationships we actually cultivate with other peopl  too easily positions the conflicts that 
inhibit our interactions with one another as ontological in nature and therefore to a certain 
point beyond our control. When there is only one common world, however, a world in 
which we must continually interpret one another’s ge tures, in a world where the 
meanings of our gestures are located in the specific exchanges in which they occur, and 
thus when our discourse is theorized as causal and not socially constructed, then all of our 
conflicts are ultimately discursive conflicts. And all of our discursive conflicts, our 
breaks in communication, can be resolved when interlocutors use their discourse to 
relocate the common world that our communicative int raction serves to continue. In 
other words, when interlocutors can recognize that r etorical conflicts are not the result 
of incommensurable worldviews, discourse communities, cultures, languages, or the like, 
and instead see that they more often than not result from the failure to locate a common 
object of concern, then the prospects for discursive remedy are made brighter.  
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In short, Mead offers a theoretically viable explanation of rhetorical invention, one 
that can account for all of those things LeFevre specifies rhetorical invention is good for, 
without relying on the presence of metaphysical schemes to explain how our gestures 
become meaningful, how they become “significant symbols” as he calls them. Rhetorical 
invention can therefore be conceptualized as the interaction in which we participate with 
one another and the world as we attempt to continue his common world with our 
discourse.  
Inventing the Collaborative Moment: Kairos and Reflexivity 
 On the one hand, science posits emergence, the occurren e in the evolutionary 
process of novel elements. On the other hand, the rationalistic procedure of scientific 
method is deterministic, postulating that every event can be causally explained by its 
antecedent conditions. Hence a serious antinomy arises between the principle of 
emergence and the principle of causation, both espoused by science and scientific 
philosophy; and this antinomy illustrates the nature of a metaphysical problem, since 
the assertion of the reality of one side seems to entail the allegation of the unreality of 
the other. Its solution, Mead held, rests upon an adequate theory of time, which would 
reconcile emergent novelty with causal conditioning. 
- Andrew Reck, Introduction to Mead’s Selected Writings 
 
 
To move collaboration in theory away from social-epistemic and social 
constructionist explanations that situate it as either an essential quality of communication 
in a discourse community or as an instructor-managed pedagogical tool, one that can be 
adopted or rejected by teachers at will, we first must re-conceptualize collaboration away 
from explanations that can only locate it under the rhetorical canon of style. At the risk of 
sounding like a broken record, I repeat that in most of our theory on collaboration, it can 
at best only denote a type of procedural interaction, one that requires certain conditions of 
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proximity and temporality. That is, within a social-epistemic framework collaboration 
usually denotes a type of temporary engagement between or among individuals who are 
proximally linked and sharing some kind of work. 
Now I wish to discuss how we can begin to think more specifically about 
collaboration as invention; in particular I want to highlight the role of deliberation and 
forethought necessary for invention if collaboration s to denote something more than the 
always-already happening conversations within a discourse community. To this end I 
want to forward the notion of what I call the invention of the collaborative moment, a 
phrase I have come to use to explain why we must understand the temporal dimensions of 
collaboration in order to recognize what kind of delib ration and forethought is necessary 
for collaboration itself.   
“Inventing the Collaborative Moment; or, Why 1 + 1 = 3,” is the title of a 4C’s paper 
I wrote several years ago that was part of a panel bout what my co-presenters and I were 
calling the “collaborative imagination.” Unfortunately our panel proposal wasn’t 
accepted for inclusion on the conference program that year, nevertheless the ideas I 
tackled in that paper helped me articulate a problem I had identified as a teacher, one that 
took the shape of a question: “How do we encourage students to recognize the opportune 
time for collaboration?” 1 By “opportune time” I was referencing the classical notion of 
kairos, what often gets translated as “right” timing and i  opposition to chronos, the 
concept we use to denote linear time. I had not yet worked out the problems inherent in 
theorizing collaboration within social-epistemic and social constructionist paradigms, yet 
I had noticed that for many students “collaboration” denoted a temporary engagement 
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with others that begins and ends when a collaborative ssignment itself begins and ends. 
In other words, when collaboration comes to an end (its teleological end) is also when 
collaboration comes to an end (its temporal end). At the time this was an underdeveloped 
idea and one I had limited language to articulate, but I noticed that for many people 
collaboration is temporally linked to the temporary engagements with others that we 
enter into “collaboratively” to complete some kind of task. In my own experiences with 
collaboration, especially with my colleague and collaborator, John Pell, I noticed that our 
collaboration was not strictly mediated by the specific projects on which we worked. The 
value of our collaboration was for me located in the myriad ways in which we were 
learning how to understand new ideas and formulate new ways of articulating those ideas. 
Moreover, I recognized how even when John and I were not “working” on something 
together, our collaborative perspective could nevertheless inform my other “individual” 
work as a teacher and scholar.  
Thus I developed a curiosity about the idea of collaboration in the study of writing, 
curiosity that developed in such a way that you are now reading a dissertation on the 
subject. The point of this anecdote, however, is that I wanted to understand how to talk 
about collaboration to students in a way that could promote the work of rhetorical 
invention and promote in them, my students, an ethic for collaboration that extended 
beyond those temporary engagements with other students that begin and end with 
particular assignments. Another way of framing thisproblem is that I wanted to promote 
in my students an understanding of collaboration they could utilize in order to foster 
relationships with others to enhance both their understanding of and ability to 
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productively intervene in discursive conflicts. To “invent the collaborative moment,” 
then, came to denote those times when we recognize a new idea or understanding or way 
of saying something as being connected to the work of hetorical invention with another 
person.  
To explain how we can recognize these collaborative moments, I return to the above 
point I make about kairos and how we must move away from the association of 
collaboration with temporary engagements with others. In other words, we should move 
away from conceptualizing collaboration as something with a clearly articulated 
beginning and end. In his recent RSQ article, “On ‘Getting It’: Resistance, Temporality, 
and the ‘Ethical Shifting’ of Discursive Interaction,” Stephen Yarbrough explains that 
successful discursive interaction “requires us to not only ‘account’ for the objects of their 
[others’] attention but to adjust our actions to their actions’ timing.” To interpret others, 
to follow the give-and-take within discourse, “we must re-order time” (7). Yarbrough’s 
understanding of discursive interaction is partially informed by Mead’s theory of the 
gesture, which I briefly reviewed earlier. As Mead explains, “the existence of motion in 
the passage of events depends not upon what is taking place in an absolute space and 
time, but upon the relation of a consentient set to a percipient event” (Selected Writings 
315). Mead suggests that our individual perspectives (consentient sets) are relative to 
particular discursive situations (percipient events). To suggest that our discursive 
interaction relies on our ability to re-order time, as Yarbrough does, is to suggest that in 
discourse the linear time of chronos is less important than the opportune time of kairos. 
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Although popularly understood as right or proper timing, the etymology of kairos 
reveals a rich and complicated history in rhetorical theory. As Philip Sipiora explains,  
 
kairos carried a number of meanings in classical rhetorical theory and history, 
including ‘symmetry,’ ‘propriety,’ ‘occasion,’ ‘due measure,’ ‘fitness,’ ‘tact,’ 
‘decorum,’ convenience,’ ‘proportion,’ ‘fruit,’ and ‘wise moderation,’ to mention 
some of the other common uses. (1) 
 
  
For Sipiora, to understand kairos requires that we recognize how the experience of 
temporality is influenced by the appropriateness of discourse in certain places and at 
certain times. In other words, to understand someone’s talk requires us to recognize the 
ways we experience the temporality of discourse itself: 
 
The “grasping of concepts” means to think in a particular way at a particular time, a 
function of epistemology. It is necessary, according to sophistic rhetoric, that a rhetor 
“scientifically” know the various forms of the discourse (eide ton logon), in order to 
avoid violating the rules of appropriateness (ton kairon me diamartein); to alter the 
discourse for convenience (prepontos holon ton logon katapoikilai); and to choose 
forms that are harmonious with each other. All of these issues demonstrate the 
magnitude of kairos. (4) 
 
 
For our current discussion, it is necessary to recognize that conceptually kairos points to 
the qualitative dimension of time; it suggest that time is not simply the linear progression 
of seconds, minutes, hours, days, and years because while this might be how we 
experience time in passing, it is not necessarily how we experience th passing of time. 
The temporal shifts we often associate with the passing of time really just point to the 
temporal quality that we assign to experiences. This is why, for example, events that 
happened a decade ago might be remembered as if they happened yesterday. Similarly, 
this is why I can catch up with a friend with whom I haven’t spoken in several months 
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and remark that “it feels like years” since we lastt lked. Still more, this is why two 
people can “lose track of time” during a conversation. To conceptualize a moment as 
such is therefore to play with time, at least insofar as we use “the present” as the starting 
point for remembering “the past.” As Mead explain in The Philosophy of the Present,  
 
It is idle, at least for the purposes of experience, to have recourse to a “real” past 
within which we are making constant discoveries, for that past must be set over 
against a present within which the emergent appears, and the past, which must then be 
looked at from the emergent, becomes a different past.(36) 
 
 
We understand time, in other words, through the kairotic shifting and re-ordering of 
experience that allows us to conceptualize things like “the present moment” in the first 
place. John E. Smith offers a nice explanation of this necessity quality of kairos: 
 
I shall suggest that kairos presupposes chronos, which is thus a necessary condition 
underlying qualitative times, but that, by itself, the chronos aspect does not suffice for 
understanding either specifically historical interpr tations or those processes of nature 
and human experience where the chronos aspect reaches certain critical points at 
which a qualitative character begins to emerge, and when there are junctions of 
opportunity calling for human ingenuity in apprehending when the time is “right.” 
(48) 
 
 
Put simply, chronos is less important than kairos because we “experience” time through 
the latter. When it comes to the timing of our discourse, as Yarbrough stipulates,  
 
We need to re-order time when our interlocutors are acting within different ethical 
fields than we because our fields’ temporal orders are different: events within them 
have different temporal spreads, different rhythms or patterns of emphasis, different 
urgencies, and so on, such that what will constitute an exigency—to use Lloyd 
Bitzer’s term—will be different in each field. (12) 
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At stake in successful discourse, then, is the shared timing that not only makes discursive 
interaction possible, but also determines whether discoursers will be able to successfully 
anticipate the future meanings they might come to share.  
When it comes to collaboration, what gets invented is the ethical space for reflexive 
dialogue through a kairotic reordering of time, which s supplemented by and dependent 
on an ability to triangulate the “moments” necessary fo  novel discourse.  For example, 
when I write with my collaborator, John, we must first talk through the idea we wish to 
render into text. But this talk isn’t meant to simply reach agreement on “what we want to 
say,” for it is what we want to say that is the problem, e.g., we must invent a shared 
understanding of the object of our discourse before we can—with any success at least—
render this understanding (translated through discourse) into text. As we converge on 
meanings through our discourse, that is as we begin to recognize that we are sharing 
ideas, so to speak, it is then that we can anticipae the invention if discourse to articulate 
these shared ideas. In this way our collaboration “reorders” time so to ready our discourse 
for textual articulation.  
As Jerry Blitefield suggests, “kairos is less about the ‘right-timing’ of rhetoric and 
more about a domain of time created for rhetoric, a time which makes possible the 
emergence of a multitude of meanings not attributable to any particular agent.” It is 
therefore possible to consider kairos in terms of place, because as Blitefield continues,  
 
Shifting away from a human focus, rhetorical agency here is in large part given order 
to the confidence of kairos (a temporally bordered domain) and place (a physically 
bordered domain), a confluence in which rhetorical time and rhetorical action are 
marked off and contained. (69) 
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What Blitefield suggests is that before the right timing of discourse can be assessed, there 
must be a place for discourse to transpire.  In other words, “prior to the kairos of 
discourse, we must take into account the place of that discourse” (71). The primacy of 
place grounds kairos in the world, not over and above it. While a social onstructionist 
might use this idea to argue why tactical configurations of individuals (in a space) is 
necessary for collaboration, what is really suggested is an interactionist conception of 
language as-always-in-passing. This is true insofar as I correctly interpret Blitefield’s 
central thesis to mean that we cannot hang the kairos of future discourse on the 
expectations brought to bear on prior occasions of discourse that took place at other times 
and in other places; and insofar as place and time mark the conditions for kairos to 
emerge in the first place, kairos is nontransferable; it is always an emergent quality of 
discourse-in-action.  
If we understand collaboration as an inventive art, one that requires collaborators to 
invent the “moments” for their collaboration, it reasons to ask what collaborators do to 
ready this timing. Here I want to return to the first characteristic of my redefinition of 
collaboration, that collaborators use reflexive dialogue to intervene in and enhance the 
progression of their interaction with an object of discourse.  The discourse collaborators 
enter into is best described as a kind of reflexive dialogue that serves two primary 
functions. First, it allows collaborators to discursively engage a common object (be it an 
idea, problem, meaning, question, way of saying something, etc.) and in the process they 
come to create a shared perspective or “consentient set,” to use Mead’s term, to interact 
with the object. Second, this reflexive dialogue is undertaken with the expectation that 
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novel discourse will emerge—that this collaborative “thirdspace” as a pragmatist might 
call it will yield a perspective that allows for the emergence of discourse that wasn’t 
anticipated before the collaboration itself. As I say at the beginning of this chapter, 
novelty in this context simply refers to new ways of thinking about and articulating an 
idea that collaborators invent with their reflexive dialogue. Thus we can begin to 
conceptualize the connections between and among novelty, rhetorical invention, and the 
timing collaborators create for their reflexive dialogue. To invent the collaborative 
moment, as I say above, therefore points to the recognition we ascribe to those occasions 
when novelty emerges through our rhetorical invention with another person.  
We can further understand the reflexivity of collaboration by turning to what Donna 
Qualley and Elizabeth Chiseri-Strater say about the interaction with one another 
collaborators engage. They point to a paradox inherent in collaboration, “that through the 
process of interacting with others, individuals (re)discover their selves,” and that it takes 
the loss of self to realize one’s selfhood:  
 
The paradox of collaboration also contains its promise. Borrowing from Gadamer, we 
might say collaboration allows for a “fusion of horizons” that results in an 
enlargement of one’s perspective, what we call a more “complicated understanding.” 
If collaboration is to provide a way for students to negotiate multiple (and often 
contradictory) positions, it must involve two recursive moves: a dialectical encounter 
with an “other” (a person or idea) and a reflexive engagement with the self. (111)  
 
 
According to Qualley and Chiseri-Strater, viewing collaboration as a “simultaneously 
dialectical and reflexive” process is how to recognize the transformative consequences of 
collaborative inquiry. “As we see it,” they explain, “collaborative inquiry exposes and 
highlights the creative and ongoing dialectical tensio  that is always present between 
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individuals and their worlds” (112). Qualley and Chiseri-Strater examine the idea of 
collaboration from a pedagogical lens, and they use ethnographic observations of their 
own students to reach their contingent conclusions about the dialogic and reflexive work 
of collaborative inquiry. Interestingly, they posit that the production of a product (or the 
completion of a project) is not what makes collaborti n valuable; indeed, they suggest 
that reflexive dialogue—“dialogue that may lead to the construction and examination of 
one’s own position”—is what makes collaboration an important pedagogical concept. 
Reflexive dialogue, therefore, “should be the aim of a pedagogy intent on enlarging, 
complicating, or challenging students’ experiences and belief systems” (113).   
In her monograph Turns of Thought: Teaching Composition as Reflexive Inquiry, 
Qualley defines reflexivity as “the act of turning back to discover, examine, and critique 
one’s claims and assumptions in response to an encounter with another idea, text, person, 
or culture.” But it also involves “a commitment to b th attending to what we believe and 
examining how we came to hold those beliefs while we are engaged in trying to make 
sense of an other” (3, 5 emphasis in original). It is Qualley’s distinction between 
reflexivity and reflection, however, that merits attention: 
 
Reflexivity is not the same thing as reflection, although they are often part of the 
same recursive and hermeneutical process. When we reflect, we fix our thoughts on a 
subject; we carefully consider it, mediate upon it. Self-reflection assumes that 
individuals can assess the contents of their own minds independently of others. 
Reflexivity, on the other hand, does not originate in the self but always occurs in 
response to a person’s critical engagement with an “other.” Unlike reflection, which 
is a unidirectional thought process, reflexivity is a bidirectional, contrastive response. 
The encounter with an other results in new information or perspectives which we 
must hold up to our current conception of things. The juxtaposition of two different 
representations often reveals their ill fit. In order to make sense, we are compelled to 
identify and examine our own underlying assumptions. Once we actually articulate 
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these tacit beliefs, they themselves become open to reflection, critique, and perhaps, 
transformation. (11-12) 
 
 
I quote Qualley at length because her distinction between reflection and reflexivity 
reveals the difference at stake for collaborators when they engage in reflexive dialogue, 
especially as it concerns the function of their “reflection” together. As Qualley clearly 
explains, reflexive dialogue requires interlocutors to consider their own positions as 
interlocutors, which is to say that collaborators don’t discourse in a vacuum. If they are to 
share an object of discourse and engage in reflexive dialogue that anticipates the creation 
of novelty, they must take into consideration the ethical positions from which they 
approach the collaborative grounds of their interaction.  
When collaboration is explained simply as conversation within the boundaries of an 
epistemic system like a discourse community, the ground on which collaboration occurs 
is preestablished; moreover, so are the aims of collaboration preestablished insofar as 
collaboration serves as a method for doing work as “members” of that discourse 
community. But if collaboration is theorized as an inventive art, one that occurs when 
individuals deliberately attempt to transgress and transform the limits of their discourse 
through reflexive dialogue, it is reasonable to imply that collaboration does not occur 
when common ground is located; rather it emerges when collaborative ground is 
invented. To understand this claim, it might be helpful to review how Yarbrough 
theorizes the grounds for discourse, those perceived boundaries that limit how and to 
what extent discourse itself is possible. In After Rhetoric he explains that because rhetoric 
is often understood as the counterpart to dialectic, the human mode of response to 
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discursive conflict is through the marshalling of rhetorical arguments. Rhetoric, says 
Yarbrough, “as it has been traditionally understood, is a symbolic substitute for war and 
forms of agonistic struggle.” While “rhetorical force” is often preferable than “actual 
force,” nevertheless there is always present the promise of inevitable discord. His 
description of how “fields” (another term for the grounds of discourse) get established 
highlights the relevance of conceptualizing collabor ti n according as an inventive art.  
 
My hope, however, is that settlement by force is only inevitable when the parties 
involved believe the field of play is closed prior t  deploying rhetorical strategies in 
struggles that will determine what the parties believe the configuration of reality 
within the field will be. Rhetoric presumes that the field is already closed, and every 
rhetor’s strategies could be divided into (1) those that aim to persuade others that his 
or her view of the configuration of the already closed field is the best view, and (2) 
those that presume that others have the same view of the field’s boundaries and seek 
to gain better positions within it. I proposed a new approach…that presumes (1) that 
no field is ever closed in advance except by mutual agreement of (not necessarily all 
the) parties involved, and (2) that the determination of the field is more important 
than struggles for positionality within the field, because (3) fields that are arbitrarily 
closed can be arbitrarily reopened and then reclosed. (51) 
 
 
The central consequence of Yarbrough’s proposition about rhetorical fields bears upon 
how we conceptualize whatever boundaries we assume exist that limit what, when, how, 
and where we can speak. If collaboration involves reflexive dialogue aimed at the 
creation of novel discourse, it makes sense that part of what distinguishes collaboration 
from non-collaborative discourses is the establishment of the collaborative ground in 
which collaborators’ inventive discourse emerges. Lest I come across as suggesting that 
we can clearly distinguish collaborative from non-collaborative discursive ground, I am 
not. In fact, the type of dialogue collaborators might be said to engage certainly occurs 
between individuals who might not identify themselves as collaborators, such as, for 
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example, when a student and teacher discuss an idea in tail together, or when a writing 
center tutor dialogues with a student about a paper the latter is writing, or simply when 
two friends are discussing the NFL draft over beers. What I am suggesting, however, is 
that collaborators becomes collaborators with experience as they learn to deliberately 
engage the reflexive dialogue that together they have learned to foster in the service (and 
anticipation) of novelty. 
Note 
1. If you are keeping track, this is the second time I’ve mentioned a CCCC rejection. 
It’s interesting to consider how the papers that don’t get accepted to the conference 
usually yield generative value in other venues, ones I would argue are much more 
valuable than a single conference presentation.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
THE TECHNÉ OF COLLABORATION: TRIANGULATION, RESISTANCE, AND 
INTERVENTION
 
 
In the previous chapter I introduced a new definitio  of collaboration and specified 
why collaboration should be conceptualized rhetorically as an inventive art. At the end of 
that chapter I discussed in some detail how the ideas of novelty, kairos, and reflexivity 
figure into this redefinition. In particular I explained that what collaborators do is foster 
reflexive discourse with one another as a method for inventing novelty—a term I use to 
signal new ideas and ways of articulating those ideas discursively. I did not, however, 
carefully explain my redefinition of collaboration as such because it was first necessary 
to review why and how collaboration can be linked rhetorically to the canon of invention. 
So in Chapter 4, I want to discuss what actually happens in collaboration. As I have 
already proposed, collaboration points to the ways in which interlocutors use reflexive 
dialogue to intervene in and enhance the progression of their interaction with an object of 
discourse.  
That collaborators foster reflexive discourse with one another to invent novelty 
broadly names what we do with and in collaboration, but it does not adequately explain 
collaboration in terms that sufficiently move it awy from the collaboration-as-
conversation model popularized through social turn epistemology.  In other words, to say 
that collaboration is better theorized when we use the idea of reflexivity to name the 
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interaction collaborators engage with one another may indeed provide a more helpful lens 
for understanding the roll discourse plays in collaboration, but certainly this is only 
marginal. Collaboration-as-reflexivity does not sound like much of a stretch from 
collaboration-as-conversation. To say that collaborti n is entered into for the sake of 
novelty does provide us with a relatively unrestricted end with which to explain why we 
might utilize collaboration in the first place, one that is not limited to the material and 
temporal constraints of isolated rhetorical exigenci s where “collaboration” is considered 
temporary and ends with some kind of material production. Take for example when a 
team of professional writers finishes the draft of a grant or when students give their final 
“group” presentations at the end of a course; these are examples of “collaboration” 
defined by the material conditions associated with certain kind of production—a grant, a 
report, a presentation. But to rely on the relatively undefined idea of novelty to situate an 
understanding of collaboration that departs from social constructionist models only seems 
to amend how we theorize the ends of collaboration and not how we understand what 
actually happens in the kairotic spaces of collaborti n itself. This latter point represents 
the ideas I will explore presently.  
To recall one of my primary arguments, I have explained why within social-epistemic 
theories of rhetoric collaboration has no inventive consequences because at best it can 
only be engaged stylistically as a method for enacting the practices that already occur 
within things like “discourse” or “knowledge” communities, groups whose very 
definition is constituted by the epistemic practices therein. In my positioning of 
collaboration as a reflexive relationship that collaborators engage to invent novelty, I 
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have redefined collaboration as a kind of engagement with one another that intervenes in 
and enhances the progression of our interaction with objects of discourse. If part of this 
redefinition means moving away from using material and temporal constraints to define 
collaboration, which is what I suggest, then the invention of novelty that collaborators 
anticipate occurs within the discursive space that collaborators create. In other words, 
unlike social constructionist explanations that explain conversation as something we enter 
into—a “conversation of mankind” for example—collaborators should recognize that 
“time” and “proximity” do not automatically aid in the progression of their discourse; 
they must actually create—invent—the right timing for their discourse. This is the claim I 
posed at the end of the previous chapter. Now I want to explain how collaborators do this, 
how they re-order time to invent the discursive space for their collaboration, and to do so 
I propose turning to the classical concept techné. 
So to continue the work of fostering a pragmatic theory of collaboration, let me 
suggest that to understand the difference between collaboration-as-style and 
collaboration-as-invention is to differentiate betwen episteme and techné. Although each 
of these terms has a rich and contested history in classical philosophy, an Aristotelian 
approach suggests that episteme refers to a body of knowledge while techné refers to an 
art or craft. Within social-epistemic theories of rhetoric, episteme points to the 
intellectual boundaries of knowledge communities; or m re precisely it denotes the body 
of knowledge and social practices one must “know” in order to participate within and be 
considered a member of a community. As distinct from episteme, techné denotes a 
productive power, one that is developed over time and with practice, a power to create 
 
 137
and render—to bring about something. However the products one produces using his or 
her “craft knowledge”—another way to think about techné—do not define a techné as 
such because techné denotes technology, a kind of practical equipment that suggests an 
informed capacity to invent that itself never static and always in development.  
Techné and Collaboration: An Overview 
If collaboration is to be conceptualized apart from episteme, it must be imagined as a 
kind of power or craft, one that we deliberately utilize instead of unconsciously enact. In 
other words, to move collaboration away from social turn concepts that position it as 
conversation that mediates the episteme of a discour e community, it must have an 
inventive function, one that signifies a clear difference between conversation for 
conversation’s sake and collaboration for the sake of invention. To this end, we can 
utilize the classical concept of techné to understand he power collaborators foster with 
their discourse to intervene in and enhance their inte action with whatever ideas, 
problems, questions, and the like motivate their collab ration in the first place.  
What does it mean, then, to theoretically position c llaboration as a techné that allows 
writers to intervene in the processes of rhetorical invention? First, it might be helpful to 
review how the notion of techné itself developed in classical philosophy and rhetoric. 
David Roochnik explains that the term “techné” is derived from the Indo-European root 
“tek,” which means to fit together the woodwork of a woven house. By the time of the 
Homeric poems, techné “came to refer to the knowledge or skill of the tekton, he who 
produces something from wood” (19). With time techné came to mean “craft” or 
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“productive knowledge.” As Roochnik continues, “It is knowledge of a determinate field 
(or subject matter), knowledge of how to shape specific material into a useful product” 
(22). The idea of techné naturally came to denote the artistic capacity necessary for 
producing things that required technical knowledge—shipbuilding, medicine, animal 
husbandry. By the time of Prometheus, writing was also included on many lists of 
technai. “Writing is techné,” Roochnik explains, “because it requires mastery of a 
determinate subject matter: namely, a fixed set of lements (letters) and their specific 
rules for their proper combination (orthography and grammar)” (34). Before Plato would 
criticize writing for these same reasons, Roochnik notes that many praised writing for its 
capacity to stand in for memory. As well writing afforded humanity the capacity to 
become more self-sufficient, less beholden to the will of the gods.  
 
While Aeschylus’s Prometheus is hardly the figure revered by nineteenth-century 
Romantics…it is clear that writing tokens some measure of liberation from the gods 
and fate; with this techné, human beings become their own Muse. (36) 
 
 
From a rhetorical lens, writing becomes a source of invention, a craft through which 
humans come to control their lives through a new kind of order and a new kind of 
memory. 
So the idea of techné came to suggest a capacity to exert technical force in the world 
to intervene in the natural order of things. Indeed, this is how Aristotle came to 
understand techné. As Joseph Dunne notes, “For him [Aristotle] techné is reason as 
source of purposive change in the world” (250). Butit is a reasoned capacity to make 
that separates techné from other forms of production, which is to say that a “technician” 
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can provide a rational account of his craft separate and distinct from the products of the 
craft itself. As Dunne explains, “The end determines the form, and it is in his knowledge 
of this form that his techne essentially resides,” and this knowledge is what accounts for 
the technician’s reasoned capacity “to give a ration l account (logos) of his procedures—
an account which is rational precisely insofar as it can trace the product back to the 
‘causes’ (aitiai) to which it owes its being” (250).  
Because I propose that collaboration is not the effct of something else, that it is 
instead a deliberate engagement between individuals (a source of causes, per say), it 
makes sense why using a classical approach to techné might help to account for the 
discursive work collaborators engage without falling back on metaphysics as a source of 
explanation. For example, Ede and Lunsford called th ir early collaboration a kind of 
“magic” while later scholars have used terms like “synergy” to explain the power of 
collaboration.1 While I do not want to treat what are offhanded remarks as arguments in 
themselves, I do suggest that scholars of collaboration have as a whole inadequately 
explained what exactly occurs in collaboration that distinguishes it from other kinds of 
interaction. Therefore I believe it is reasonable to consider how collaborators together 
foster an inventive techné for their discourse, one that does not reside in the minds of 
each individual collaborator but emerges as a shared capacity between collaborators to 
engage the work of rhetorical invention with greater efficiency and effectiveness.  
To further conceptualize collaboration alongside techné, I turn to Janet Atwill’s 
masterful book on the liberal arts, Rhetoric Reclaimed, where she carefully interprets the 
history of techné and explains how contemporary rhetoricians can profit from this history 
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in their own adoption of the term. Atwill defines techné as a transformative power or 
engagement, usually of the kind that transforms limits and transgresses various restraints. 
In particular she describes techné according to three defining characteristics, ones that 
she develops throughout the course of her book. These characteristics together situate 
techné as a capacity one must develop over time with practice and patience. Moreover 
these characteristics show that a techné is not a reproducible art from technician to 
technician because at most a techné is only half “skill” in the conventional sense. 
Technicians bring to their techné unique visions for what their “reasoned capacity” will 
produce, visions that change and develop as the craft is enacted. In this way Atwill 
suggests a techné cannot be reduced to “a set of deductive postulates” (7). But before I 
explain how Atwill’s explanation of techné bears upon our thinking about collaboration, 
let me review these three primary tiers in her definition of techné.  
First, a techné is not a body of knowledge (episteme) because that would imply it has 
a systematic quality that can be mapped and subsequently represented. Techné should 
instead be conceptualized as something like a power, ability, or capacity: 
 
(1) A techné is never a static body of knowledge. A techné is described as a dynamis 
(or power) and a set of transferable strategies, both c ntingent on situation and 
purpose. A techné neither represents reality nor encompasses a set of deductive 
postulates. (7) 
 
 
So a techné is heavily contingent on the visions a technician casts for what is possible 
through the manipulation of certain objects (e.g., material) in the world. This vision is 
contingent precisely because the positioning of the technician in relation to her craft is 
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never wholly stable. As the technician accounts for changes in the world, so too must she 
account for changes in the technical orientation she brings to her subject.  
 
(2) A techné resists identification with a normative subject. The subjects identified 
with techné are often in a state of flux or transformation. For example, when an art is 
employed or exchanged, characters frequently change their identity. They cross the 
boundaries that separate animals from humans and mortals from immortals. Since a 
techné is always transferable, no matter how brilliant the plan or strategy, it is never 
confined to a specific human or god. In other words, techné is never “private” 
knowledge, a mysterious faculty, or the product of unique genius. (48) 
 
 
With this second characteristic, Atwill’s description also points to the mythological roots 
of techné as a power that allows subjects to cross b undaries and engage various limits 
and constraints, transgressing and in the process tran forming them, which leads to the 
third characteristic Atwill explains to define techné: its inventive quality.  
 
(3) Techné marks a domain of human intervention and invention. What is at stake in a 
techné is neither subjectivity nor virtue. In both ancient literary and technical 
treatments, techné is defined against the forces of necessity, spontaneity, experience, 
chance, compulsion, and force; it is often associated with the transgression of an 
existing boundary—a desire for “more” that challengs or redefines relations of 
power. In contrast to philosophical knowledge, a techné is defined by its relation to 
situation and time. A techné is knowledge as production, not product; intervention 
and articulation, rather than representation. (7) 
 
 
A techné functions neither to produce knowledge nor to somehow transmit it, so in this 
way a techné is not epistemic. Moreover, neither is a techné teleological in the 
Aristotelian sense of this term because predetermined ends cannot define it. Atwill’s 
triadic definition of techné suggests it references the power to transform the perceived 
limits of one’s subjectivity through inventive engagement with the world. To situate this 
in terms that highlight the pragmatic work of collaboration, one’s rhetorical agency is 
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heavily influenced by the limitations to our discourse we perceive at any given time and 
place, constraints that can be transgressed as one develops the capacity to recognize how 
these constraints are actually lapses in “technical” vision. As collaborators develop a 
shared capacity to “see” discursive remedies to these constraints, they foster the 
technology necessary to develop and “transform” this kind of rhetorical agency.  
When considered alongside the idea of rhetorical invention, techné is thus the 
apperceived power within one’s subjectivity that anticipates the potentiality for discursive 
interaction, for what we consider, that is, to be discursively possible. If we agree with 
Stephen Yarbrough that discourse is the human mode of interaction with the world 
(Inventive 14), then it makes sense for techné to denote the perceived potentiality of this 
interaction; potentiality that of course is partially understood in terms of its limitations, of 
what is and is not possible with our discourse. So what collaborators foster for their 
inventive interaction is a unique techné that resists identification with a normative 
subjects and “deductive postulates.” Already this approach renders insufficient any 
attempt to reduce collaboration to certain tactical configurations or step-by-step 
processes, which is to say that we cannot “point” to collaboration as such because it 
speaks to the reasoned capacity individuals develop in their discourse to transform and 
transgress particular rhetorical exigencies. To further explain the  inventive interaction 
that marks the technological quality that emerges in collaboration, I turn to three 
concepts—triangulation, resistance, and intervention—that provide some helpful 
definition for developing a pragmatic belief in the techné of collaboration. I denote these 
concepts as qualities because it is through an understanding of each of these ideas that 
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one fosters a qualitative knowledge necessary to invent one’s own recognition of the 
technology collaborators foster.  
The Quality of Triangulation 
Atwill’s multi-tiered definition of techné begins with her explanation that we should 
imagine it as a kind of power or dynamis, one that denotes an ability to manipulate. We 
can understand the idea of manipulation here in two ways. As Atwill explains, the 
“earliest uses of techné found in Homer and Hesiod frequently convey the sense of trick 
or contrivance” and techné “is often associated with apaté, or ‘deception,’ and the 
product of a techné is often a ruse—something that is not what it appears to be” (52-53). 
So on the one hand techné-as-manipulation can be associ ted with trickery, one’s ability 
to manipulate others with shrewdness and cunning. But techné also refers to a craft or 
trade, one “that can generate economic capital.” In this latter case techné “is generally 
identified with artifice as opposed to nature.” That is, “the material of techné may be 
taken from nature, [but] by skill the artist produces something that nature on its own 
could not create” (53).  
In this second sense techné-as-manipulation refers to one’s ability to take some kind 
of raw material and manipulate it into a good, one that might carry “economic capital.” It 
is from this second sense of techné that we derive the term “technology,” but there is 
generative potential in attempting to balance both of these conceptions of techné side-by-
side to imagine the hybrid notion of “technique.” To manipulate a raw material like 
speech, for example, requires technique if we intend our words to persuade others. 
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“Technique is both a rational, conscious capacity to produce and an intuitive, 
unconscious ability to make,” explains Byron Hawk.  
 
This dual conception of technique moves t chné away from a reductive, generic, a-
contextual conception of technique toward a sense that technique operates through 
human bodies in relation to other bodies (animate and inanimate) in larger, more 
complex contexts (372).  
 
 
Understanding the persuasive power of language accords with Hawk’s conception of 
technique because not only must we intend our speech to bring about certain effects, but 
we also must possess the capacity to adjust our language to whatever resistances arise 
within the local contexts of particular rhetorical engagements. Discourse requires 
technique, in other words, because we enter into communication with expectations about 
what our words and gestures will do, but we must possess the power to adjust these 
words and gestures accordingly because communication is never a straightforward, 
uncomplicated process. 
To recall Mead, we continually adjust our words andgestures to account for the 
breakdowns in understanding that make communication necessary in the first place. 
Sometimes this linguistic adjustment is a conscious process, like when we explain an 
abstract concept in concrete terms, or when we interact with others who do not speak the 
same “language.” But most of the time this linguistic adjustment occurs under the radar; 
it is, to echo Hawk, “an intuitive, unconscious ability to make” shared meanings with 
whomever we discursively interact. Our discursive int raction with others, however, 
always occurs within environments, “complex contexts” where we exist “in relation to 
other bodies (animate and inanimate).” In short, if we wish to account for how our 
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discourse with others is meaningful, we must take into consideration the ecological 
factors that at any given moment influence the ways in which we adjust our words and 
gestures to better serve the purposes of communication itself. It is therefore not enough to 
stipulate that we engage (just) each other to construct shared meanings for our discourse 
because our discursive interactions always occur in the world, which is to say that 
interlocutors always discourse about something. Communication is therefore never 
dialogic because there is always a third component at work in our communicative 
interaction, those objects of discourse about which we communicate in the first place.  
In this way social turn theories of collaboration prove inadequate because they rely on 
the metaphor of conversation to explain what collabr tors “do” with their discourse. 
Collaborators enter into conversations with one another as a method for enacting 
knowledge within a discourse community, but a discourse community is defined in 
epistemic terms by conversation itself. Just like th  paradigmatic “conversation of 
mankind,” discourse communities are recognized by the “conversations” in which their 
members interact with one another. Collaboration frm this perspective is therefore 
undertaken for the value of conversation itself. It is talk for talk’s sake. If the world is 
part of how social turn theory explains collaboration, it is rendered into the concept of 
artificial but distinct “discourse” and “knowledge” communities that comingle in the 
larger world itself. A discourse community is like a little world within the bigger world, 
and our “talk” only makes sense within the contexts of whichever little worlds recognize 
it as authorized discursive behavior. Theoretically speaking, a conceptual split is 
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therefore established that our discourse must bridge between an “inside” in which our 
talk is familiar and an “outside” in which it is foreign. 
Philosophers of language who rely on these kinds of conceptual splits to delineate one 
discourse community from another can be said to embrace an “internalist” theory of 
language that positions meaning as something that exists prior to discourse itself. From 
an interalist perspective, meaning is something that gets transported through language to 
other people, and thus the conceptual split between an “in here” (the mind) and an “out 
there” (the world) that language itself serves to bridge. The conversation model of 
collaboration fails pragmatically because it cannot account for novelty—how individuals 
might use their discursive interaction with one another to invent new ideas and ways of 
articulating those ideas. From a social turn perspectiv , novelty is not really “novel” 
within a discourse community because the community itself (however one decides to 
define it) has to authorize any “abnormal discourse” and therefore render it a viable 
epistemic contribution to an existing conversation. If this explanation of collaboration 
sounds too heady and abstract, it should. My point is to show why the conversation 
model of collaboration does not provide us with utile theory to understand what 
collaboration is and how it works. Moreover it fails to position collaboration as 
something we voluntarily choose to enter into, which I argue is an imperative quality of 
collaboration if we are to recognize its pragmatic consequences in terms that depart from 
theories of social construction. 
If we turn to Donald Davidson’s theory of communicat ve interaction, specifically 
what he calls “triangulation,” we are given a pragmatically viable theory of discourse that 
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can account for the technique required for any kind of effective communication. 
Moreover it provides us with a useful heuristic for c nceptualizing the techné of 
collaboration, the inventive craft or dynamis collaborators foster with one another to 
engage their discourse. In the remainder of this section I will explain Davidson’s concept 
of triangulation and then explain how it informs what I am calling the techné of 
collaboration.  
Triangulation basically names how Davidson envision the work of communicative 
interaction, the process of discursive exchange we nt r into with others to communicate. 
Davidson’s approach has been labeled “externalist” (a  opposed to “internalist”) because 
it positions the relationship between thought and speech as intersubjective and therefore 
inherently dependent on the actual interactions betwe n discoursers (and thus “external” 
from our individual minds) to account for the meaning of our “language.” I have been 
putting this term—language—in quotations because Davidson promotes the radical 
argument that abstract schemes like “discourse communities,” “cultures,” and, yes, 
“languages” do not exist, at least not in the way that philosophers have traditionally 
explained what these things are. As he explains,  
 
A language may be viewed as a complex abstract object, d fined by giving a finite list 
of expressions (words), rules for constructing meaningful concatenations of 
expressions (sentences), and a semantic interpretation of the meaningful expressions 
based on the semantic features of individual words. I shall not be concerned…with 
the details of how such objects should be described or defined. (“Second Person” 
255) 
 
 
What Davidson does care about, however, is how discour e—our actual gesture 
interactions with one another—works. 
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In his seminal essay “A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs,” Davidson answers the 
following question: What must interlocutors share to understand each other’s utterances? 
Note that Davidson does not attempt to theorize langu ge as a conceptual system; instead 
he approaches the problem of language looking for the path of least resistance, which is 
to say he is primarily concerned with what happens in discursive interaction itself, the 
messy and unpredictable moments in which we actually interact with others using words, 
gestures, and marks. As Davidson explains, to understand discursive interaction we have 
to make a distinction between what a speaker means with his or her words and what the 
words actually mean. He points to malapropisms for a p ime example of this distinction. I 
might say to a friend, “For all intensive purposes, the party has been canceled,” without 
realizing that the correct phrase is “for all intents and purposes.” I intend my utterance to 
convey the conventional meaning of this latter phrase, which means “for all practical 
purposes,” but the literal meaning of my utterance is something all together different. If 
my friend picks up on the malapropism, it might elicit a guffaw, but my misspoken 
phrase is likely to go unheeded because we both understand what I intend my utterance to 
mean. “All that is needed” to understand discursive exchanges like this one, says 
Davidson, “is a firm sense of the difference between what words mean or refer to and 
what speakers mean or refer to” (98). We associate the meaning of specific words with 
conventions or “theories” of what a word means based on prior experience with that 
word. But our theories of what words mean are not always sufficient for actually 
interpreting another’s discourse, especially when someone uses “language” in a way that 
doesn’t align with our expectations (e.g., as with malapropisms). In these instances we 
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can usually adjust our expectations to arrive at the intended meaning. “To put this 
differently,” explains Davidson, “the theory we actually use to interpret an utterance is 
geared to the occasion. We may decide later we could have done better by the occasion, 
but this does not mean (necessarily) that we have a better theory for the next occasion.” 
We might realize in retrospect that our interpretation of another’s discourse could have 
been more effective, in other words, but this realization does not guarantee the efficacy of 
future discursive interaction. “The reason for this is, as we have seen, perfectly obvious: a 
speaker may provide us with information relevant to in erpreting an utterance in the 
course of making the utterance” (101).  
It is in the work of how we constantly adjust our exp ctations about how discourse 
“means” in the actual moments of its use that Davidson explains why we do not need 
conceptual entities like “language” to account for discursive interaction. Rather all we 
need is a working concept of what Davidson calls prior theory and passing theory:  
 
For the hearer, the prior theory expresses how he is prepared in advance to interpret 
an utterance of the speaker, while the passing theory is how he does interpret the 
utterance. For the speaker, the prior theory is what he believes the interpreter’s prior 
theory to be, while the passing theory is the theory he intends the interpreter to use. 
(101) 
 
 
Philosophers have tended to theorize language as anbstract system of signifiers 
(langue) that exists prior to our speech (parole). To understand the latter we must have 
access to the former. According to Davidson, however, what we call “language” really 
just amounts to a set of expectations (prior theories) about what certain sounds and marks 
mean. What these sounds and marks ctually mean is contingent to the occasions in 
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which they are deployed. Thusly, and “for all intensive purposes,” we cannot rely on the 
idea of language to account for discursive understanding. “What must be shared for 
communication to succeed is the passing theory,” sas Davidson. “For the passing theory 
is the one the interpreter actually uses to interpret an utterance, and it is the theory the 
speaker intends the interpreter to use. Only if these coincide is understanding complete” 
(102). Sharing a “language” in the conventional sense certainly makes communication 
convenient, but as Eli Dresner explains in his summary of Davidson’s theory, “this is not 
to say that convention is a prerequisite for interpr tation.” As he continues: 
 
For one thing, understanding can be attained without persons adhering to the same 
convention. It is sufficient that each party knows how to interpret the different 
idiolect of the other. Furthermore, it is not an essential condition for communication 
that the contemporary linguistic behavior of two peo l  engaged in conversation be 
the same as their behavior yesterday, in virtue of following some kind of convention. 
Regularity, albeit a flexible one, is not the issue here. Rather, what is essential is that 
persons will be mutually understandable on each concrete occasion. (“Davidson’s 
Philosophy” 164) 
 
 
Davidson therefore takes the process of interpretation out of the minds of individual 
interlocutors and locates it within their discursive nteractions with each other and the 
world. This is why, hypothetically speaking, two ind viduals who do not speak the same 
language can nevertheless learn to communicate with eac  other, because with enough 
interaction they learn to adjust their utterances to arrive at enough passing theories for 
understanding. Granted, this understanding might be only partial and fragmented in the 
beginning, but this is only a matter of degree, for with enough time and interaction their 
mutual discourse will require less effort.  
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So to recognize the difference between prior and passing theory accounts for an 
understanding of how interlocutors respond to one another’s discourse, but remember that 
we interact with others in the world and so we must also account for the objects of 
discourse interlocutors actually share. Here is where Davidson’s concept of triangulation 
emerges. As Dresner notes, “Davidson maintains that we assign meaning to another’s 
utterances not by translating them into our own language, but rather by associating them 
with things in the world surrounding us” (“Radical” 124). Triangulation therefore names 
the process through which interlocutors adjust their discursive interaction to share objects 
of discourse. In “The Second Person,” Davidson alludes to the necessity for triangulation 
in this way:  
 
So we can say…that if anyone is to speak a language, there must be another creature 
interacting with the speaker. Of course, this cannot be enough, since mere interaction 
does not show how the interaction matters to the creatu es involved.  Unless the 
creatures concerned can be said to react to the interaction, there is no way they can 
take cognitive advantage of the three-way relation which gives content to our idea 
that they are reacting to one thing rather than another. (263-64) 
 
 
It is through the process of triangulation that interlocutors actually discourse because 
discourse itself presumes discourse about something. Therefore when interlocutors 
converge on passing theories, they are converging on a shared meaning of an object of 
discourse. I use this term “object of discourse” in the same way I employ it in my 
definition of collaboration; it can mean an idea, problem, meaning, object, or whatever 
“thing” in either the concrete or abstract sense constitutes an object of attention. 
It has required a fair amount of explanation to get to this point, but triangulation 
undergirds the technological work of collaboration because first and foremost 
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collaborators must learn to actively share objects of discourse. That is, collaborators don’t 
just engage in conversation for the sake of conversation; moreover they do not discourse 
with one another simply to locate shared objects of attention; rather collab rators are 
deliberate about heightening the efficiency of there discursive interaction. Remember 
that, first, techné points to a power or dynamis with which we create (or manipulate) 
something natural into something that nature on its own would not have created. 
According to Davidson’s theory of triangulation, we“naturally” adjust our discourse with 
one another to converge on shared meanings about an object of attention, which is to say 
that triangulation is not the exception, it is the rule; it is how we come to understand 
utterances in the world.  
If collaboration is to yield pragmatic consequences, however, it has to be more than 
simply a “natural” process. Keep in mind that according to social constructionist 
epistemology, collaboration names the natural processes of conversation through which 
individuals get assimilated into the conceptual sphere of a discourse community. 
Collaboration is not a natural process if we theorize it as an inventive techné because 
collaborators must foster the dynamis with which they will enhance the triangulation 
process through which they communicate. So in a sense, to understand the concept of 
triangulation as a critical component in the techné of collaboration is to recognize that 
what collaborators foster with one another is an enhanced capacity to share objects of 
discourse. The more effectively collaborators anticipate the passing theories necessary to 
share meaning, the more effectively they can use their reflexive dialogue to trace the 
invention of new ideas and articulations that have emerged within their discursive 
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interaction. One way to imagine what collaborators bring about or “manipulate” 
technologically with their discourse is thus critical awareness of the triangulation process 
itself.  
But to fully understand the concept of triangulation, we must account for the third 
point in the triangle, those objects we discourse “about” at any given moment of 
communication. I say these are the objects we discour e “about” because a fuller 
interpretation of Davidson here suggests that these objects are just as important as the 
utterances of each interlocutor because what these utterances mean will be shaped by 
how we interact with an object. An externalist theory f discourse might therefore 
stipulate that objects of discourse interact with us just as much as we interact with them. 
We therefore must account for this triangulated interaction, and we can do so with the 
idea of resistance. 
The Quality of Resistance 
To continue in my consideration of how Atwill’s multi-tiered definition of techné 
informs how we can conceptualize the techné of collab ration, I turn to the second tier of 
her account. As Atwill notes, often the subjects of techné—the artistic vision technicians 
engage with their craft—are in a state of flux and transformation. Moreover,  
 
when an art is employed or exchanged, characters [tho e who employ the techné] 
frequently change their identity. They cross the boundaries that separate animals from 
humans and mortals from immortals. Since a techné is always transferable, 
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Atwill continues, “no matter how brilliant the plan or strategy, it is never confined to a 
specific human or god. In other words, techné is never ‘private’ knowledge, a mysterious 
faculty, or the product of unique genius” (48). Keep in mind that Atwill is describing how 
the idea of techné works in the contexts of classicl literature; nevertheless her expansive 
interpretation of techné provides contemporary rhetoricians with a generative lens 
through which to imagine the technological work that goes into our discursive 
interaction.  
When we recognize that discourse is always the product of triangulation and not just 
the two-way exchange often associated with dialogism, Atwill’s insistence that techné 
never amounts to “private knowledge” or “unique genius” makes sense because the craft 
knowledge we associate with techné originates through our exchanges with one another 
and with objects in the world. From a rhetorical standpoint, what gives collaboration its 
practical difference is in the deliberate attempt on he part of collaborators to heighten 
and enhance this work of triangulation. Indeed, what gives successful collaborators their 
edge is the capacity they share to triangulate withthe world in ways that enlarge the 
potential for rhetorical invention. And how collaborators foster this capacity is to 
recognize how they each individually and together account for the resistances involved in 
triangulation itself.  
This idea of resistance, the second quality I ascribe to the techné of collaboration, 
points to the critical role objects of discourse play in the give-and-take of our 
interactions. What we come to “know” about an object of discourse through 
triangulation—what we come to share with interlocutrs—is knowledge of this object’s 
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resistances. To put this in simpler terms, just as our materials actions are constrained by 
objects in the world (for example, my ability to sit down at any given time is constrained 
by things like chairs, gravity, social conventions, and the occasional pain in my lower 
back), so too are our discursive actions constrained by the ways in which objects resist 
our beliefs (e.g., “meanings”) that we share with ot ers about these objects.  As 
Yarbrough explains,  
 
what interlocutors come to know together is the ways the objects resist their 
intentions toward it. We can describe these resistances as relations within the objects, 
and between the object and other objects. The set of these relations, what the objects 
will come to be to the interlocutors, is unified by their common relationship with, or 
attitude toward, the object. (“On ‘Getting It’” 5) 
 
 
Yarbrough provides a helpful example of “resistance” in the context of discursive 
interaction, one I will quote at length: 
 
For example, if you and I come from different social groups and have no common 
“language,” when I point at a couch and say “couch” you will not necessarily think 
my word “couch” indicates a “couch.” Such an object may not even exist for your 
society. You might think that “couch” indicates leather, or furniture, or obstacle, or 
that it could be translated into your language as “mine,” or “sit down,” or any of a 
thousand different things until interactions with the object I had indicated to be a 
“couch” take place, such as my pointing to another couch not leather and saying 
“couch,” or saying “Sit on couch” and then sitting on the couch followed by “Sit on 
floor” then sitting on the floor. If you were to join in sitting on things and calling 
them “couch,” and so on, and observing not only my reactions but the couch's 
reactions to the interactions—to its resistance or consent, as it were, to our intentions 
toward it—before too long we would both have a fairidea of how the other uses the 
word “couch” as we gradually triangulate upon a common object of the discourse. 
The important thing to note is that both I and the couch “resist” your possible 
misinterpretations of my use of the sign “couch.” Not only will I resist if you interpret 
“couch” to mean “edible,” but the couch itself will resist if you try to eat it. The 
couch, as it were, has its own say in the conversation. (5) 
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Yarbrough’s example is useful because it takes a hypot etical (although nonetheless 
reasonable) scenario to demonstrate how an object of discourse, in this case a material 
object like a couch, “interacts” with discoursers in the process of triangulation. While this 
example brings with it a quality of obviousness, the point Yarbrough makes is that all of 
our discursive interaction requires this type of engagement with resistance. Therefore if 
collaborators intend to heighten and enhance their riangulation with objects of discourse, 
they must learn to anticipate and account for how their discourse “resists”; how to adjust 
and readjust their expectations (prior theories) to arrive at passing theories more 
efficiently.  
When we step back to consider what is at work in our discourse, one can see that our 
words are selected because they represent the best possible articulation that can be shared 
with another person at any given moment with an object of discourse. Yarbrough’s 
example of the couch is helpful because it illustrates in very clear terms how objects 
resist our interactions with them (e.g., a couch will resist our belief that it tastes good). 
But we can turn to an abstract example of resistance t work, one that further 
demonstrates the quality of resistance in the triangulation process. If during a church 
service the pastor holds up a piece of bread and utters the phrase “the body of Christ,” I 
will have to share a similar field of perception to understand his meaning. Far from a 
hypothetical example like eating couches, this is a very common utterance to hear, one 
that gets spoken tens of thousands of times every wek at various church services around 
the world; the utterance is part of the ritual pastors engage to ready the elements for their 
use in the sacrament of communion. So if I am to understand the pastor, especially if I am 
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to understand that the pastor is not crazy—that he can recognize a piece of bread from a 
human body—I have to interact with the bread as an object of discourse in way that 
aligns with the pastor’s interaction with it. In fact, there are two primary objects of 
discourse, a piece of bread and the idea of Christ’s body, objects that will resist my belief 
if I propose that the bread is literally Christ’s body. But to debate this idea we then get 
into the theological problem of transubstantiation, so it helps to recognize what is meant 
by this theological doctrine—yet another object of discourse that requires our attention. 
The point I wish to make is that very rarely are we ev r focusing on only one object of 
discourse, that to engage in discourse both efficiently and effectively we must possess the 
skills to address multiple objects simultaneously. In the case of the communion bread, I 
will probably need to consider the myriad other beliefs the pastor associated with the idea 
of Christ as an object of discourse. So if I were tmporarily stymied by the pastor’s 
utterance about the bread being Christ’s body, and if I ecided to talk with her after the 
service, we would have to triangulate with these multiple objects of discourse for me to 
understand that the pastor is making a theological observation rather than a physical one. 
Certainly she does not believe that the physical quities of the bread are identical to the 
physical quality of a human body, but she may very well believe that a mystical 
transformation has occurred.  
So what does the above example mean in reference to our discussion of 
collaboration? If I were to partner with this pastor, f r example, to write an essay about 
the rhetoric of transubstantiation, we would have to identify the various resistances to 
these objects of discourse as a method for developing a shared perceptive of and vision 
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for what we might be able to say together within the essay. The tricky business of 
theorizing collaboration within an externalist theory f discourse is that one runs the risks 
of unduly amplifying the “moves” collaborators have to make in response to one another 
for the work of collaboration itself to proceed. Like the bicycle rider who crashes because 
he pays too much attention to the interrelated tasks of balancing, pedaling, and steering, 
so too can a theoretical discussion like this one tempt readers to overanalyze what is 
much like the work of riding a bike. Indeed, as collaborators learn to discourse with one 
another, it takes practice and a fair amount of trial and error for them to recognize how 
they “triangulate,” but soon enough the immediacy of this effort will subside as 
collaborators more readily converge on passing theories while learning how to relate. 
And learning how to relate—figuring out how to share n object of discourse—is another 
way to understand the idea of resistance as a component f the techné collaborators 
foster. To this end, ethos becomes a critical concept in an externalist theory of 
collaboration. 
To understand resistance requires one to consider the ethical stances discoursers 
assume within an environment. Externalist theory, what I will also call from here forward 
interactionist rhetorical theory, understands that ese ethical positions determine what 
how we account for the objects of our perception.  More than simply accounting for an 
individual’s character, an interactionist theory of ethos considers how certain beliefs 
about the world are made possible through the topical relationships we recognize from 
perspective within the world. In this way, how we interact with other objects in the world, 
including people, influences what we are able to “know” about those objects. The 
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connection to the idea of resistance should be apparent here. In interactionist rhetorical 
theory ethos does not refer to the cultural relativism implicit in social-epistemic rhetoric; 
how beliefs can be neither right nor wrong because our individual characters are 
determined by and confined to certain “networks” of knowledge and belief. For this 
reason an externalist conception of ethos can be stood oppositely and in response to 
classical conceptions of ethos since in the latter ethos is more or less universally defined 
by character traits.  The virtues Aristotle outlines in the Nicomachean Ethics, for 
example, are distinguishable qualities that maintain their meaning across contexts. 
Interactionally, however, and departing from a culturally relative epistemology, 
Yarbrough writes that one’s ethos “describes a familiarity with how things relate to one 
another with respect to a particular purpose in a particular place, a familiarity with the 
topoi used habitually to solve certain kinds of problems and answer certain kinds of 
questions” (Inventive 171). Those who are able to imagine the perspectives of others, 
those who can willingly assume new ethical stances, are those who are better situated to 
respond to the exigencies that stymie our interactions. They are the ones who can use 
discourse to invent arguments, to foster understanding, and to create novelty if need be, 
all for the purposes of maintaining interaction, maint ining Mead’s continuance of the 
common world.  
Elsewhere I’ve tried to explain how this discursive continuance of the common world 
can be understood through a virtue ethical approach to invention that provides a non-
relativistic, non-foundational lens through which to understand what makes rhetoric 
“good” (“Rhetoric, Virtue”). In short, because we are beings who use discourse to 
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negotiate and make sense of our experiences in the world, and because of our ability to 
respond to exigencies, we also seek resolution to the problems that upset our habits of 
belief. By virtue of rhetorical invention existing beliefs can be maintained and novel 
beliefs created in the face of our day-to-day experiences. From the purview of rhetorical 
interactionist theory, the discourse we share with the world does not exist prior to 
interaction itself because discourse is the interacion, which is the claim Mead uses to 
support his theory of truth; it is the idea that fuels Davidson’s theory of communicative 
interaction; and it is the premise from which Yarbrough constructs his interactionist 
theory of ethos. 
A rhetorical interactionist approach to ethos, combined with Davidson’s account of 
communicative interaction, informs the inventive interaction that collaborators engage 
when they are no longer simply conversing for conversation’s sake, but instead using 
their discourse to anticipate something novel, whether it be an idea, observation, or 
textual articulation. In interactionist terms, collaborators foster discourse that helps them 
to recognize ethical relationships between objects, including themselves, objects that 
continually resist systematization within the symbolic bounds of something like “normal 
discourse.” That is, objects in the world, including abstract objects like ideas, become 
meaningful as we learn to negotiate their resistances to our expectations. As Mead 
explains, “Meaning is a statement of the relation between the characteristics in the 
sensuous stimulation and the responses which they call out.” He continues, “If the 
occasion for the consciousness of meaning is not found in the habitual act may it not also 
be found in the conflict of acts?” (Selected Essays 129). It is in both the development of 
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expectations (habits) and the challenges to these exp ctations (conflicts/resistance) that 
meaning emerges, and it is through this continual adjustment of expectations that we 
communicate.  
The techné of collaboration therefore suggests the ways in which collaborators 
develop a sensitivity to the flux and transformation, to echo Atwill, that a good technician 
traces and anticipates as they perform their craft. In act, Joseph Dunne explains that 
those who can be said to possess a techné do not rely n chance to determine the 
outcomes of their craft. But neither do they presume a static and reproducible product, 
which is to say technicians cultivate sensitivity for the craftwork itself, the dynamic 
process of molding something natural into something synthetic.  
 
Success is to be achieved in them not so much by keeping one’s gaze fixed on the 
preconceived form which one will impose on the materi l, as by a flexible kind of 
responsiveness to the dynamism of the material itself. It is sensitivity or attunement 
rather than mastery or domination that one strives for. (256) 
 
 
In collaboration individuals use their interaction t  cultivate discursive practices that 
lead to iterations of novelty, but their communication, unlike within a social 
constructionist framework, is not meant to inevitably arrive at some manifestation of 
“consensus” in the epistemic sense. Rather collaborators use their discourse to heighten 
each other’s sensitivity to the rhetorical work of invention. Put in Davidson’s terms, one 
can understand collaboration as enhanced triangulation enacted to foster the convergence 
necessary to arrive at understandings that make rhetorical invention better. What 
collaborators foster with their techné isn’t just talk; they fosters habits of discourse that 
establish enhanced communicative relationships with one another. Collaboration is 
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therefore not a static marker of a type of discourse or an epistemic model for knowledge 
production; it points to a fluid discursive engagement that over time individuals can more 
readily manipulate in order to, as J.L. Austin might say, do things with words.  
The Quality of Intervention 
If we theorize collaboration as an inventive art, one that informs the work of a techné, 
then it makes sense that we consider the ethical positioning of collaborators in response 
to a common of object of concern. In the previous two sections I have explained how to 
use the notions of triangulation and resistance heuristically to recognize the “external” 
quality of collaboration theorized as a discursive techné. But if collaboration is to be 
imagined as an inventive art, and indeed, to understand my redefinition of collaboration 
as a method of intervention individuals engage to progress their interaction with an object 
of discourse, we must also consider a third quality to collaboration’s techné, one that 
compliments triangulation and resistance as characteristic markers of the reasoned 
capacity needed to collaborate.  
The idea of intervention is pulled directly from my definition of collaboration but it 
also echoes how Atwill understands the value of techné as she articulates it in the third 
tier of her interpretation of this classical term. Techné, as she explains in this regard, 
“marks a domain of human intervention an invention…it is often associated with the 
transgression of an existing boundary—a desire for ‘m e’ that challenges or redefines 
boundaries” (7). If collaborators foster a techné for their collaboration, then this 
engagement anticipates the transgression of some type of boundary or limit. In particular, 
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I suggest the limits collaborators engage are the limits of their individual apperceptions of 
objects of discourse. The reflexive dialogue that mrks the kind of talk collaborators 
foster therefore serves two primary functions. First, t allows collaborators to discursively 
share a common object, or rather, a set of objects as hey come to share an enhanced 
ethical positioning in relationship to this set of objects, a kind of thirdspace, one that 
belongs to neither collaborator in isolation from the other’s discourse. Second, the 
dialogue collaborators share is undertaken at leastin part with the expectation that novel 
discourse will emerge—that this collaborative thirdspace will yield perspective that 
allows for further discursive interaction about an idea, problem, question, or what have 
you. So the techné of collaboration is what emerges when collaborators recognize that 
their discourse engages and transforms the boundaries of their individual rhetorical 
agency, the agency that gives them the power to discour e about certain things in certain 
ways at certain times in certain places.  
So collaboration as a kind of intervention speaks to the deliberation collaborators 
bring to their discourse as well as the discursive ag ncy they foster to enhance the work 
of rhetorical invention. But the idea of intervention is what also gives the techné of 
collaboration its strong pragmatist bent. One way to imagine how to forward 
collaboration in composition studies “consequently” is to recognize how collaboration 
transgresses and transforms boundaries in order to widen the possibilities for future 
action. In fact, thinking about collaboration as a kind of intervention in these terms 
harkens back to how John Dewey defined pragmatism in 1925 “as an extension of 
historical empiricism, but with this fundamental difference, that it does not insist upon 
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antecedent phenomena but upon consequent phenomena; not upon the precedents but 
upon the possibilities of action” (“American” 196).  
If there was ever an educator who supported the pragmatic work of collaboration it 
was Paulo Freire. Although he never discussed collab ration as a distinct pedagogical 
concept, all of his work as a progressive literacy dvocate builds on the necessity of 
combining perspectives in order to transgress and transform the material limits of our 
experience. To be a progressive educator who speaks “to the people,” says Freire, “one 
must convert the ‘to’ to a ‘with’ the people. And this implies respect for the ‘knowledge 
of living experience’ of which I always speak, on the basis of which it is possible to go 
beyond it” (Hope 19). Freire believed that learning was at its best when “limit situations” 
are engaged, when discernable obstacles that impede critical consciousness, or 
“conscientização,” are overcome through reciprocal di logue and interaction. There is 
always a temptation with Freire to over-romanticize, or some cases simply write off, the 
Marxist jargon that gives his prose its sense of urgency, especially when reconciling the 
liberatory calls to action advocated by Freire within American contexts that hardly 
represent the oppressive material realities out of which Freire wrote.  
I bring up Freire because he provides a rich storehouse of generative vocabulary to 
conceptualize what it means for discourse to intervene in and provide agency for critical 
action in the world. To this end I turn to his notion of “untested feasibility” because it 
nicely extends the quality of intervention as I understand it within my theoretical 
approach to collaboration. Untested feasibility is another name for conceptualizing what 
collaborators anticipate with their reflexive dialogue, particularly when deciding what it 
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means to attach the qualifier “novel” to this kind of discourse. That is when it comes to 
how a collaborative’s discourse anticipates future rhetorical exigencies, particularly when 
anticipating how a collaborative’s discourse will have to answer for as-yet-to-be-
encountered problems of articulation, this is where Freire’s concept might prove 
especially useful from a heuristic standpoint. Furthe more, when positioned as a 
speculative instrument untested feasibility represents a concept with which collaborators 
can imagine the possibilities for how their discourse names the world, as Freire would 
say. But before I comment on this point, let me brifly turn to the pragmatic dimension of 
untested feasibility. 
In their essay on Freire’s relationship to pragmatist philosophy, Kate Ronald and 
Hephzibah Roskelly explain that both pragmatism and liberatory pedagogy promote the 
testing of experience as the primary method through which limit situations are 
transformed and transgressed. “Being able to break through limit situations means being 
able to see them as problems rather than as givens and thus being able to act to change 
them as well as reflect on the consequences of that action” (615). Untested feasibility 
becomes a useful concept because it points to the imagined limitations of our critical 
perception that inspire praxis, that critical interplay between action and reflection.  
 
Critical literacy for Freire involves movement betwen participant/reflector, 
reflector/participant; for the pragmatists, too, movement between 
doing/reflecting/doing constitutes the path of learning. Central to both the pragmatic 
agenda and Freire’s praxis is the necessary connectio  between action and reflection; 
this connection leads both Freire and the pragmatists to a sense of hopefulness, a 
belief at least in contingent possibility. For both p ilosophies, belief means a 
willingness to act and the assurance that reflection on action will lead to better, more 
helpful acts. Freire calls this kind of hope “untested feasibility”. . . . (614) 
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As a critical term used to denote the potentiality that exists beyond the constraints of limit 
situations, untested feasibility therefore has richpotential as a speculative instrument, 
especially since its very terminology, the idea of undetermined possibility, calls upon us 
to keep in mind the pragmatic qualities of contingecy and consequence when assessing 
discursive feasibility. Of course, what is feasible is not necessarily guaranteed, but to 
offer guarantees betrays the metaphoric function of feasibility for Freire, namely because 
“feasibility” is a term that denotes the necessary use of imagination to anticipate how to 
transform and transgress limit situations.  
Put another way, untested feasibility as heuristic calls for a kind of unchecked 
imagination. As a speculative instrument untested feasibility can therefore be utilized as a 
lens through which to imagine the pragmatic possibilities of our discourse. Berthoff 
explains the import of Freire’s pedagogy is in its emphasis on inviting students to 
imaginatively experiment with language:  
 
The experience of recreating their language becomes the model for transformation of 
the world they inhabit. The power source of their rclaimed imagination: they can 
envisage real change in their lives because they have experienced real change in the 
literary process. 
 
 
Understanding the heuristic potential of Freire’s work is located in the intersections of 
how we conceptualize transformation and “reclaimed imagination.” There is nothing 
mystical, magical, or metaphysical here. “Conscientization must be demystified,” 
exclaims Berthoff. “Critical reflection is an act: it is praxis: it is transformation” 
(“Remembering” 308).  
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The pragmatic possibilities for untested feasibility as a kind of intervention are most 
recognizable when I return to the argument for conceptualizing collaboration as a 
pragmatic techné. According to the externalist principles of triangulation, the technical 
work of collaboration is to construct triangulated interaction that illuminates the untested 
feasibility of our discourse. As I’ve already described, what collaborators craft is the 
reflexive dialogue they use to anticipate novel discourse. Accordingly, using Janet 
Atwill’s interpretation of techné as a domain of inve tion and intervention, I utilize 
Aristotle’s definition of techné as “a certain state involving reason concerned with 
production” (1140a) but with the added component of intervention. In this way, the 
techné of collaboration isn’t so much a “reasoned capa ity to make,” which is a pithier 
way to interpret Aristotle’s definition of techné (Dubinsky 6); it is perhaps best described 
as a reasoned capacity to anticipate. Of course, even for Aristotle the product is not what 
defined a craftsman; it is his skill, the r asoned capacity that is used to explain the 
craftsmanship. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle says the following: 
 
Every craft is concerned with coming to be, and the ex rcise of the craft is the study 
of how something that admits of being and not being comes to be, something whose 
principle is in the producer and not in the product. For a craft is not concerned with 
things that are or come to be by necessity; nor with things that are by nature, since 
these have their principles in themselves….A craft, then, as we have said, is a state 
involving true reason concerned with production. Lack of craft is the contrary state 
involving false reason and concerned with production. (1140a) 
 
 
While for Aristotle a techné is not defined by its products, it is nonetheless product-
directed, but with collaboration no material product necessarily has to develop in order 
for the techné of collaboration to be successfully engaged. Keep in mind that I have 
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defined collaboration primarily in terms of ethos, as a shared discursive commitment to 
not only invent but also intervene in the perceived limits of a collaborative’s ability to 
articulate whatever subject their discourse engages, and hence the potential of untested 
feasibility as a speculative instrument to name this kind of critical perception. 
When the notion of techné as a domain of invention and intervention is combined 
with the idea of untested feasibility, it makes sense that the techné of collaboration could 
be described as the ethical relationship discoursers manipulate to anticipate the feasibility 
of their discourse. Remember, I am utilizing ethos in the interactionist sense, which is to 
say it speaks to the relational dynamic that both cnstrains and directs our apperceptions 
and, by default, our discourse with the world. To bring this back to Freire, the techné of 
collaboration is what collaborators engage to craft a shared conscientização: 
 
Reflection upon situationality is reflection about the very conditions of existence: 
critical thinking by means of which people discover each other to be “in a situation.” 
Only as this situation ceases to present itself as a dense, enveloping reality or a 
tormenting blind alley, and they can come to perceive it as an objective-problematic 
situation—only then can commitment exist. Humankind emerge from their 
submersion and acquire the ability to intervene in reality as it is unveiled. Intervention 
in reality—historical awareness itself—thus represent  a step forward from 
emergence, and results from the conscientização f the situation. Conscientização is 
the deepening of the attitude of awareness characteristic of all emergence. (Oppressed 
109, italics in original) 
 
 
To a certain extent Freire’s explanation of conscientização might be too abstract for us to 
recognize its relevance for understanding the work of collaboration, but the resistance 
one might have to this comparison is itself an invitation to consider what Freire means by 
emergence. Emergence is Freire’s term for the initiation of c nsciousness that is required 
to pursue limit acts, engagements that challenge limit situations, and for collaboration to 
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be a limit act we must first experience the resistance of trying to coordinate anticipation 
in the first place.  
The point here is that to foster the techné necessary to anticipate the untested 
feasibility of their discourse, collaborators must be able to share a disposition that allows 
them to observe the changes in what they can articula e—in what “objects” they are able 
to share discursively. In a way, the techné of collaboration can be described as the power 
or dynamis that gives collaborators an enhanced ability to observe differences, which is 
how Dewey actually defines the work of inquiry: to evaluate aims and experience side-
by-side, or as he says elsewhere, to make activity intelligent: “[I]t means foresight of the 
alternative consequences attendant upon acting in a iven situation, and the use of what is 
anticipated to direct observation and experiment” (Democracy and Education 129). 
Patterns of inquiry, the observed consequences of certain modes of action, are for Dewey 
what create the quality of continuity that we use to distinguish useful from non-useful 
habits of action. Indeed, like James and Peirce before him, Dewey equates knowledge 
with the way we develop habitual responses to the anticipation of future consequences. 
As Melvin Rogers says, “Continuity between action and production is the origination of 
knowledge, which, in turn provides points of departure for future encounters with an 
uncertain world that either reaffirms that knowledg or throws it into question” (94). In 
Logic: A Theory of Inquiry, Dewey develops the term “pattern of inquiry” to distinguish 
the sustained commitment necessary to probe problems b yond the surface value of 
simple asking questions. We can turn to Dewey because the way he pragmatically 
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situates the work of inquiry serves as conceptual glue for linking untested feasibility to 
Atwill’s sense of a techné’s interventions. 
To understand inquiry, Dewey suggests that what we look for are patterns to help us 
assess the practical consequences that a particular problem has yielded. As he explains,  
 
The search for the pattern of inquiry is, accordingly, not one instituted in the dark or 
at large. It is checked and controlled by knowledge of the kinds of inquiry that have 
and that have not worked; methods which, as was pointed out earlier, can be so 
compared as to yield reasoned or rational conclusions. For, through comparison-
contrast, we ascertain how and why certain means and agencies have provided 
warrantably assertible conclusions, while others have not and cannot do so in the 
sense in which “cannot” expresses an intrinsic incompatibility between means used 
and consequences attained. (“Patterns” 483) 
 
 
Through the identification of patterns of inquiry Dewey suggests logic is used to test the 
methods used within the borders of an experiment to evaluate their usefulness. “Inquiry 
as a mode of conduct is accessible to objective study,” writes Richard J. Bernstein in his 
sketch of Dewey, “and the function of logic is to discern the methods and patterns of 
inquiry in order to provide us with a guide for better and more successful inquiries” 
(102). Before I continue, however, let me share Dewey’s definition of inquiry, for even 
his articulation of what inquiry is helps to illuminate the discursive situations 
collaborators create: “Inquiry is the controlled or directed transformation f an 
indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and 
relations as to convert the elements of the original situation into a unified whole” (483). 
Embedded in this definition is what Dewey calls an indeterminate situation, which names 
the context in which the need for inquiry arises; it is an occasion that “evokes inquiry” 
and is “uncertain, unsettled, disturbed.” But to diagnose such a situation, discourse is 
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required that can map possible directions that transform an indeterminate situation into a 
determinate one. As Dewey explains, “In the intermediat  course of transition and 
transformation of the indeterminate situation, discourse through the use of symbols is 
employed as means. In received logical terminology, propositions, or terms and the 
relation between them, are intrinsically involved” (483).  
The social dimension implied with Dewey’s understanding of what constitutes a 
pattern of inquiry should not be underemphasized.  In fact, inquiry is what Dewey 
considers to be the principle activity human beings pursue to anticipate and direct future 
action. As noted above, inquiry differs from questioning because the former can become 
its own object of study and reflection, and this is what gives inquiry its dynamic 
potential. Bernstein notes, “A successful inquiry results in knowledge, and knowledge 
can now be characterized as the warrantably assertible product of inquiry” (110). As 
Dewey explains in Democracy and Education, “To have an idea of a thing is thus not just 
to get certain sensations from it. It is to be able to respond to the thing in view of its place 
in an inclusive scheme of action; it is to foresee the drift and probable consequence of the 
action upon us and of our action upon it.” He continues,  
 
To have the same ideas about things which others have, to be like-minded with them, 
and thus to be really members of a social group, is therefore to attach the same 
meanings of things and to acts which others attach.  (36) 
 
  
Inquiry is the dynamic process through which we are abl  to test our meanings in light of 
our actions within an indeterminate situation, to maintain Dewey’s diction, that prompt a 
common response. Keep in mind the “individual” and “social” are not mutually exclusive 
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for Dewey, so to individually respond to an exigency implies simply one mode of 
thinking about how our individual agencies are linked to those of others and a shared 
common environment. I like how Dewey words it this way: “There is not, in fact, any 
such this as the direct influence of one human being on another apart from use of the 
physical environment as an intermediary” (33). Inquiry requires deliberately holding 
some form of experience as an object that can be obs rved as such, but to communicate 
this observation requires there to be a shared disposition that can recognize the very 
object under consideration. To this end, there is no uch thing as purely individual 
inquiry. As Dewey says, “participating in a joint activity [is] the chief way of forming 
disposition” (34).  
The import of understanding intervention as a quality of the techné collaborators 
foster with their discourse can therefore be found in Dewey’s call for us to develop 
sensible methods of deliberating about the possibilities of action in an uncertain future. In 
other words, to bring Dewey’s empiricism in line with Freire, the emergent critical 
consciousness we harness to transgress those constraints hat limit the potentiality of 
discourse we can understand pragmatically as the “logical rectification” that is invented 
as we probe the concrete ground of our discursive interactions with the world.2 So what 
does it mean to say that as a techné collaboration is used as a method of intervention in 
the processes of triangulation? In short, collaborati n becomes a way for individuals to 
deliberately step outside their limited points of view. But more importantly it is when 
collaborators recognize that their capacity for rhetorical invention is enhanced because of 
how they are pushed to the limits of their discursive potential through their purposeful 
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interaction with one another that the techné of collab ration displays its consequential 
affect. 
The Novelty of Theorizing Collaboration 
Whenever definitions are suggested, theories questioned, philosophy expounded 
upon, or metaphors extended and established, all ofwhich I have been doing in this 
chapter and in my dissertation as a whole, both writers and readers must wrestle with the 
challenge of forcing clarity into abstraction. Over the course of these last three chapters I 
have been challenging readers to understand the epistemological commitments that must 
be given up if we wish to embrace pragmatic agency i  our practices of collaboration 
over and above theory that leaves no room to conceptualize how such agency is possible.  
In his lectures on pragmatism, William James suggested that beliefs were 
“instruments of action” valuable to the extent they proved true (78), and for all the 
pragmatists, including the ones I’ve discussed in this present chapter, “true” beliefs are 
those that sustain continuity of action. The heuristic reflection I have offered in this 
chapter through discussion about the qualities of triangulation, resistance, and 
intervention serve as a critical lens through which to test one’s beliefs about 
collaboration, and this is how I suggest collaboratrs can develop their own interpretation 
of collaboration using these concepts from the school of interactionist rhetorical theory. 
One pragmatist principle demonstrated through this discussion is that like pragmatism 
itself, the reflexive discourse and inventive techné collaborators foster “is uncomfortable 
away from facts” (James 26). Collaborators begin with tracing the practical consequences 
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of their discursive interaction to, again echoing James, initiate the discovery of “all sorts 
of definite working values in experience” (27). But these working values are fallible and 
therefore collaborators must recognize the need to hold their articulations contingently 
until better, more productive discourse emerges. To a certain extent, then, one 
consequence for theorizing collaboration as an inventi  techné is the recognition that the 
reflexive discourse collaborators foster directly engages the indeterminacy of meaning 
and its articulation. But here is where collaboration shows its pedagogic hand. 
Indeterminacy gives our discourse its pragmatic virtue because it requires substantial 
work to engage the untested feasibility of this indeterminacy. In other words, 
collaboration makes us better writers and discoursers b cause it requires a heightened 
awareness of and therefore more taxing engagement with he hermeneutic processes of 
identifying and sharing objects of discourse and deciding how best to render them 
textually. For sure, working “alone” is a much easir and less arduous process.  
But for those who are willing to recognize that collaboration can yield discourse 
greater than the sum of its individual parts, and as well are willing to embrace the messy 
work that comes with engaging collaboration’s techné, then there is much to be gained in 
reconsidering the place of collaboration in the study of rhetoric and composition. To 
review three of the important arguments I have posited over the course of the last two 
chapters, I over the following summary: 
• First, collaboration implies that individual interlocutors have fostered a discursive 
relationship with each other, one that is marked by a deliberate commitment to 
reflexive dialogue. 
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• Second, what collaborators foster is novelty, a term I use to denote the emergent 
meanings and articulations that a collaboration preci itates. It names what gets 
created when two or more individuals attempt to share perspective. Therefore 
“novelty” in this context simply points to new ways of both thinking about and 
articulating an idea.  
• Third, collaboration implies that limits of some kind have been engaged and 
transgressed if novelty is its outcome. In this way, collaboration can be 
conceptualized as a techné, a technology with which collaborators use to interact 
with and invent discourse that enhances their engagement with objects in the 
world.  
Something I have not been able to discuss at any length is what some critics will 
negatively credit to this externalist theory of collaboration: that collaboration so 
understood requires an excess of time and personal eng gement that many people, 
whether students or teachers or researchers, simply cannot afford. Collaboration no doubt 
takes both practice and patience, but pragmatically speaking all of our reflective practice 
requires time. Such an ethic is reflected by Dewey in How We Think: “Reflective 
thinking is always more or less troublesome because it involves overcoming the inertia 
that inclines one to accept suggestions at their face v lue; it involves willingness to 
endure a condition of mental unrest and disturbance” (13). For a pragmatist, reflective 
thought is what allows us to test the effectiveness of our beliefs, and for pragmatist 
collaborators, to use their reflection deliberately to anticipate novelty is nothing short of 
what Emerson once called the still, quiet voice speaking out of experience: genius.  
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Notes 
 
1. See my discussion of Reither and Vipond (“Writing as Collaboration”) in Chapter 
2. Also see Ede and Lunsford’s “Why Write…Together?” 
2. See Dewey, “The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism” 
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CHAPTER V 
 
THE POST-PROCESS OF COLLABORATION IN COMPOSITION PEDAGOGY
 
 
So far this dissertation has focused primarily on a theoretical discussion of 
collaboration, beginning with a review of its conceptual history within the critical 
terminology of social constructionist epistemology. In addition, I have offered a 
substantive theoretical argument for redefining collaboration according to an externalist 
epistemology rooted in pragmatist philosophy and interactionist rhetorical theory. 
Because my redefinition of collaboration remains fairly open-ended, contingently based 
on general principles rather than well-defined premis s, I have deliberately avoided 
giving this redefinition a formal moniker and instead have chosen to call it, rather 
generally, an externalist theory of collaboration. My approach therefore has been to 
suggest an “externalist” avenue of thought for rethinking collaboration in composition 
studies. I have not, however, spelled out what this approach does or even should look like 
in practice. In this way, I have resisted buying into the theory-practice binary that might 
tempt readers to imagine that externalist collaborati n should follows certain rules or 
adhere to particular configurations of individuals working in proximity. In fact, proposing 
that collaboration conforms to such standards was the focus of my critique of social turn 
collaboration theory in Chapter Two. Nevertheless some readers might reasonably 
contest that a study such as mine is much too speculative and abstract, that theory by 
itself always begs for evidence that can demonstrate its practical value. In short, one 
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might reasonably ask what are the pedagogical implications of “externalist” collaboration 
theory. 
But to question the pedagogical implications of a theory is not quite the same as 
questioning how a theory works in practice. The forme  type of inquiry is pragmatic in 
scope and implies that theories become meaningful when we can identify the differences 
they make in our experience. The latter type of inqu ry, however, begs the question that 
there exists a conceptual gap that must be bridged between theory and practice for either 
one of them to have pedagogical legitimacy. When this latter question is posed, it is 
implied that theory and practice represent two separate ontological spheres, one that is 
wholly conceptual and the other that is wholly materi l. Within this framework, 
pedagogy functions as the mediator between these spheres; it is a practical art that bridges 
training (knowing) with practice (doing). It is therefore understandable that in the 
discipline of rhetoric and composition there exists a strong pedagogical imperative to 
articulate the practical applications of theory, especially since the modern history of 
composition studies is rooted in the teaching of writing. Yet throughout composition’s 
disciplinary ascension into the realm of a “legitimate” academic field of study, debates 
have persisted about how best to negotiate theory al ngside practice.  
One commonplace argument to which compositionists frequently appeal is that theory 
and practice should not be conceptualized apart from each other since they both represent 
vital ways of thinking about the work we do as teachers of writing. In “What’s at Stake in 
the Conflict Between ‘Theory’ and ‘Practice’ in Composition” (1991), John Schilb 
presents just such an argument. It is problematic to define theory apart from practice, says 
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Schilb, because “each of these terms bears contradictory meanings and thus proves 
unstable.” That is, both categories are constructed on “phantasms conjured up by each 
other” (91, 94). In a gesture to Stephen North’s taxonomy of the “methodological 
communities” of composition professionals that he outlines in The Making of Knowledge 
in Composition (1989), Schilb suggests “the very act of labeling groups one or the other 
is a reaction to disorienting shifts in the terrain they inhabit” (96). Debates concerning the 
relationship between theory and practice are a natural consequence of composition’s 
expanding disciplinarity, especially sense it is harder to define standards for scholarship 
(95). Schilb’s proposal at the time was for English departments, journals, and national 
organizations to sponsor “forums that address the variety of disputes obscured by these 
terms,” theory and practice, and to “juxtapose them for rigorous evaluation” (96). Given 
that two decades have passed sense Schilb’s article first appeared in the pages of Rhetoric 
Review, it is easy to suggest in the present that simply teasing out all the different ways 
these terms can mean is something of a fool’s errand, especially if one’s goal is to simply 
deconstruct the ideas of theory and practice themselve , which is what Schilb admits is 
one of his goals (91). In other words, simply identifying the different ways we reify terms 
does little to address where the need to deconstruct these terms comes from in the first 
place. 
So when Schilb posed the question “what’s at stake?” when rhetoricians and teachers 
of writing imagine their work in the dichotomous terms of theory and practice, he should 
have asked whether the tension generated between th supposed split between theory and 
practice could be avoided altogether. But this is exactly what Lester Faigley set out to do 
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in Fragments of Rationality: Postmodernity and the Subject of Composition, published 
one year after Schilb’s article. Faigley’s purpose is to consider how “composition studies 
has maintained a modernist tension between form and chaos, coherence and 
fragmentation, and determinacy and indeterminacy, consistently privileging the former 
over the latter” (14). He draws attention to the “postmodern” epistemologies proffered by 
Richard Rorty, Clifford Geertz, Thomas Kuhn, and the like—all of whom 
compositionists have used to articulate their understanding of social constructionism—
and points to how at best the discipline has only pla ed lip service to these theorists while 
still maintaining the primacy of a foundationalist, product-centered pedagogy even 
though it has been dressed up in non-foundational “process” garb. Even though 
“composition studies professes to value process, it i  not process for its own sake but 
rather the process of teleological development toward a product” (14). “What’s at stake” 
for Faigley therefore is whether a “postmodern” writing pedagogy is even possible, one 
that runs counter to mentalities that construe pedagogy itself as a conceptual balance 
between something called theory and something else call d practice.  
The only line of scholarly inquiry to actually imagine what a “postmodern” (which 
from here forward I’ll call “non-foundationalist”) theory of composition would actually 
mean for the teaching of writing is the school of theory that today gets labeled as “post-
process,” even though that term is something of a misnomer. As noted by Lee-Ann 
Kastman Breuch, “post-process” unfortunately came to mean “anti-process” in many 
circles: “Because process is so often the topic of discussion in post-process scholarship, 
post-process has come to mean a critique of the process movement in composition 
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studies,” and thus post-process scholarship often gets “shortchanged.” (120). The 
perennial criticism that post-process theory faces is that it has no practical application; of 
course it didn’t help matters when several high profile post-process theorists glibly 
suggested in the 1990s that writing itself could not be taught, but I will return to this 
criticism momentarily. Therefore I do not want to suggest that collaboration cannot be 
taught, even though the externalist theory that informs my understanding of collaboration 
in this dissertation is the same theory that informs post-process theories of composition.  
As the title of this chapter signals, I nevertheless believe we can locate the 
pedagogical value of an externalist theory of collabor tion by connecting it to post-
process composition theory. Rethinking how collaborti n is understood pedagogically 
might require some teachers to give up attempts tha allow for collaborative interaction in 
the classroom without diminishing the individual write  as composition’s privileged 
pedagogical subject. As Faigley notes in Fragments of Rationality,  
 
Where composition studies has proven least receptive to postmodern theory is in 
surrendering its belief in the writer as an autonomous self, even at a time when 
extensive group collaboration is practiced in many writing classrooms. 
 
 
As he continues,  
 
Since the beginning of composition teaching in the lat nineteenth century, college 
writing teachers have been heavily invested in the s ability of the self and the 
attendant beliefs that writing can be a means of self-discovery and intellectual self-
realization. (15) 
 
 
While Faigley questions how we identify the subjects to whom our pedagogy is directed, 
what post-process theory has historically challenged is the primacy of process as 
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composition’s privileged pedagogical object. In both cases there is an amplification of the 
modernist tension Faigley names, tension that pulls theory and practice in opposite 
directions, especially when it comes to the formulation of pedagogy as such—theory 
rendered into craft. If non-foundationalist, pragmatic theory were actually informed the 
organization of a writing classroom, one consequence might therefore be that teachers 
privilege the interactions between students and the world, including the discourse they 
create through these interactions, over the “self-discovery and intellectual self-
realization” students supposedly tap into through private, single-authored writing.    
Regardless, crafting an externalist theory of collabor tion into a clearly articulated 
pedagogy is therefore something of an impossible task, t least insofar as we continue to 
demand something called “practice” from something else called “theory.” I nonetheless 
believe that teaching students about collaboration fr m an externalist perspective is not 
inconsequential. Indeed, I hope this final chapter rovides compositionists with 
motivation to recognize the possibilities of incorprating a new language of collaboration 
into their teaching, as well as the courage to allow students to experiment with 
collaboration in ways that might seem counterintuitive when viewed alongside our 
discipline’s emphasis on the individual writer as the primary agent in how we 
conceptualize the teaching of writing. 
Moreover, an externalist approach to collaboration ca  bolster the legitimacy of post-
process composition theory because we can link collab ration to a non-foundationalist 
approach to teaching. In the next section I briefly review the emergence of post-process 
criticism and offer a summary of what I understand would be the central precepts of a 
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post-process writing pedagogy. Next, I explain how these precepts apply to an externalist 
theory of collaboration. I conclude with a brief discussion that returns to the original 
question about the teachable qualities of an externalist approach to collaboration. In the 
end, I suggest that if we credit post-process theory with forwarding legitimate claims 
about how discourse works, in addition to taking seriously pragmatism’s imperative for 
heuristic reflection, what we can therefore “teach” is how to foster and evaluate those 
moments that collaborators engage in reflexive dialogue as a strategy for inventing novel 
discourse.  What students “learn” is the messy work of deliberately engaging discursive 
production alongside discursive reception. The material interaction that collaboration 
requires opens opportunities for students to conscie tiously engage the ever-changing 
rhetorical dynamics between themselves, their words, and their audiences. In short, a 
post-process pedagogy rooted in collaboration promotes a rhetorical education.   
Post-Process Theory on the Process Horizon 
The emergence of post-process composition theory has been well documented by a 
number of scholars interested in its potential for changing the way compositionists 
conceptualize the work of teaching writing; however, defining “post-process” is difficult 
because there is not a single definition that can be pointed to as conventional.1 I 
nevertheless defer to Joseph Petraglia who explains that post-process theory simply 
points to thinking that rejects arguments that writing and communication in general can 
be reduced to well-defined formulas or frameworks. In this way post-process theory 
should not be conceptualized as anti-process, even though post-process critics do suggest 
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that process pedagogies can easily be rendered into systematic formulas for teaching 
students how to write. Certainly the idea of process utilized as a heuristic metaphor for 
understanding how writers negotiate the production of texts has its merits, but as 
Petraglia says, “we now have the theoretical and empirical sophistication to consider the 
mantra ‘writing as a process’ as the right answer to a really boring question. We have 
better questions now, and the notion of process no lo ger counts as much of an insight” 
(53). To suggest that the teaching of writing cannot be reduced to systematic formulas 
and neat pedagogical expressions is not a particularly radical suggestion, and for anyone 
who teaches writing this kind of insight is commonse ical. Even though John Trimbur is 
not considered a post-process theorist, he was one of th  first scholars in rhetoric and 
composition to temper suggestions that process pedagogy might have its flaws. 
If fact, Trimbur is actually credited for coining the term “post-process” in his review 
essay for College English, “Taking the Social Turn: Teaching Writing Post-Process.” 
Evaluating what were then new books by Patricia Bizzell, C. H. Knoblauch and Lil 
Brannon, and Kurt Spellmeyer, he explains how all three texts “locate their concerns in 
relation to the much publicized literacy crisis in American education” (108). When read 
together, these texts underscore a common concern for the development of critical 
consciousness through the teaching of writing. At the time, books like E. D. Hirsch’s 
Cultural Literacy were popularizing new debates about literacy (or returning to older 
ones, like “Why Johnny Can’t Write,” to echo the infamous Newsweek cover story that 
appeared in 1975) while at the same time professionals i  composition studies were 
championing the rise of process pedagogy over what they termed current-traditional 
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rhetoric. As Trimbur explains, “the distinction betw en product and process, which 
initially seemed so clarifying, not only proved coneptually inadequate to what writers do 
when they are writing, it also made writing instrucion appear easier that it is” (109). 
Once product-centered pedagogy was replaced by process-centered pedagogy, “the 
canniest among them [students] recognized that sincerity and authenticity of voice were 
the privileged means of symbolic exchange,” and in an ironic turn, Trimbur notes how 
“teachers’ desire to operate outside oppressive institutions and avoid the errors of the past 
only reinstituted the rhetoric of the belletristic tradition at the center of the writing 
classroom.” Far from reprimand, however, Trimbur does not intend “to accuse the 
process movement of self-deception but to recall the heady sense of breakthrough that 
many writing teachers, myself included, experienced in the name of process pedagogy” 
(110).  
Trimbur’s review functions as a reflection on how the process movement has not 
tempered anxieties about how teachers negotiate their authority in a writing classroom, 
and if anything it has showed us the limitations in believing “a particular kind of 
discourse, whether storytelling or essayism or anti-foundationalist theory, can be 
privileged as the means to liberate students or empower its practitioners” (118). So when 
Trimbur uses the term “post-process” he is not refer ing to a school of theory but instead 
referencing the temporal shift in composition’s pedagogical focus, one from process to a 
kind of critical/political advocacy as evidenced by the books under review in his essay. In 
short, Trimbur asks readers to consider how the problems of teaching writing, especially 
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those challenges of negotiating teacher authority alongside student agency in the 
classroom, still persist “post” this turn to process pedagogy. 
In a sense, Trimbur is responding to teachers of writing who welcomed process 
pedagogy as the long-awaited anodyne to current-traditionalist teaching. As an example, 
when Maxine Hairston published “The Winds of Change: Thomas Kuhn and the 
Revolution in the Teaching of Writing” in 1982, she effectively declared the emergence 
of a new paradigm in the teaching of writing, one that emphasized the primacy of process 
over product in composition instruction. Hairston explained that this new process 
paradigm “views writing as a disciplined creative activity that can be analyzed and 
described; its practitioners believe that writing can be taught” (448). Even though 
Hairston acknowledged that the process paradigm “is sketchy and leaves many problems 
about the teaching of writing unresolved” (450), her enthusiasm for process pedagogy 
communicated a sense of equilibrium insofar as the theory and practice of teaching 
writing was concerned. Process theory seemed to naturally inform process pedagogy, in 
other words, and the result for Hairston is a new paradigm, a completely new way of 
imaging writers at work that trumps all the older pdagogies.  
It should be noted that those compositionists often cr dited as the first generation of 
process theorists did not herald process pedagogy as a new paradigm that would 
completely change how we imagined the teaching of writing. Nor did they believe that 
utilizing the metaphor of process as a pedagogical heuristic always resulted in effective 
teaching. In fact, one of these early process theorists, Peter Elbow, suggested that the 
value of process pedagogy can be located simply in how it lessens the stakes of writing 
 
 187
itself, allowing students to approach the work of cmposition with less trepidation. When 
describing freewriting in his essay “Freewriting and the Problem of Wheat and Tares,” 
for example, Elbow notes “that there is no such thing as freewriting badly,” and as we get 
more comfortable with this messy activity of spilling words onto the page, “we can move 
in and out of the freewriting mode at various moments i  the writing process” (85, 86). 
Freewriting is therefore not a part of the “inventio ” stage one must move through to 
enter the “drafting” stage, it simply names a strategic activity writers might engage to 
render words into text. Donald Murray, perhaps the earliest prophet of process, reflects 
on how his early advocacy of this pedagogy was misinterpreted by compositionists who 
believed he was defining how writing should always be taught. “I considered process one 
way of speculating about writing, a play of possible meaning: many seemed to take it as 
the way of teaching the writing act.” As Murray continues,  
 
I considered the writing process as a way of separating the knowing from the not 
knowing, or, to put it differently, a way of organizing knowing so the writer could be 
launched into the more important world of not knowing. (“Knowing Not Knowing” 
60) 
 
 
An advocate of expressivist pedagogy, Murray believd writing allows individuals to 
render the unknown into the known, i.e., it allows for discovery and the exercise of 
imagination. He admits, however, that it is difficult to teach writing from the position of 
the unknown. “As a writer I was comfortable with not knowing but as a teacher I was less 
comfortable. I needed the answers to the questions my tudents who were not content 
with not knowing were asking” (62). In short, Murray is describing what happens when 
students are not content to experiment with their writing; when all they want is for 
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teachers to tell them what and how to write. Murray’s reflection on “not knowing” is 
therefore a reflection on embracing the speculative work of teaching—on embracing 
teaching rooted in “not knowing,” i.e., experimentation. 
What today gets labeled as “post-process” composition theory is built on the work of 
a number of scholars who speculated that writing pedagogies in general too often rely on 
tenuous “internal” (as opposed to external) theories of discourse that misconstrue 
language as a community-mediated, systematic set of rules and conventions that when 
properly followed result in successful texts. In other words, post-process theorists 
questioned the efficacy of teaching writing as setsof conventions, rules, and grammars. 
The scholar most associated with post-process as a school of theory is Thomas Kent, who 
actually did not utilize the term “post-process” to describe his work until the publication 
of his edited collection, Post-Process Theory: Beyond the Writing Process Paradigm 
(1999). Similar to the questions Trimbur raises in “Taking the Social Turn,” the post-
process theory Kent has popularized interrogates th limitations of process pedagogy; but 
unlike Trimbur, Kent’s focus is not so much on issue  of power as it is on what exactly it 
means to teach writing in the first place. As Kent xplained six years before Trimbur’s 
review essay was published,  
 
I believe that neither discourse production nor discourse analysis can be taught as an 
epistemologically centered body-of-knowledge, and if we are serious about finding 
better ways to help our students improve their writing and reading skills, we might 
rethink our traditional ways of doing business and ttempt to account for the powerful 
paralogic/hermeneutic dimension intrinsic to the production and analysis of discourse. 
(“Paralogic Hermeneutics” 40) 
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This latter line of inquiry helped Kent and others make the argument that for many 
teachers of writing “process” simply replaced “product” as the thing students work 
toward to make the grade. Put another way, the idea of process became the synthetic 
marker to which a student needed to perform in order to be labeled a competent writer 
within composition’s disciplinarity. As Gary Olson notes in the lead essay to P st-
Process Theory,  
 
The problem with process theory, then, is not so much that scholars are attempting to 
theorize various aspects of composing as it is that they are endeavoring (consciously 
or not) to construct a model of the composing process, thereby constructing a Theory 
of Writing, a series of generalizations about writing that supposedly hold true all or 
most of the time. 
 
 
As Olson notes, the problem with process scholars is that they “are attempting to 
systematize something that simply is not susceptible o systematization” (8). Ironically, 
Olson champions post-process theory because it abandons “the rhetoric of assertion” (9), 
yet he does so, rather unfortunately, on the back of a straw-figure rendering of process 
pedagogy. It is justifications for post-process theory such as Olson’s that have prompted 
critics of post-process thought to simply write it off as an intellectual exercise that has no 
practical value for teachers of writing.  
But post-process composition theory also gets written off because some of its most 
vocal advocates, like Kent, Olson, and Sydney Dobrin, for example, have supposedly 
suggested that teaching composition is impossible because “writing” as such cannot be 
reduced to an epistemological system of rhetorical moves and discursive conventions. 
Obviously such a suggestion would invite criticism, especially if it were interpreted as an 
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attack on the idea of teaching in general. Take for example the way Bruce McComisky 
rehearses his refutation of post-process:  
 
Post-process theory, as Dobrin and Kent describe it, r ceived its very generative 
impulse as a paralogic and oppositional reaction against what is arguably composition 
studies’ most valuable pedagogical strategy—teaching the composing process—yet 
post-process theory offers no pedagogical strategy of its own; regarding actual 
writing instruction, then, it is purely a negative dialectic. (40) 
 
 
Another line of criticism against post-process is evid nced by Richard Fulkerson, who 
essentially writes off post-process theory because, a  he claims, it rejects process 
pedagogy in the same way that process pedagogy rejected current-traditional rhetoric. As 
he explains, composition theorists created a need for process theory by arguing that 
  
pre-process teaching constructed writing as an ‘act’—not an extended, complex 
process, not a process of ‘discovering’ meaning or something worth saying, not a 
recursive, messy procedure, but a simple set of activities that any competent writer 
could perform ‘on demand’.(96) 
 
 
In other words, Fulkerson points to how process pedagogy gained popularity in part 
through its construction of current-traditionalist teaching as backward and wrongheaded.  
 
But now the process theorists are also being treated as backward, hopelessly retro 
from the perspective of ‘post-process’ theorists. The small revolutionary post-process 
group looks down their noses at old-fashioned ‘process’ folk, and want to drag them 
into the 21st century, a brave new postmodern post-process (pmpp) era of 
composition. (97) 
 
 
Fulkerson calls Kent’s position on the teaching of writing “radical” (98), and then he 
pretentiously asserts that advocates of post-process th ory don’t actually teach anything 
when they enter the classroom. 
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What the various post-process and “social” pedagogies have in common is that they 
don’t “teach writing” (in the sense of explaining various invention and revision tactics 
for students and directing the students to practices using them) but do require it, while 
focusing on reading instead. What I mean by saying that post-process teachers do not 
“teach” writing is that there is no indication from write-ups of their courses that they 
[the teachers] try to explain to students, and have them rehearse, such practices as 
various techniques of invention, principles or tactics of revision, the rhetorical use of 
titles and introductions, etc. Instead, the students a d instructor read some texts 
together, usually texts on liberatory topics, often with all the writings being about a 
single theme for a semester. Then the students write about the readings and their own 
worlds. (113) 
 
 
As a critique of post-process theory, Fulkerson’s is more bitter than it is thoughtful, 
evidenced especially by his vague anecdotal evidence based on the “write-ups” of “their” 
courses that Fulkerson uses to suggest how post-process advocates are irresponsible 
teachers who simply encourage students to write about readings “and their own worlds,” 
whatever this is supposed to mean. Such a reductive perspective on post-process theory is 
not uncommon, but keep in mind this perspective is primarily in response to the supposed 
claim by post-process theorists that writing cannot be aught. But where does this claim 
come from? Have post-process theorists indeed suggeted that at best teachers of writing 
can only get their students to “read some texts together” and write about them without 
pedagogical rhyme or reason?  
In his essay “Paralogic Hermeneutic Theory, Power, and the Possibility for Liberating 
Pedagogies,” Dobrin includes an epigraph that reads “No course can teach the acts of 
either reading or writing,” a line taken from Thomas Kent’s 1989 article “Paralogic 
Hermeneutics and the Possibilities of Rhetoric.” This is the type of claim critics of post-
process hold up as evidence that Kent and other post-pr cess thinkers offer nothing of 
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practical value to teachers of writing. In one of the more recent studies of post-process 
theory, Helen Foster’s Networked Process: Dissolving Boundaries of Process and Post-
Process, the author similarly quotes Kent in order to summarize this negative view on 
teaching. “As for the potential repercussions of paralogic hermeneutics,” Foster writes, 
“Kent says the theory would require us to re-think the student/teacher relationship…we 
would also understand that writing and reading ‘cannot be taught, for nothing exists to 
teach’” (9). While both Dobrin and Foster are sympathetic to post-process claims about 
the limitations of process pedagogy, they both misrepresent what Kent has actually 
claimed about teaching; in fact, they both misquote Kent and fail to acknowledge that he 
has never suggested it is impossible to teach writing.  
The epigraph Dobrin utilizes is presented as a stand-alone sentence (beginning with 
the capitalized “No”), but this is not what Kent writes in his essay. Here is the full 
quotation, one that suggests an idea noticeably less stringent from what is implied in the 
truncated quotation Dobrin constructs: “Although specially designed composition and 
literature courses can sharpen and expand a student's writing and reading know-how, no 
course can teach the acts of either writing or reading” (37). Next, the piece of quotation 
Foster utilizes comes from a relatively clear explanation Kent offers about how 
conventions of writing are valuable “background skill ,” ones that are teachable and ones 
students should learn.  
 
If we accept these claims [the principles of paralogic hermeneutics], we cannot ignore 
the pedagogical consequence of our position: writing a d reading—conceived 
broadly as processes or bodies of knowledge—cannot be taught, for nothing exists to 
teach. In order to be understood on this point, I need to repeat the commonsense 
observation that certain background skills, such as understanding of grammar, can be 
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taught, but the acquisition of these skills never guarantees that a student will be able 
to communicate effectively; no framework theory of any kind can help a student 
predict in advance the interpretation that someone els  may give to an utterance. So, 
any composition or literature pedagogy that presumes such a framework assumes that 
writing and reading consist of a well-defined process that, once mastered, allows us to 
engage unproblematically in communicative interaction. (Paralogic Rhetoric 161) 
 
 
I don’t see Kent suggesting anything here that a reasonable composition instructor would 
counter; certainly effective writing requires much more than simply possessing 
background knowledge of certain discourse conventions, and nothing we teach can 
guarantee that our students will become—as a direct result some particular pedagogy—
better writers or readers. Students can certainly “learn” something like grammar or how 
to write a thesis statement for a research paper, but this doesn’t mean students will 
assimilate this knowledge in such a way that allows them to, as Kent says, “engage 
unproblemtaically in communicative interaction.” 
Those who write off Kent’s claim that teaching is not possible are therefore writing 
off a claim Kent never made. He finally acknowledge in 2002 that this 
misrepresentation of his position on teaching is one that “haunts me and often hounds 
me.” As Kent explains,  
 
I have never claimed that composition cannot be taught, for we certainly may teach 
systematically and rigorously subjects dealing with how texts operate, how texts 
shape understanding, and how texts function within different social contexts. My 
claim that writing cannot be taught means simply that we need to know a bunch of 
stuff before we can effectively communicate (write, speak, employ appropriate 
gestures in public situations, select the right attire, and so forth). Certainly, we need to 
know some sort of language (a system of signs or sounds) before we can 
communicate, but we don’t need to share a common langu ge in order to 
communicate. Knowing a language and knowing how to knock about by employing it 
are necessary but not sufficient for communication. (“Principled Pedagogy” 432) 
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Another post-process theorist, Stephen Yarbrough, arees with Kent’s general assertion 
that teaching writing and reading as bodies of knowledge is impossible. But Yarbrough 
goes further to suggest that teaching a course on writi g is not much different from 
teaching a course on living. In other words, when Kent says that people “need to know a 
bunch of stuff” to effectively communicate, he effectively asserts that knowing how to 
write requires knowing far much more than simply how t  use commas and when to 
avoid the passive voice; in fact, to successfully communicate with others we must be able 
to successfully interact with them, and successful interaction requires successful 
navigation of an environment, which itself requires knowledge about that environment, 
and so forth. Yarbrough simply takes this idea and flattens it: learning how to write 
requires the same skills needed for learning anythig else: 
 
I still think teaching a “composition” or “how-to-write” course makes about as much 
sense as teaching a course on “how-to-live.” We can le rn about and teach students 
how people have lived, are living, and might live; we can teach them how the 
conditions in which people lived made their ways of living necessary and possible; 
we can teach them how people’s beliefs about those c nditions have affected how 
they live; we can teach them how the requirements for life differ under differing 
conditions, and so on—but we cannot teach them how to live as such. All we can say 
about the teaching of life we can say about the teaching of discourse because once we 
erase the distinction between language and things, nature and culture, we have erased 
the difference between saying and doing—and so too the difference between 
discourse and life. (After Rhetoric 213) 
 
 
Certainly on its surface, Yarbrough’s explanation is decidedly more pointed than 
anything Kent has written about teaching, yet for bth Kent and Yarbrough the point is 
not that we should stop teaching students about writing and the common habits and 
expectations certain groups bring to written discourse; what we should give up is bad 
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pedagogy that pretends writing is something as such, something that exists within its own 
epistemological matrix. The post-process theorists argue that any writing pedagogy that 
fails to acknowledge the artificiality of process in truction does a disservice to students 
who might come to associate certain ways of writing effectively as the only ways to write 
effectively. But again, any competent instructor would teach their students about the 
artificiality of discourse no matter what specific angle a composition course takes, 
whether through principles of rhetorical theory, certain modes of academic discourse, or 
heuristic strategies like teaching writing as a process. 
To understand post-process as something other than “anti-process,” one must grasp 
how post-process composition theory explains the artificiality of our discourse, 
specifically with what Kent calls “paralogic hermeneutics,” his account for how discourse 
works without appeals to grammar, language, discourse communities, and other 
manifestations of conceptual schemes (e.g., conventions). As he explains, “both [Donald] 
Davidson and Derrida agree that an irreconcilable split exists between the sign or 
sentence and its effect in the world. Because of this split, what Davidson calls ‘the 
autonomy of meaning’ and Derrida calls ‘displacement,’ we can never be certain that our 
hermeneutic strategy—our use of signs—corresponds to another hermeneutic strategy.” 
In other words, when speakers of the same “language” who utilize the same “grammar” 
discursively interact, appeals to either language or grammar as systems that maintain the 
stability of a discourse’s meaning are misinformed, namely because we communicate 
through paralogic hermeneutics, the constant interpreting and reinterpreting of discourse 
so as to arrive at common “passing” theories of meaning in the actual moments of 
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communication, and since no two rhetorical situations are ever completely identical, this 
constant hermeneutic guessing is required for communication to proceed. Kent does say 
that  
 
social conditioning, the sharing of certain common practices, helps narrow the split 
by supplying a heuristic starting place for interprtation; that is, in day-to-day 
communicative interaction we assume that our neighbors employ the same 
hermeneutic strategy that we do, although, of course, we may be wrong. (“Paralogic 
Hermeneutics” 28) 
 
 
What we call language, the signs we draw upon habitu lly to communicate with others, 
might therefore more accurately be described as a kind of communicative theory—a 
common cache of gestures and words we draw upon becaus  others use these same 
gestures and words in a similar way.  
What post-process composition theory posits, then, is a slightly less philosophical 
description of how the principles of paralogic hermneutics inform the work of 
composition teaching. To this end the most extensive, and in my view the best 
explanation of post-process thought, is Kent’s edited collection, Post-Process Theory.  In 
the book’s introduction, Kent claims that most post-process theorists “hold three 
assumptions about the act of writing: (1) writing is public; (2) writing is interpretive; and 
(3) writing is situated” (1). To say that writing is public is to acknowledge that even 
though we sometimes write privately, that is, in isolation from others, discourse in 
general is always a public act, a kind of communicative interaction based on our previous 
experiences of using discourse with others. As Kastm n Breuch explains, “Emphasizing 
the public nature of writing reminds us that beyond writing correctly, writers must work 
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toward communicating their message to an audience” (133), and this holds true even if a 
writer has no immediately discernable audience outside of herself. On the surface these 
three claims are not provocative, but Kent insists that when taken together they negate the 
claims of  pedagogues who insist that learning to write can be boiled down to learning 
certain formulas, rules, conventions, or processes.  
To argue that writing is interpretive, Kent’s second characteristic of post-process 
theory, is to acknowledge that both the reception and production of discourse is a 
hermeneutic act. The implications of such an observation warrant teachers of writing to 
use the products and our procedures of our discourse, what we use to explain things like 
the writing process, for example, as heuristic models instead of rigid guidelines. But as 
every teacher of writing can probably testify, teaching the difference between how to 
expect our discourse to work (prior theory) and how it actually does work (passing 
theory) is much easier said than done. In other words, novice writers don’t just struggle 
with putting words on the page—how to get from five pages of written text to ten pages 
of written text—they also struggle with how to recon ile the differences between speech 
and written discourse. That is, successful writers r cognize that written discourse is just 
as malleable as spoken discourse, and to do either well equires the same skill base, one 
that is rooted in the work of paralogic hermeneutics—having the ability to effectively 
anticipate how others will use discourse and interpret one’s own.  
Finally, to say that writing is situated simply underscores that discourse is only 
meaningful when we place it within a context. “Because writing is a public act that 
requires interpretative interaction with others,” explains Kent, “writers always write from 
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some position or some place; writers are never nowhere” (Post-Process 3). The flipside 
of this observation is that the products of our discourse, like a written text for example, 
are never stable entities that perfectly translate from situate to situation. Another 
contributor to Post-Process Theory, George Pullman, explains that texts are  
 
the diaphanous effect of multiple interpretative efforts by people who may or may not 
share contexts or interpretative practices, who mayor may not occupy the same 
context at the moment of the text, who may in fact have the text in common only as a 
site of combat over other issues such as control over a circumstance of which the text 
is merely a sign or even an epiphenomenon. (27-28) 
 
 
The point Pullman suggests is that contexts can never be fixed, that even if we can 
successfully anticipate how someone will interpret our written discourse tomorrow, for 
example, the day after tomorrow might be different.  
Surprisingly, there exists a dearth of criticism that points to how post-process theory 
aligns with the classical rhetorical tradition. As I have suggested at several points already, 
there is very little that post-process theorists advocate that runs counter to how most 
teachers of writing already think about their work. In a sense, post-process theory 
presents a novel conceptual vocabulary for actualizing how classical rhetorical theory 
informs the work of teaching composition. In particular it underscores the philosophical 
work associated with teaching writing—how we should think about the unstable nature of 
discourse and how to explain this phenomenon to our students. Ann Berthoff, certainly 
not conventionally labeled a post-process theorist, nevertheless connects how our 
philosophies of discourse influence how we teach it. Explaining reflexive inquiry as a 
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strategy for “forming” composition (one of her metaphors for writing), she insists that 
teaching writing must always be framed as a speculative endeavor:  
 
Unless we think philosophically about thinking, what’s likely to happen with mind is 
what has already happened with process: it will be used and manipulated within the 
framework of positivist assumptions and thus will not help us develop a pedagogy 
appropriate to teaching the composing process. (The Making of Meaning 63) 
 
 
Berthoff essentially calls for process pedagogues to be more rhetorical, to recognize the 
ever-changing relationships between writers, readers, and the texts they share in order to 
become, as Kent would say, better hermeneutic guessers. The enemy of rhetorical 
sophistication, as far as Berthoff is concerned, is po itivist philosophy that looks for one 
to one correlations between our words and our meanings. As she writes, 
 
Positivist presuppositions are everywhere to be found in current rhetorical theory, and 
they are the chief cause of our woe. Let me offer a polemical summary. Positivism is 
a philosophy whose epistemology is fundamentally associationist. The positivist 
notion of critical inquiry is a naïve misconception f scientific method—what is 
sometimes called “scientism.” Positivists believe that empirical tests wield true facts 
and that’s that; they do not understand that scientists test hypotheses. Underlying all 
positivists methods and models is a notion of languge as, alternately, a set of slots 
into which we cram or pour meanings, or a veil thatmust be torn asunder to reveal 
reality directly, without the distorting mediation f form. (If that sounds mystical, it’s 
because if you scratch a positivist, you’ll find a mystic: neither can tolerate the 
concept of mediation.) I believe that we should reject this false philosophy, root and 
branch, and in doing so it is important to realize that we are in excellent company. 
(62) 
 
 
The company Berthoff names include noted pragmatists William James and C.S. Peirce, 
but she also names I.A. Richards, Susan Langer, and Alfred North Whitehead. To this 
same list I would append Thomas Kent and the post-process theorists, including Donald 
Davidson, the philosopher to whom Kent is most indebted. Just as Berthoff rejects 
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positivist epistemologies that ignore the contingenci s of experience and expectation, 
what rhetorical theory has always aimed to negotiate, so too do the post-process theorists 
reject positivist pedagogies. The difference with this latter group, a difference Berthoff 
hints at in the quotation before the above longer excerpt, is that they specifically are 
addressing the reality that many teachers of writing u critically adopt positivistic 
attitudes that betray the paralogic hermeneutic work we actually do to communicate. 
What post-process theory offers is a call to compositionists to acknowledge the 
legitimacy of a non-foundationalist (e.g., non-positivistic) theory of discourse as the 
starting position for teaching students how to understand the way our words work. Insofar 
as we are teaching students how to become better, more competent writers, the flexibility 
of our methods matter. Our responsiveness to how our students negotiate the discursive 
terrain in class should be reflected in their own maturing responsiveness to the plasticity 
of language and the written word. In other words, we want our students to develop 
rhetorical sophistication and be sensitive users of discourse. Post-process therefore 
represents an approach to theorizing composition that is non-foundational and open to 
contingency. What is noticeably absent in some of the articulations of post-process are 
“pedagogic” formulas that teachers of writing can appropriate and graft into their 
teaching, but criticism of post-process theory in this regard completely misses the point. 
If we want a non-foundational writing pedagogy then we need to stop pretending that 
theory and practice are two separate conceptual entities that must be mediated 
pedagogically. This is not a claim originally forwarded by advocates of post-process, for 
this is exactly the kind of argument made by all the classical American pragmatists: C. S. 
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Peirce, William James, G.H. Mead, and John Dewey. Take for example what Dewey 
writes in “The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy,” which should certainly be considered 
one the best treatises on the fallacy of philosophical dualism: 
 
For the static, cross-sectional, non-temporal relation of subject and object, the 
pragmatic hypothesis substitutes apprehension of a thing in terms of the results in 
other things which it is tending to effect. For theunique epistemological relation, it 
substitutes a practical relation of a familiar type—responsive behavior which changes 
in time the subject-matter to which it applies. The unique thing about the responsive 
behavior which constitutes knowing is the specific difference which marks it off from 
other modes of response, namely, the part played in it by anticipation and prediction. 
Knowing is the act, stimulated by this foresight, if securing and averting 
consequences. The success of the achievement measures the standing of the foresight 
by which response is directed. (226-27) 
 
 
With some slight tuning, Dewey’s emphasis on the experiential processes through which 
apprehension of knowledge takes shape is the basic argument Kent uses in his 
articulation of paralogic hermeneutics. We can never pr dict with complete certainty how 
our words are going to mean, just as we can never predict with complete certainty that 
our knowledge of something will hold as we enter future exigencies. Hermeneutic 
intelligence is like pragmatic intelligence, the latter Dewey says is akin to “creative 
intelligence, not a routine mechanic” (229). 
While theorists like Kent have resisted explicit discussion about the pedagogical 
value of post-process theory in any conventional context, several recent scholars of post-
process theory have risen to the occasion, including Lee-Ann Kastman Breuch and 
Matthew Heard. According to the latter, post-process theory “when carefully mapped 
onto more familiar pedagogical strategies…can be practically instituted in ways that 
build toward a promising and workable future for writing instruction” (283-84). Toward 
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the end of his essay “What Should We Do With Postprcess Theory?,” Heard explains 
that process pedagogy and post-process theory need not contradict each other. 
 
I have seen the perceived conflict between postprocess ideals and the reality of 
students’ experiences brought into a harmonious and pro uctive dialectic, with 
students ultimately benefiting from the dual attentio  given to their individual “prior” 
theories (shaped through culture) and also their participation in moments of “passing” 
with dominant discourses. We as instructors have a unique opportunity to foster 
students’ growth into adept producers and analyzers of discourse, and therefore we 
need to figure out together how we can best catalyze and facilitate the metacognitive 
awareness of postprocess using our own ‘prior theories’—the resources and methods 
we already employ. (291) 
 
 
Heard offers rather detailed discussion of how he has come to “practice” a post-process 
pedagogy in his writing courses, a reflection that I certainly recommend to critics of post-
process. More importantly, Heard demonstrates what post-process theory inherently 
demands of teachers: to experiment with its principles edagogically in order to develop 
their own practical methods of teaching “post-process.” That is to say, to teach post-
process is not to teach something (or rather, some thing) in particular; it refers to the 
philosophy of language from which an instructor responds to the writing his students 
produce. To teach students that writing is a process, for example, is not necessarily 
antithetical to a post-process philosophy, especially when an instructor uses process 
pedagogy as a kind of prior theory, to echo Davidson, which students use to anticipate 
how their written discourse will develop. What a post-process mindset stipulates in these 
cases, however, is that the instructor couches the idea of process in heuristic terms, 
presenting it as a kind of inventive strategy, speculative instrument, or simply a guiding 
metaphor, one that is helpful to the extent that students use it to become the rhetorically 
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savvy discoursers we encourage. Of course, if we return to those original teachers of 
process like Donald Murray, this is exactly how process pedagogy was utilized. 
I have offered this brief review of post-process comp sition theory because it 
suggests possibilities for what a non-foundationalist composition pedagogy looks like in 
philosophical terms. But as Heard points out above, to make any kind of non-
foundationalist philosophy applicable to one’s specific ircumstances, teachers must 
develop this practical avenue of application for themselves, pragmatically testing what 
they teach with how well it promotes the discursive values teachers want their students to 
adopt. To this end, I want to suggest how collaborati n speaks to what I interpret to be 
the pedagogical consequences of post-process composition theory. Collaboration, in other 
words, is the practical application through which I have come to experientially 
understand the principles of paralogic hermeneutics. I want to therefore explain how one 
might conceptualize an externalist theory of collabor tion within the framework of a non-
foundationalist pedagogy, one that supports the genral tenets of post-process theory, but 
before I do this, in the next section I offer a short overview of what specifically a non-
foundationalist composition pedagogy might stipulate by way general principles teachers 
of writing can use to test the post-process quality of their instruction.  
From “Non-Foundationalist” to “Externalist” Writing  Pedagogy: Some Provisional 
Guidelines 
When understood as a guiding philosophy, post-process omposition theory paves a 
road for teachers of writing to understand the pedagogical implications of non-
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foundationalist epistemology. Non-foundationalism of any sort usually gets conflated 
with postmodernism, which at the sake of oversimplification simply refer nces 
philosophical arguments that assert there is no ground or permanent point of stasis on 
which to plant appeals to truth, rationality, meaning, and the like. In short, postmodern 
philosophy dismantles epistemological foundations. Externalist language philosophy such 
as interactionst rhetorical theory, for example, explains why some supposedly non-
foundationalist theories are actually foundational, like social constructionism and sociol-
epistemic rhetoric. Indeed, social constructionist theory is quite modern insofar as it uses 
ideas about cultural relativity to account for the phenomenon of incommensurability, 
when two or more competing arguments, beliefs, or points of view seem hopelessly 
deadlocked.2 Kenneth Bruffee, for example, supposedly forwards a non-foundationalist 
theory when he argues that consensus arrived at throug  collaboration enacts the work of 
a discourse community, but this supposedly amorphous, metaphysical concept of a 
discourse community is a foundation, a ground on which epistemological appeals are 
given root.3 Because the term “non-foundational” (and its variations) has been frequently 
used by rhetoricians and compositionists to describe schools of theory like social 
constructionism, I find it necessary to drop the term and employ in its place the term 
“externalist,” the same marker I use to name my theory of collaboration. While this latter 
term is in many ways just as generalized as the term “non-foundationalist,” it not only 
encourages readers to separate interactionist rhetorical theory from other supposedly 
“non-foundational” theories, but the term also benefits from no negative prefix (the 
“non”), which some might interpret as needlessly oppositional and contrarian.  
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An externalist theory of writing, therefore, must somehow offer an adequate 
explanation for why writing should not be taught through conceptual schemes, whatever 
artificial systems of language use (rules, grammars, conventions, etc.) that mark the 
discourse communities in which they are to be initiated in college. In this section I 
connect post-process composition theory to a provisional list of guidelines that a 
externalist writing pedagogy would support. I present these guidelines as ones teachers of 
composition can use to help articulate the post-process quality of their pedagogies. In 
addition, these guidelines can be utilized to pragmtically test pedagogy after the fact, to 
determine how well the principles of post-process have been actualized in our actual 
teaching. 
So an externalist writing pedagogies would generally support the following claims: 
• The most important object of inquiry is the paralogic hermeneutic process. 
• Our written discourse is a form of communicative interaction, subject to the 
same contingencies of all discourse. 
• The most effective writers are those who can anticipate the prior theories of 
their readers and adjust their written discourse accordingly. 
• The most effective assignments are those that require creative experimentation 
with discursive conventions. 
• The products students compose are only contingently valuable in relationship to 
the rhetorical awareness that reflection on the production of those products 
evidences in a student’s discourse. 
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The most important object of inquiry is the paralogic hermeneutic process. 
Many iterations of process pedagogy imply that the stages of writing, what we do 
from one moment to the next when we actually compose, so to speak, is the most 
important object of inquiry in a composition course. Post-process theory emphasizes, 
however, that if the teaching of writing is reduced solely to the teaching of process, that 
is, to a narrow articulation of “how to” lessons that move students from stage to stage—
how to invent, how to draft, how to revise, how to edit—students are presented with a 
false and potentially unproductive outlook on what t e work of composition involves. As 
Berthoff writes in The Making of Meaning,  
 
Composing is not a process like playing a game of tnnis or cooking a meal; there are 
no hard and fast rules, and it does not proceed in one direction—in a straightforward 
manner. Composing is not a linear process, though what it creates has a linear form. 
(20) 
 
 
With that said, understanding paralogic hermeneutics gives compositionists an 
explanatory space in which to couch ideas like “process” or any other strategies for (or 
metaphors of) composing as examples of prior theory. “Prior theory,” as you will recall, 
is the term that Donald Davidson uses to denote how we are prepared for others to 
interpret our discourse. As part of the triangulation process within Davidson’s theory of 
communicative interaction, prior theory anticipates (but cannot account for) passing 
theory, how others actually do interpret our discourse. Davidson’s theory of 
communicative interaction has been interpreted by anumber of post-process theorists 
who clearly explain the difference between prior and passing theories, so I will simply 
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point out here that for Davidson successful communication boils down to coherence, the 
convergence and sharing of meaning, and this requirs successful hermeneutic guessing.4  
To put this differently, successful communication occurs when two or more 
interlocutors can anticipate how others will use gestures (like words) to mean. It is 
through the constant process of adjusting both our words and how we take these words to 
mean that prior theories converge into passing theories. As Stephen Yarbrough explains 
the process,  
 
Triangulation refers to the response and counter-response of (minimally) two 
interlocutors to a third object that both can come to identify as the “common cause” 
of their respective responses. This process of trial and error, vision and revision, 
action and reaction, allows the interlocutors’ responses to ‘converge’ upon a common 
cause. Moreover, this process of learning together w at things are is the same process 
as learning what the words that refer to those things mean”. (“On the Very Idea” 495) 
 
 
To therefore say that the most important object of inquiry is the paralogic 
hermeneutic process is to suggest that students of writing should be invested in the 
deliberate examination of how discourse works on the level of hermeneutics. In other 
words, when writers can come to terms with the reality that our language is inherently 
unstable, that our words and how we deploy them can never be fixed so as to ensure 
successful future communication, that we are always h ving to adjust our prior theories, 
then they are better prepared to rhetorically engage the “processes,” or rather “acts” of 
composition. As Yarbrough might suggest, they are better prepared to rhetorically engage 
what he calls the phases of discourse, his reinterpretation of how the traditional rhetorical 
appeals of logos, ethos, and pathos can be explained within an interactionist rhetorical 
framework.  
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As an example of how to emphasize the paralogic hermeneutic process that accounts 
for our discourse, Yarbrough’s rendering of the rhetorical appeals is quite useful on a 
pedagogical level. For many teachers of writing, the r etorical appeals often get rendered 
in our teaching as interchangeable parts of discourse; Yarbrough uses the production of 
car as an ongoing example of this kind of thinking. As he explains,  
 
the assumption seems to be that the associations among thought, emotion, and ethics 
are merely coincidental—much as one might assume that a car’s color, shape, and 
material are coincidental—and that one might well alter an argument’s ethical appeal 
without affecting its rational or emotional appeal—just as one might alter a car’s 
color without affecting its shape or material. (491)  
 
 
Using interactional rhetorical theory, Yarbrough explains why this assumption is 
incorrect and explains that our communication is an ongoing process, that we use 
discourse to interrupt, alter, and redirect. When our discourse is viewed as a unitary 
process, we can think of the rhetorical appeals as representing phases through which our 
gestures and words are made meaningful. Calling these the cognitive, ethical 
apperceptive, and affective phases, Yarbrough explains how we converge on meanings 
through this hermeneutic process of adjusting prior theories (the cognitive phases), but 
the topical relationships that condition perspective, “how we relate to things” (the ethical 
phase), often must be altered to adjust to broken expectations “either about how our 
interlocutors will interact with things with words, or about how things will interact with 
us” (the affective phase). He explains that if our expectations were never broken in our 
discursive interactions, “if everyone thought and spoke as we do, and if we were gods 
who could rightly predict the behavior of all things all the time—we would never 
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experience emotion” (502, 503). Even though this is a quick summary of Yarbrough’s 
take on the rhetorical appeals, it nevertheless preents one way teachers of writing can 
teach students about the paralogic hermeneutic process through which we communicate. 
Having an explanation for how to think about the rhtorical appeals as interrelated 
phases of our discourse instead of as a set of interchangeable parts obviously yields 
pedagogical appeal since, for me at least, I want my students to think rhetorically about 
their writing without reducing the rhetorical appeals to qualities we use to dress up a text. 
Extending his car metaphor, Yarbrough explains that discourse  
 
is not some thing that can be broken into parts and put together again like a car. 
Discourse is an intervention in an ongoing, complex, but normally habitual process. 
Writing is more like driving a car than building one. (508-09)  
 
 
So when it comes to locating the paralogic hermeneutic process as the most important 
object of inquiry in a composition course, this simply means that in all of our 
explanations and responses, in our assignments and discussions, writing is never treated 
like a closed system. In fact, when it comes to the teaching of writing, Davidson’s 
concept of prior theory, just like Yarbrough’s rendring of the rhetorical appeals, can be 
adjusted to denote those ideas with which we use to anticipate how our composing will 
work, what will be required in order to render whatever words we believe will become 
effective written discourse.  
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Our written discourse is a form of communicative interaction, subject to the same 
contingencies as all discourse. 
Obviously related to the above discussion of the paralogic hermeneutic process, this 
second guideline underscores the fact that our written discourse operates the same way as 
our spoken discourse, according to the principles of communicative interaction, a fact 
that many teachers of writing either do not understand or have never carefully considered. 
One of the potential hazards of an over-determined process pedagogy is that students 
never have the opportunity to reflect on and subsequently incorporate this knowledge 
about communicative interaction into their understanding of writing. From an externalist 
perspective, when the subject of writing is presented as a closed epistemological system, 
a student might come to conceptually separate written discourse from other forms of 
communication, what no doubt contributes to many forms of “writer’s block” and other 
instances of stymied discourse. As Reed Way Dasenbrock notes,  
 
An author’s understanding of what the words he or she uses is never perfectly 
matched by a reader’s, and, therefore, theories that posit such a shared understanding 
as necessary for communication aren’t going to work f  writing. (“A Response” 524-
25) 
 
 
In the end, teachers need to emphasize that writing, speaking, and even reading are all 
forms of the same hermeneutic process, which post-pr cess theorists account for using 
paralogic hermeneutics. 
Thomas Kent suggests that an externalist pedagogy supports the following claims, 
ones that exclusively point to the work of communicative interaction:  
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(1) writing and reading are kinds of communicative int raction; (2) communicative 
interaction requires triangulation; (3) triangulation requires us to make hermeneutic 
guesses about how others will interpret our utterances; (4) the process we employ to 
make our hermeneutic guesses cannot be codified; (5) consequently, no system or 
framework theory can predict in advance how utterances will be interpreted; (6) 
therefore, neither writing nor reading can be reduc to a systemic process or to a 
codifiable set of conventions. (Paralogic 161) 
 
 
Kent follows these claims with the stipulation that even though things like grammar, 
paragraph cohesion, and so forth are often codified into conventions of discourse and 
useful as “background knowledge,” such conventions by themselves are not sufficient for 
communicative interaction. As Kastman Breuch points out, Kent “does not suggest that 
teaching writing is impossible; he suggests that teching writing as a system is 
impossible” (123). The pedagogical takeaway of understanding that our written discourse 
is a form of communicative interaction can therefor be developed into a continual 
commitment to highlight the contingencies of our discursive conventions.  
The most effective writers are those who can anticipate the prior theories of their 
readers and adjust their written discourse accordingly. 
As is my intention, I hope this tentative discussion of an externalist writing pedagogy 
shows that hardly any radical adjustment is required in how many of us probably already 
conceptualize the work of teaching writing. Perhaps thi  third guideline is the one that 
most reflects the reality that a non-foundational writing pedagogy does not dismantle 
commonsense knowledge about composition. Just as we must continually adjust our 
discourse with interlocutors so as to promote the convergence of passing theories, so too 
does our writing require constant hermeneutic guessing that anticipates how others will 
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read our words. To write effectively, then, requires that we correctly anticipate how an 
audience is prepared to interpret our discourse.  
From James Kinneavy’s articulation of the “modes” of discourse, to Linda Flower’s 
distinction between writer-based and reader-based prose; from Peter Elbow’s conception 
of private writing, to Mike Rose’s analysis of the “language of exclusion”; from 
Jacqueline Jones Royster’s meditation on voice, to Nancy Sommers study of response 
“between the drafts,” scholars in composition have lways emphasized in one way or 
another the importance of anticipating an audience for one’s writing. But in a similar way 
to how Yarbrough makes an argument against treating the rhetorical appeals as 
interchangeable building blocks, so too can we think about audience from an 
interactionist perspective. Many students of writing get introduced to the rhetorical 
triangle in composition courses, that figure which connects the idea of an audience to a 
writer/speaker and a text/discourse. Certainly there is heuristic value in utilizing the 
rhetorical triangle to isolate certain elements of a rhetorical situation to better understand 
the situation, but each of these elements can easily be misrepresented as different parts of 
our discourse if the three corners of the rhetorical tri ngle get emphasized more than the 
lines that connect them. In other words, the heuristic value of the rhetorical triangle is 
located in its ability to illustrate how one’s conception of a speaker, for example, affects 
that discourse’s intended audience, which in turn simultaneously influences how we 
conceptualize the content of a discourse itself.  
It is valuable then to encourage students to develop a healthy conception of what an 
effective writer does as a means to illustrate that t ere is no body of knowledge or 
 
 213
specifically defined skill set that can ever be mastered on our way to becoming better 
writers. In her discussion about a writer’s agency i  her essay in Post-Process Theory, 
Barbara Couture contends that actualizing  
 
personal agency is a constant process of matching available expressive resources with 
our design for our own lives, of adjusting to those resources, and of noting how they 
coincide with or differ from our intended expression. (44) 
 
 
Using Charles Altieri’s understanding of what he calls “willful acts,” Couture suggests 
that we conceptualize writing, i.e., the inscription f discourse, as a form of design that 
experiments with writing skills that get developed through emulation of “recognized 
discourse practices.” As she continues,  
 
The process of achieving alignment with certain recognized discourse practices, for 
instance, discourse styles and ways of knowing, involves choosing what to value on 
the basis of some formula for one’s own happiness, idealizing that choice, and then 
negotiating that choice with others to see it realized within our lives. (43, 44) 
 
 
 In short, we might say that effective writers learn to anticipate the prior theories they 
read in “recognized discourse practices” and through negotiation of these prior theories 
through activities like rereading, revision, and peer review, we attempt to “realize” our 
discursive expression in text. 
The catch here, however, is that from a non-foundation l perspective there can never 
be “correct” ways of adjusting our discourse for an audience. That is, making appeals to 
grammar or certain conventions of academic discourse as the “right” way of doing things 
in our writing misrepresents the rhetorical nature of our communication. As I constantly 
tell my own students, when it comes to rhetoric andthe principles of communicative 
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interaction, our writing can never be “good” (a relative marker of value) because at best it 
can only be effective (at communicating the meaning we intend an audience to 
understand).  
The most effective assignments are those that require creative experimentation with 
discursive conventions. 
“In emphasizing the mutability of our prior understanding,” explains Dasenbrock, 
“Davidson establishes creativity and innovation at the very heart of communication” (“A 
Response” 525). When teachers of writing continually direct the attention of their 
students to the paralogic hermeneutic process while emphasizing that effective writers 
learn to recognize and anticipate how their written discourse is affected by the same 
interactive conditions that affect their spoken discourse, they illuminate the contingent 
operations of communicative interaction. But students are placed in composition courses  
because colleges and universities want their studen body to foster the discursive skills 
that will make them successful (usually academic) communicators, and obviously 
students can expect that in college they will have to perform discursively in ways that 
might be unfamiliar and will require the development of skills they do not yet have. 
To encourage the discursive skill set a composition teacher wants for her students, she 
obviously designs writing assignments that require students to practice these skills. But 
from an externalist perspective the most effective assignments are those that require 
creative experimentation with discursive conventions. To echo Couture’s argument that 
as agents of discourse we identify “recognized discourse conventions” in which to 
develop our communicative skills, so too must compositionists identify “recognized 
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discourse conventions” for their students to emulate and with which to experiment. As 
Dasenbrock notes, “We attain our own voice, a Davidsonian approach to usage suggests, 
not by slavishly following nor by desperately avoiding received conventions, but by 
playing off them” (525). I have no stake in making an argument about what types of 
discourse conventions, “modes” of argument, styles of writing, and the like should be 
included in the teaching of a composition course; in fact, attempting such an argument 
would run counter to the provisions of an externalist writing pedagogy offered here. What 
matters, however, is that students are given ample space and time to experiment with 
conventions of discourse in order to recognize how conventions of discourse are 
contingent and interactive. By this latter term, interactive, I mean that when it comes to 
communicative interaction we are always engaging others through our use of discourse 
even when those others are not immediately present or physically identifiable. Discursive 
conventions are conventions because other discourses initiated them and still others 
emulate them, and thus writers can benefit from experimenting with such conventions as 
a means of honing their hermeneutic guessing. As David Foster reminds us, “Language is 
the source of conventions, not the result of them, and they come to light only in the act of 
language making” (“Contingency” 152). Or as Matthew Heard has observed, it is 
necessary “to emphasize conventions and strategies as active, living prior theories 
gathered from real interaction between writers and u iences” (295). While certainly 
teachers might value certain conventions of discourse over others in the writing 
classroom, what makes an assignment effective is how and to what extent it asks students 
to play with these conventions as a means of developing their prior theories about them. 
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The products students compose are only contingently valuable in relationship to the 
discursive awareness that reflection on the production of those products evidences. 
Like many of these guidelines, this last one points to what many might consider 
conventional wisdom. Process pedagogy, after all, is founded on the notion that if writers 
can reflect upon and identify the different parts of their writing processes, they are better 
positioned to intervene and remedy problems associated with writing in general. Post-
process composition theory is founded on the observation that, upon reflection, our 
communication is paralogic and thus resistant to codified criteria; it is thoroughly 
hermeneutic. At the risk of sounding aphoristic, effective writers are reflective writers. 
The longer I teach composition the less concerned I am with the final products my 
students compose; what I care about is a student’s ability to evidence knowledge about 
her writing, how it is and is not effective, and how well she can reflect upon her own 
discursive awareness of this effectiveness. In other words, it doesn’t matter, for example, 
if my students can write a summary according to whatever standards to which I imagine 
good summaries conform. What does matter is that my students can talk about what they 
did as they composed a summary, why they did it, how well it adheres to certain 
conventions, and maybe even how it could be done diff rently.  
To this end multiple and varied opportunities for discursive reflection are absolutely 
necessary if teachers want their students to understand the paralogic hermeneutic process 
that informs their communicative interactions. By discursive reflection, I simply mean 
that students consider different questions about their discourse, how it works, and why 
they write in certain ways. In fact, the questions are limitless depending on what a teacher 
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wants students to direct attention towards. No matter the specific direction teachers 
encourage reflection, students should always be prom ted to consider the how and why 
of their prior theories, how and why they have assumed their discourse will work in 
certain ways. “In my own experience,” notes Heard,  
 
I came to realize that practicing postprocess theory requires a moment-by-moment, 
class-by-class commitment to the goal of teaching writing through engagement and 
interaction. Without this commitment, instructors may find themselves slipping back 
into habits that subtly reinforce writing as a tool to be mastered. (294) 
 
 
 Addressing his role as an instructor, Heard’s observation holds true for students as well 
since they, too, often conceptualize writing as a tool. What he calls a “moment-by-
moment, class-by-class” commitment to engagement and interaction is where discursive 
reflection is most important. Many standard elements of composition courses, such as 
instructor feedback, peer-review, and one-on-one coferencing represent “passing 
moments,” as Heard suggests, “where the prior theories f students and teacher meet, and 
create new discourse that in turn affects the prior theories of both parties” (297). 
Discursive reflection in this case means that we pause to reflect upon the passing theories 
of our discourse in retrospect as a means for revising these prior theories in anticipation 
of their future deployment.  
**** 
 
I suggest that opportunities for discursive reflection should be multiple and varied 
because the overall experience of reflection is most effective when we have multiple 
perspectives through which to evaluate our discourse. In a composition course, discursive 
reflection can be encouraged through formal and informal writing assignments, various 
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forms of group interaction, different types of rhetorical analysis, peer-review reflections, 
individual and group conferencing, and, for which I will make a case below, collaborative 
writing. Some might suggest that valuing the discurive awareness students develop 
through reflection on the processes and products of their writing is undercut by the reality 
of assigning grades, which of course must be calculted according to whatever (arbitrary) 
standards of evaluation we use to assess student performance. But as Heard suggests, 
“grading does not necessarily paralyze students’ development of metacognitive 
awareness within a postprocess environment,” and he credits the discursive space created 
during conferences as evidence. He notes,  
 
I came to understand that the most helpful and authentically postprocess moments 
during the quarter ultimately took place during one-on-one conferences, wherein 
individual students and I collaborated to solve the problems that were affecting their 
writing.(298) 
 
 
In other words, the metacognitive reflection that occurs during one-on-one conferences is 
how, for Heard at least, he came to value post-process theory pedagogically. “My 
students commented that the time spent in individual conferences was the most 
productive and useful activity for them during the quarter,” Heard concludes, “and their 
comments altogether credit the postprocess claim that learning takes place through the 
kind of collaborative negotiation that postprocess mbraces and that these conferences 
enabled” (298-99). 
It is not coincidental that Heard references collabr tion twice in the conclusion of 
his essay; indeed he credits the “collaborative negotiation” fostered in student 
conferences as evidence of how post-process theory can productively inform a non-
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foundational writing pedagogy. But as Heard notes, his students say they most benefited 
as writers in these conferences, confessing that these valuable interactions between he 
and his students were significantly limited in comparison to the time these students 
actually spent in class. Therefore, I believe fostering opportunities for sustained 
collaboration, like the kind of collaboration that Heard shared with his students, can 
benefit students of writing in ways that exemplify the guidelines of an externalist writing 
pedagogy that I have been suggesting.  
Collaboration and Externalist Pedagogy 
In response to the consideration of whether an externalist writing pedagogy is 
experientially possible, I wish to continue my discu sion of collaboration by explicitly 
connecting it to post-process philosophy. The externalist theory of collaboration this 
dissertation develops is linked most directly to post-process in my suggestion that we 
cannot predetermine the outcomes of successful collaboration, at least not when it comes 
to material production. The same applies for composition when informed by post-
process: there is no generic system of criteria that can be met to ensure an effective 
written text. Collaboration points to a discursive relationship fostered by individuals who 
want to engage in novel discourse; it is not a neutral method for mediating the epistemic 
workings of a discourse community. As a technology for rhetorical invention and 
intervention, collaboration is valuable for the ways in which individuals come together to 
foster reflexive dialogue. Collaboration is a non-frmulaic process of interaction 
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discoursers must deliberately initiate and carefully reflect upon in order to pragmatically 
test the effectiveness of their discourse. 
As I pointed to above, Matthew Heard’s appeal to collab ration is the most effective 
method through which to pedagogically enact the principles of post-process theory. I 
want to mention several other scholars who have reached similar conclusions. In 
Fragments of Rationality, Lester Faigley says that at least since the late nin teenth 
century, “college writing teachers have been heavily invested in the stability of the self 
and the attendant beliefs that writing can be a means of self-discovery and intellectual 
self-realization,” and this continues to be the case, “even at a time when extensive group 
collaboration is practiced in many classrooms” (15). In “Paralogic Hermeneutics and the 
Possibilities of Rhetoric,” Kent points to the preponderance of “monologic writing” in 
composition courses, writing that “always stops” and “ ever engages the other in open-
ended dialogue and collaboration” (38). This latter ype of writing, what Kent calls 
“dialogic writing,” occurs “when students enter into collaborative—and therefore 
hermeneutic—interaction with the other” (37). For David Foster, collaboration is the 
perfect method for negotiating the discursive conflicts that concern the ethical demands 
of teaching writing. “The turn toward the social and the emphasis on difference create 
unpredictable, often unstable interactions that can often lead to conflicts.” Conflict, he 
says, is more than the petty clashing of opinion, “I mean the collision of divergent 
attitudes, values, judgments, and personal temperaments compounded in any classroom 
group dedicated to recognizing difference” (150). Following the lead of David Bleich, 
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Foster believes that students and teachers must carefully engage conflict through dialogue 
and sensitive forms of disclosure via collaborative discourse. 
The only limitations to connecting collaboration to p st-process composition theory is 
that no one has yet considered with any detail what collaboration might mean when it 
informs a post-process perspective. That is, even though Heard, Faigley, Kent, and Foster 
all point to collaboration as a productive mode of inquiry in a writing classroom, none of 
them tease out what they mean by collaboration as such. Indeed, post-process theorists as 
a whole have failed to consider the pedagogical impications of post-process through a 
externalist explanation of collaboration. More than twenty years ago, Lisa Ede and 
Andrea Lunsford, anticipating Faigley’s similar observation in Fragments of Rationality, 
reminded the field of composition in their book Singular Texts/Plural Authors how 
“collaborative learning theory has from its inception failed to challenge traditional 
concepts of individualism and ownership of ideas and has operated primarily in 
traditional ways.” They continue, “Students may work together on revising or on problem 
solving, but when they write, they typically write alone in settings structured and 
governed by a teacher/authority in whom power is vested” (118). Ede and Lunsford 
challenged the discipline to experiment with extended collaborative writing in the 
classroom, especially in ways that substantially undercut the privileging of single-
authored texts. In addition, this challenge is bolstered by the post-process indictment of 
product-centered pedagogy that places ultimate value on the material inscriptions that 
students produce despite process rhetoric that asserts otherwise. 
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But what does collaboration look like from a pedagogical perspective, especially 
when we give authority to students over the direction of their collaboration? Ede and 
Lunsford resist outlining definitive guidelines for collaborative writing because they 
believe such outlining would undermine the spirit of c llaborative inquiry to widen the 
potential for discursive novelty; it would undercut, as they put it, our ability to 
“problematize both theory and practice” (122). Neverth less, they do offer some guiding 
principles for teachers who want to experiment with a collaborative writing assignment:  
 
Poor collaborative writing assignments are artificial in the sense that one person could 
really complete the assignment alone: such assignments l ad only to busy work and 
frustration…. [They] also fail to provide guidelines for students about the processes 
they might best use to complete the assignment effectively. Students are simply 
assigned a topic or a project and abandoned to negotiate the minefield of 
interpersonal and group processes.(123) 
 
 
Certainly Ede and Lunsford are correct in their asses ment that instructors should 
provide helpful strategies for students to negotiate the intersections of their collaboration 
with one another, but to say that to do otherwise means casting students aside, 
abandoning them in the “minefield of interpersonal and group processes,” seems like an 
overstatement. From the perspective of an externalist theory of collaboration, this is what 
students should be doing when they engage each other through a collaborative writing 
assignment. That is, when teachers leave collaborative writers on their own, they have the 
opportunity to create and develop the discursive relationship necessary to engage in 
successful collaborative writing in the first place. Certainly they should be given 
direction and even resources to understand their discursive engagement (such as 
collaborative heuristics, for example), but jumping  to their collaboration and learning 
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on the fly is necessary for that reflexive dialogue to organically grow out of this 
interaction. So where Ede and Lunsford are right is in their suggestion that teachers 
should provide collaborative writers, especially inexperienced ones, with pedagogical 
coaching, or as they say, some “guidelines for students about the processes they might 
best use to complete the assignment effectively.” To this end, John Pell and I have 
written a forthcoming essay for college students about collaborative writing, one that 
offers novice collaborative writers twelve different heuristic, process-oriented strategies 
for actually engaging in the work of collaborative writing, but as an advocate of post-
process composition theory I certainly won’t hold up these strategies as the only 
strategies teachers might use to instruct students about collaborative writing.5 Unlike the 
advice of Ede and Lunsford, I suggest there is tremendous value in letting new 
collaborative writers struggle with the various frustrations they are sure to experience. 
Moreover, I don’t believe that a collaborative writing assignment need be any different 
from a non-collaborative writing assignment. If collaboration with another student is 
presented as an option on an assignment, no special rules or requirements need apply as 
far as the assignment details are concerned. The purpose of collaborative writing from a 
pedagogical standpoint is to heighten the experience of composition; a bad collaborative 
writing assignment would probably still be bad even if there was no collaborative 
requirement. In other words, instructors need not believe that some extra element should 
be included to make a collaborative writing assignme t somehow truly “collaborative.” 
To suggest that such elements exist, moreover, is to fall back on an arbitrary material 
division between collaboratively composed and single-authored texts. 
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I have suggested that we can use an externalist theory of collaboration to demonstrate 
how collaboration itself, especially collaborative writing, can be deployed productively as 
a working model of what a non-foundationalist writing pedagogy might look like in 
practice. To briefly return to the guidelines presented in the last section, I will draw a few 
connections between those and the working tenets of an externalist theory of 
collaboration that were developed at the end of Chapter Four. Now slightly amended for 
brevity, those tenets are: 
1.   Collaboration refers to the dynamic commitment between two or more 
individuals to engage in reflexive dialogue in order to anticipate novel discourse. 
2.   Collaborators negotiate the ethical spaces of their collaboration through concerted 
efforts recognize, retrace, and reengage moments of di cursive novelty. 
3.   The primary purpose of collaboration is discursive, to anticipate novel discourse, 
so collaboration may or may not result in material production. 
4.   Collaborators attempt to transform and transgress the imagined limits of their 
discursive inquiry, which requires both a commitment to think alongside another 
person while consciously shaping effective discourse. 
These tenets nicely complement the guidelines for an externalist writing pedagogy 
through a relatively focused articulation of what collaborators might do when they make 
the paralogic hermeneutic process the primary object of their inquiry. As I suggested in 
Chapter Three, reflexive dialogue requires interlocut rs to consider their own position as
interlocutors in response to each other; it requires them to think about their discourse as 
discourse; it opens opportunities, in other words, to identify and examine the paralogic 
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hermeneutic effects that have influenced the progression of their discourse. Moreover, 
while I have already explained how we might conceptualize the idea of novel discourse 
within an externalist theory of collaboration, I think there is heuristic potential in thinking 
about how the anticipation of passing theory—as yet arrived at interpretations—might 
also help us to define novel discourse for students in a pedagogically accessible manner.  
To recognize how writing is subject to the same ruls and contingencies of all 
communicative interaction, the work of collaboration, especially collaborative writing, is 
one method through which to encourage students to make this connection on their own. 
Collaborative writing requires a healthy combination of talking and writing with another 
person. While certainly collaborative writers at some points will write separately, they 
nevertheless must talk through their writing as they craft text that reflects their shared 
discourse. The more (and varied) opportunities teach rs can provide for collaborative 
writers to experiment with the simultaneity of speaking/writing, the more “real” writing 
becomes for students as a form of communicative interac ion, one that requires the same 
kinds of hermeneutic guessing they perform in throughout their day-to-day interaction 
with the world. And this holds true when we consider the third guidelines for a non-
foundational writing pedagogy, that effective writers can both anticipate the prior theories 
of their readers and adjust their written discourse accordingly. Collaborative writers have 
the very intimate spaces of their discursive relationship in which to test out these prior 
theories on each other; they have more freedom and an increased potential to hone their 
skills at this kind of deliberate hermeneutic guessing.  
 
 226
Collaboration also provides the discursive space in which students can experiment 
with various conventions of discourse, the fourth guideline, through the anticipation of 
novel discourse that an externalist theory of collabor tion stipulates. The last guideline, 
that the products students compose are less important th n the discursive awareness that 
results from reflection on the production of those products, resonates with all four tenets 
above because it is through reflection that we construct experience, and it is through the 
accumulation of experience that we establish the working knowledge from which to 
shape and anticipate things like prior theories, for example, or the discursive awareness 
that allows us to name the novel qualities of our discourse.  
So to ask, then, a direct question: Is collaboration teachable? The answer, like the 
question posed to post-process theorists about whether writing is teachable, is both yes 
and no. Post-process theorists assert that writing is ot teachable if we conceptualize 
writing as a body of knowledge that operates according to its own epistemological 
systems. On the other hand, we can certainly “teach” conventions of discourse, naming 
them as conventions, but teaching certain conventions of discourse does not mean that we 
are teaching writing, at least when writing is presented as something with its own 
“thingness.” Similarly, if collaboration is broken down and presented as a series of 
discreet steps that collaborators follow to actually collaborate, collaboration is certainly 
not teachable since collaboration as such does not exist. There is no right or wrong way 
to collaboratively foster the reflexive dialogue collaborators share, nor is there a right or 
wrong way to identify the novel discourse collaborat s anticipate, for this is what 
collaborators must do themselves as a function of their discursive commitment to each 
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other. So just as post-process theorists insist that writing cannot be reduced into a “how 
to” mode of discourse, so too does an externalist theory of collaboration resist such 
reduction. Furthermore, just as post-process theorists use externalist philosophy to 
explain the paralogic hermeneutic character of communicative interaction, an externalist 
theory of collaboration simply explains how this communicative interaction functions for 
individuals who enter into a collaborative relationship.  
An important observation about my discussion of collaboration and post-process 
composition theory is that I have resisted discussing with any detail what these things 
might look like by way of concrete, road-tested examples. That is, while I have 
mentioned a few ways in which to enact collaboration and practice the values espoused 
by a non-foundational writing pedagogy, I have at best only pointed in certain directions 
when it comes to the development of actual assignments, activities, discussions, and 
everything else for which as teachers we are responsible for planning, implementing, and 
assessing in the classroom. But this is purposeful, because as a theorist of collaboration, 
one who values externalist, non-foundational values, I don’t want to tell teachers what to 
teach. The externalist theory of collaboration I offer is meant to initiate discussion about 
how we conceptualize the work of composition, in addition to what it means to actually 
share work in the work of composition. I think of myself as both a realist and an idealist 
when it comes to collaboration and the teaching of composition, and in this way I 
recognize that collaboration cannot completely remodel how we teach composition in the 
university; however, I do believe that as a discipline rhetoric and composition can 
embrace something like a collaborative ethic, one that encourages instructors to 
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experiment with extended collaboration while making good on the challenge set forward 
more than two decades ago by Ede and Lunsford, two teachers of writing who have 
certainly established their collaborative work as a resolute testament to the pedagogical 
value of collaboration. Byron Stay observes, however, that to be “successful” 
collaborative writers like Ede and Lunsford “require[s] a level of sophistication and 
commitment not easily transferred to the classroom, and the success of these teams does 
not mean that classroom co-authorship is either possible or desirable” (43). Certainly 
Stay is correct, since after all, collaborative writers who have had success like Ede and 
Lunsford have also had decades to hone the sophisticat on of their collaborative voice. 
But I would argue the only difference between the reflexive dialogue that two freshmen 
writers create together and the reflexive dialogue shared by collaborators like Ede and 
Lunsford is simply a matter of degree.  
Coda: Why Teach What is Not Teachable? 
With an externalist theory of collaboration the theory/practice debate that exists 
between process and post-process thought dissolves into questions about how students 
might come together collaboratively to negotiate thir prior theories of discourse and 
writing, anticipating these expectations and finding ways to effectively render text. My 
arguments have been primarily theoretical, taken from interactionist rhetorical theory, 
pragmatist philosophy, and the limited scholarship on post-process pedagogy that the 
field of composition has produced. Understandably, some compositionists resist 
capitulating to theory that might seem completely untenable pedagogically, theory that 
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leads teachers down a “hall of mirrors,” to echo the title of an essay about non-
foundationalist philosophy and composition pedagogy by David Smit. As he writes, 
proponents of non-foundationalist philosophy (he uss the term “anti-foundationalism”),  
 
often seem to imply that our language and knowledge of the world is an infinite hall 
of mirrors, in which diction and syntax, rules of grammar, the neurological structure 
of the human mind, and what we call reality reflect one another with no ultimate 
source of all the shifting mirror images. (36) 
 
 
Smit projects what is an understandable frustration towards such theory because, as he 
explains, if theory “is to have any relevance to comp sition and rhetoric, it must offer 
some convincing suggestions about how we ought to teach writing, suggestions which 
seem to be organic or integral to the theory” (41).  
Like so many others, Smit divides a line between theory and practice, how we think 
and what we do. Such a perspective obviously has seriou  consequences for the prospects 
of something like post-process composition theory or my own externalist theory of 
collaboration. But Smit makes an interesting observation, one that is certainly worth 
consideration when weighting the potentialities of an externalist writing pedagogy even if 
we have theory that “seems to accurately describe some aspect of the way language 
works or the way language reflects the material world, it does not necessarily follow that 
the best way to teach is to model instruction after that theory.” He continues,  
 
A certain state of affairs may not necessarily be the best model for how to teach 
others about that state of affairs. Similarly, a certain kind of behavior may be the goal 
of instruction, but simply having students engage in that behavior may not necessarily 
be the best way to teach it. (45-46) 
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My externalist theory of collaboration is certainly implicated by Smit’s observation since, 
after all, my advice has been (to a certain extent) “engage in that behavior” of 
collaboration as a means of learning what collaboration is and how to manipulate it. On 
the other hand, I’ve also used this chapter to consider how post-process pedagogy might 
help us conceptualize collaboration pedagogically.  
On the flipside, an externalist theory of collaboration also informs why post-process 
is not “anti-process.” While post-process philosophy is important because it underscores 
the instability of discourse, process thinking is helpful in the way that it can help us 
historicize our understanding of how particular texts we have composed came into being, 
and in this way process thought helps to widen our awareness of our passing experiences 
with writing. That is, it can help us to better understand how our expectations were both 
met and had to be revised during the actual acts of composing. In this way, process theory 
is helpful because it provides us with a vocabulary fo  breaking down our experience by, 
however arbitrarily, identifying the various stances we assume in the process of 
composing. We develop prior theories through experience, through observing how our 
meanings get conveyed and understood in passing. In this way, we can view language as 
a kind of theory, a set of hermeneutic expectations t  rely on as prior theories, but ones 
that must be adjusted to enact passing theories. Certainly a responsible composition 
teacher knows, and makes sure students know, that what they write will be interpreted 
according to certain expectations and conventions, but the existence of expectations and 
conventions does no dictate what those students can or should actually write.  
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If on the surface an externalist writing pedagogy supports the post-process idea that 
there is nothing to teach when teaching writing, i.e., there is no static body of knowledge 
that constitutes “writing” that can be transferred from context to context or spliced into 
tip sheets or skill sets, then one obvious limitation to an externalist writing pedagogy is 
that “writing” becomes a consequence, an activity, something we do in response to some 
exigency. That is, the subject of a composition becomes the study of one’s writing, for 
example, not a study in how to write. This might seem a fuzzy distinction, but it is an 
important one. Surely even the staunchest anti-pedagogues among us will concede that 
even if composition teachers cannot teach students how to write, they can certainly help 
students understand their writing.  
But the perceived limitations of an externalist writing pedagogy might well be viewed 
as potential advantages when we come to terms with what it means to actually privilege 
process over product. Another way of putting this is that what post-process theory does in 
terms of pedagogy is to actually spell out the implcations of truly valuing the writing 
process, whatever we take that to mean, over the products of writing, whatever material 
inscriptions this process yields. Process pedagogy was supposed to wrest the authority of 
discourse from the hands of teachers and give it over to students as a way for them to 
actualize their agency as writers, but that never really happened. “At best students are in 
apprenticeship to authority,” explain Ede and Lunsford when discussing how students 
often get situated as subjects in composition courses, “they do not help constitute it” 
(Singular 119). As Dobrin notes, moreover, in every instance of communicative 
interaction, “no matter how adept a participant is in his or her hermeneutic guessing 
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skills, issues of power affect the manner in which triangulation occurs” (143). Post-
process theory therefore might account for how discourse really works, but it cannot 
ameliorate the issues of authority about which process and post-process scholars alike 
might raise concern. In collaborative writing, at least when conceptualized from an 
externalist perspective, there are no right or prope  methods through which collaborators 
must compose. Collaborative writers become their own authority, which is to say that 
collaborative writers appeal to each other as an authority for negotiating the direction of 
their inventive discourse and how it will be rendered into textual form.  
Collaborative writing is pedagogically valuable because it requires constant 
hermeneutic negotiation between collaborators, not o ly to understand each other, but 
also how to understand their discourse as it gets inscribed into text. In other words, 
collaborative writing requires individuals to reflect on their communicative interaction on 
a number of levels, including the level of diagnosig what is and is not working within 
the development of a text. But more than that, the communicative interaction that 
collaborative writers enter into has the potential for making them better communicators 
in general, better hermeneutic guessers, because to successfully write collaboratively 
requires special sensitivity to the unstable and unpredictable ways language works in the 
first place. According to Dobrin, composition instruction is at its best when students 
“become participants in communication [as opposed to mere transmitters]; they must 
constantly engage in developing the skills needed to be adept triangulators” (144). Again, 
here we see how post-process theory makes room to argue the case for an externalist 
approach to collaboration, since what successful collab rative writers do—what makes 
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them successful anticipators of novel discourse—is founded on a discursive relationship 
created to experiment with, test, and transgress the limits of their shared discursive 
inquiry, what, in other words, they are capable of xpressing together in discourse. As 
Yarbrough notes,  
 
The communication process is one of interlocutors c ming together toward a single 
way of talking about a single world. Said in pedagogical terms, the more we learn 
from the other the more we can teach to the other—so long as what we are trying to 
teach and learn is something that actually exists, something we can triangulate, not 
language, conventions, ideas, or anything else we imagine might lie between 
ourselves and the world we come to share. (After 183) 
 
 
Of course, even if things like language, conventions, ideas and what not lack an 
ontological existence that separates discoursers into multiple worlds, one’s belief in such 
things is certainly a belief that must be accounted for, something Yarbrough would 
concede since he has noted the same observation. With that said, using ideas about the 
rules of language, conventions of discourse, and how writing is a process all as prior 
theories with which to experiment does not mean that as teachers of writing we will 
necessarily reduce the paralogic hermeneutic act into stubborn systems of codified rules. 
Indeed, if we take post-process theory seriously then at best all we can do is anticipate 
how our students will interpret our teaching in theactual moments of this engagement.  
The important work, the real work, is all in how wechoose to respond.  
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Notes 
 
 
1. Lee-Ann M. Kastman Breuch offers a concise review of post-process composition 
theory in her essay. “Post-Process ‘Pedagogy’: A Philosophical Exercise”; Helen Foster 
offers a substantially longer history of the division between process and post-process 
history in her book Networked Process: Dissolving Boundaries of Process and Post-
Process. 
2. Yarbrough talks about incommensurability at length in the Introduction to After 
Rhetoric.  
3. Faigley calls Bruffee an anti-foundationalist in Fragments of Rationality, as does 
Fish in “Anti-Foundationalism, Theory Hope, and theTeaching of Composition.” 
4. For a clear articulation of what Kent means by “hermeneutic guessing,” see his 
“Externalism and the Production of Discourse.” 
5. Our essay, titled “Inventing Texts Together: The Practice of Collaborative 
Writing,” breaks down collaborative writing into three phases: approaching, listening, 
and translating. In our discussion of each phase, we supply specific process strategies for 
students to work within each phase. At present we have just pulled the piece from a 
forthcoming collection on the teaching of writing in the first-year course (because the 
editors wanted us to make changes that would flatten th  externalist quality of our 
instruction, thus rendering the piece into a safer nd, we feel, pointless essay). We are 
now shopping the piece around for a new home.  
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